लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी
L.B.S National Academy of Administration
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE
पुस्तकालय
LIBRARY

अवाप्ति संख्या
Accession No. 100138.
वर्ग संख्या
Class No. 109
पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. Boy

GL 109
BOY
100138
LBSNAA

Highways of Philosophy

HIGHWAYS *of* PHILOSOPHY

by

Merle William Boyer

MUHLENBERG PRESS PHILADELPHIA

COPYRIGHT, 1949, BY
MUHLENBERG PRESS

Printed in U. S. A.
UB679

To

MY MOST STIMULATING CRITICS

THE EX-GI'S OF MY CLASSES

Preface

This book is the result of the author's efforts to present philosophy to college students. It is hoped that the book will be useful to the layman in philosophy whether he be a college student or a curious citizen outside academic circles. Indirectly, the book may serve as a handbook for the Christian who wishes to investigate the central problems of existence from a point of view that aims to be both philosophical and Christian.

Teachers are aware that no textbook can guarantee a successful course in philosophy. We must depend on the professor to offer illustrations, sidelines of discussion, criticism, additional material. We must depend upon the student to go to the original source material. He must read the philosophers. To that end we have added a bibliography in the Appendix listing anthologies which are most readily available in libraries, together with a bibliography of the most important works of the philosophers mentioned in the text.

Table of Contents

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF PHILOSOPHY 3
Some Reasons for Studying Philosophy
Philosophy Defined
The Task before Us

II. THE HIGHWAYS OF PHILOSOPHY 18
Logic: Thinking about the Tools of Philosophy
Epistemology or Theory of Knowledge: Thinking about the Adequacy of Thinking
Cosmology: Thinking about Nature
Ethics: Thinking about Man as a Moral Creature
Philosophy of History: Thinking about Man as a Social Creature
Aesthetics: Thinking about Man as a Creature of Sensations
Philosophy of Religion: Thinking about God
Metaphysics
Axiology or Theory of Value
Conclusion: Selecting a Route

PART TWO

THE TOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY—THINKING ABOUT THINKING

III. LANGUAGE AS A TOOL FOR PHILOSOPHY 37
Why the Philosopher Is Interested in Language
Pitfalls of Language
A. Language Misused because It Is an Imperfect Instrument
B. Misuse of Language because of Biased Self-Interest
Methods for Clarifying Language by Definition
A Note on Semiotic or Semantics as a Method for Clarifying Language

IV. OBSERVATION AS A TOOL FOR PHILOSOPHY 56
Observation as Personal Experience
A. Observation as Perception

B. Observation as Insight
C. Mystical Intuition
Observation through Group Experience—Authority
Observation as Scientific Method
A. Mill's Methods for Testing Hypotheses
B. Classification and Statistics as Aids to Observation
C. Methods for Observation in the Social Sciences

V. Reason as a Tool for Philosophy 73
The Nature of Reason
Analysis of the Process of Deductive Reasoning
False Steps in Reasoning
Reasoning by Analogy

PART THREE

LANDMARKS ON THE HIGHWAYS OF PHILOSOPHY

VI. Immanuel Kant and the Landmarks in Epistemology 89
Immanuel Kant: The Philosopher as Critic and Analyst
Landmarks in Epistemology—Types of Theory of Knowledge
A. Correspondence, Coherence, and Pragmatic Theories of Truth
B. The Quest for Truth a Joint Enterprise

VII. Socrates and Plato and the Landmarks in Ethics 104
Socrates: The Philosopher in Quest of the Good Life
A. Modern Man and the Socratic Teachings
B. Road Signs for the Ethical Reformer from the Life of Socrates
The Life and Work of Plato
Landmarks in Ethics—What Is the Supreme Good?
A. The Kingdom of God as the Supreme Good
B. Self-Adjustment as the Supreme Good
C. Self-Assertion as the Supreme Good
D. Self-Satisfaction as the Supreme Good
E. Criticisms of the Ethical Systems

VIII. Karl Marx and the Landmarks in Philosophy of History 128
Karl Marx: The Philosopher as Observer of Society
A. Some Criticisms of the Marxian Philosophy
Landmarks in Philosophy of History
A. Materialistic Philosophies of History
B. History as Determined by the Activity of Mind
C. History as Determined by Cultures as Organisms
D. History as Determined by the Will of God

IX. ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER AND THE LANDMARKS IN AESTHETICS 150
Arthur Schopenhauer: The Philosopher as Aesthete
A. Road Signs for the Aesthete from the Life of Schopenhauer
Landmarks in Aesthetics—What Is the Source of Beauty?
A. Theories Finding the Source of Beauty in Form
B. Source of Beauty as a Subjective Psychological Drive
C. Theories Finding the Source of Beauty in Social Factors

X. ARISTOTLE AND THE LANDMARKS IN COSMOLOGY . . 167
Aristotle: The Philosopher as Observer of Nature
A. Aristotle and the Basic Problems of Cosmology
Landmarks in Cosmology—The Universe Revealed by Science
A. How Explain the Process of Orderly Change?
B. Origin of the Universe and the Uniqueness of Life
C. The Nature of the Physical Universe
D. Space and Time

XI. SOREN KIERKEGAARD AND THE LANDMARKS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 185
Soren Kierkegaard: The Philosopher as Man of Decision
A. Road Signs for the Philosopher of Religion from the Life of Kierkegaard
B. Cultural Role of Philosophy of Religion as Compared with Theology
Landmarks in Philosophy of Religion—Upon What Can Man Depend?
A. God Regarded as Redeemer—Radical Theism
B. God as Ethical Order—Ethical Theism
C. God as Rational Order—Deism and Absolute Idealism
D. The Universe as God—Pantheism
E. God as Cosmic Process—Naturalism
F. God as Man's Ideals—Humanism

XII. HEGEL AND THE LANDMARKS IN METAPHYSICS . . . 208
Hegel: The Philosopher as Executive
A. The Cultural Role of the Metaphysician
Landmarks in Metaphysics—The Fortresses of the Spirit
A. Idealism—The Universe Regarded as Mind
B. Materialism—The Universe Regarded as Matter
C. Naturalism—The Universe Regarded as Organism
D. Supernaturalism—The Universe Regarded as Drama

PART FOUR

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHICAL LIVING

XIII. VALUES AND THE PHILOSOPHER AS MAN OF DECISION 233
The Importance of Axiology for Modern Philosophy
The Uniqueness of Man as a Carrier of Values

The Nature of Values
A. Value Defined
B. How Values Arise as Structures of Experience
C. How Values Are Grasped and Recognized
D. How Values Grow
E. How Values Become Organized into Systems

XIV. DECISIONS ON THE NATURE OF MAN 249
Statement of the Problem
Decisions about the Soul—What in Man Makes Him a Carrier of Values?
A. Soul as Biological Organism
B. Soul as Emanation of a World Soul
C. Soul as Reason and Will
D. Soul as Capacity for Eternal Life with God
Decisions about Freedom of the Will—Is Man Free to Create Values?

XV. DECISIONS ON THE COMMUNITY 266
Why the Philosopher is Concerned about Community Problems
Kinds of Community Advocated Today
A. The Traditional Community—Religious, National, Racial
B. The Economic Community—Capitalistic, Communistic
C. The Enlightened World Community—United Nations Program

XVI. DECISIONS ON EDUCATION 290
The Dilemma of Modern Education
Current Programs of Education
The Debate on Questions of Technique
A. Decisions on the Value of Discipline
B. Decisions on the Problem of Transfer of Training
Can Education Meet the Real Needs of Modern Civilization?

XVII. DECISIONS ON RELIGION 305
The Need for Social, Personal, and Intellectual Decisions about Religion
The Problem of Proof for God's Existence
The Problem of Evil
A. Is Evil Real or an Illusion?
B. Disvalue as Suffering and as Sin

APPENDIXES

I. AN OPEN FORUM AS A LABORATORY FOR PHILOSOPHY . . 323
II. BIBLIOGRAPHY 333

INDEX 346

PART ONE

Introduction

CHAPTER I

The Scope and Purpose of Philosophy

SOME REASONS FOR STUDYING PHILOSOPHY

"The study of philosophy has no immediate, practical value. . . . It deals with the investigation of abstruse problems . . . . Philosophers are inclined to use a vocabulary which is both complicated and confusing. . . ." There is sufficient truth in these three commonly held opinions regarding philosophy to discourage and frighten the beginning student. Consequently, most people approach the study of philosophy with set teeth, convinced that they must become very profound, very learned, very clever. If they are successful in mastering the subject, they ultimately expect to be recognized as very superior. Too often the student of philosophy feels like the inexperienced swimmer who is convinced that he must muster sufficient courage to jump off the diving board into the deep end of the pool in order to prove that he is in earnest about learning to swim.

Fortunately this procedure is not necessary. After all, the properties of water are the same at both ends of the pool. Only a very few learn to be expert swimmers and divers but most of us find that we can ultimately learn to swim quite satisfactorily by entering the water at the shallow end of the pool. We learn to swim sufficiently well to float peacefully about on a calm pool and enjoy the cool water. What is more to the point, we learn to swim sufficiently well to increase our chances for survival if our skiff capsizes in the middle of the lake. Mastering

a few elementary strokes enables us to go far in mastering our fears in an element that appears to be strange. In a similar way familiarity with the philosophical approach to life should enable us to come to terms with life with greater ease and with fewer mishaps.

The purpose of an introduction to philosophy is to encourage the reader to take up the study of philosophy by means of a technique of wading rather than a technique of high diving. The analogy breaks down, however, when we compare philosophy with the water which the bather enters by choice. There is no way by which man can choose to refrain from immersing himself in the stuff of life. No man can escape the world of nature and of human society. No man can cut himself off from the inner world of the soul. Every man must come to terms in some way or other with the elemental facts of life. Like the man in the boat, he is capsized into life.

Study of philosophy cannot assure success for every man in this situation, any more than knowledge of how to swim will assure rescue for the unfortunate boatman. The study of philosophy should, however, enable us to master our fears, since we can see how successful others have been in coming to terms with life and its mysteries. It should also teach us the basic techniques that will enable us to attain desirable ends afforded by the possibilities of life. While any man can be given instruction on how to swim, he will never learn unless he exerts time and effort toward that end. Every man can be taught how to philosophize. But no man can become a philosopher who does not philosophize about life and the universe; that is, who does not think straight about his experiences and who does not bind that thinking together into a set of convictions that serves to guide and sustain him personally and that contributes at the same time toward his worth as a citizen.

It is not a matter, then, of choosing whether or not one will be interested in philosophy. All of us are bound to be philoso-

phers whether we like it or not. The question is rather whether we shall be trained or untrained, conscious or unconscious philosophers. The trained thinker who is consciously trying to make the most adequate adjustment to life has a better chance of making that adjustment successfully.

Toward the declining years of the Roman Empire one of the last of the Roman philosophers, Boethius (*ca.* A.D. 480-524), wrote a work called *The Consolations of Philosophy.*[1] The book was widely read in the medieval and renaissance periods and its influence is still felt today in that many ideas about philosophy as an aloof, mysterious, elevating, and difficult subject are derived from it. We forget that for Boethius philosophy was a very practical study. It was practical for Boethius because the study of philosophy develops the philosophical attitude; that is, it provides certain traits for the personality that are in Boethius' opinion of great value, traits that he recognized from practical experience as capable of sustaining a man through the misfortune and loneliness of a long period of imprisonment. Philosophy as a course of study has usually been considered as the culminating point of the curriculum of the liberal arts. This is because many educators have agreed with Boethius that one of the important goals of education is the development of a "liberal" personality, that is, a personality that is genuinely free because of the depth and breadth of understanding applied on all occasions of good or evil fortune for the sustaining and enrichment of life.

Philosophy develops a free personality because it requires of its students a breadth of interests and information that is universal in scope. The student of philosophy must be a universal man. Like the philosopher Francis Bacon he must take all knowledge as his province. One of the tasks of philosophy ever since the time of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) has been the

[1] Cf. Appendix II for bibliographical references of works mentioned in the text.

classifying and organizing of the sciences. Even to this day the philosopher recognizes all sciences as realms of discourse that he is called upon to organize into a universe of discourse. To be sure, the realms of discourse have become very complex and the language of some of these realms has become so unbelievably abstruse that no philosopher can hope to master all the sciences. But the philosopher dare not become bewildered at this situation. Even though he cannot master all the sciences, he can master the principles involved in every science. Even though he does not make discoveries in any one field of research, he can and must be familiar with the results of research. Above all he must understand the implications of these results of research for the total picture of the universe. In an age of specialization the study of philosophy develops an attitude of comprehensive awareness that ought to make even the most immature student a welcome comrade in any group where ideas move above the level of the commonplace of idle gossip.

In the second place, philosophy develops a free personality because it enhances the growth of tolerance among its devotees. Philosophy has certain basic postulates which make it necessary for the philosopher to be a tolerant man. These basic postulates include the assumptions that the universe is wonderfully rich in mystery, that man is so constituted that he can come to grips with this mystery, that no one understanding of the mystery is likely to be final. The philosopher must be a humble man. He knows there is a difference between a symbolic picture of the mystery of the universe and the mystery itself. The surveyor makes a detailed topographic map of a section of your native community. It is a true picture of the district, but it is not the whole truth for you. You know each field and brook, each separate tree and hill from intimate personal experience.. Your insight transcends the surveyor's knowledge. The philosopher uses all the knowledge and insight at his command but in the end he can offer only a symbolic repre-

sentation of the mystery of the universe. This does not mean that the philosopher's map is not true or helpful for your guidance. It does mean that its truth is symbolic rather than immediate, and that each individual must interpret the map according to his own experience.

The philosopher knows from the history of philosophy that there have been many honest seekers who have offered a variety of symbolic maps of the nature of the universe. He knows that they cannot all be true, for they are sometimes contradictory. But he recognizes that they may all have some truth. If he is a Protestant, he recognizes that there are other thinkers besides Luther, Calvin, and Kierkegaard. If he is a Roman Catholic he knows that there are other thinkers besides Aquinas and Bellarmine. If he is a freethinker, he knows that there are other thinkers besides Voltaire, Comte, and Karl Marx.

The philosopher is tolerant. He endeavors to cultivate an attitude of openness. The history of philosophy has taught him wisdom in this respect. New insights have arisen again and again from unexpected quarters, and the most adequate systems of philosophy have again and again been shown to be weak at crucial points. To be tolerant, however, does not mean that the philosopher must be indifferent. His is not the attitude that condones a shrug of the shoulder. Sooner or later he must act as a man as well as a philosopher and then, like all of us, he ventures to act on the faith that the symbolic map of the mystery of the universe is the true picture of the universe and that increased insight will give added proof of its truth.

Study of philosophy tends to develop a truly liberal personality because it emphasizes the cultivation of the ability to think. Philosophy is a discipline that teaches the art of acute, stringent thinking. The formal discipline of logic has always been an important element in philosophy. This phase of philosophy has become so exacting in some circles that logical analysis has come to resemble mathematics. In other circles

logical analysis is carried on as a discipline in the analysis of language commonly known as semantics. In some respects the history of philosophy could be considered as the history of a continuous debate. Since the time of Socrates (469-399 B.C.) philosophy has contributed to the development of critical thinking by demanding high standards of those who approach the rostrum of philosophical debate. Hand in hand with skill in analytical thinking goes courage in criticism. Philosophy demands of its students that they have the caution of the scientist combined with the daring of the explorer. The task of the analytical phase of philosophy is primarily that of clarification. But philosophy cannot stop with clarification. It takes up its task of synthesis where analytical philosophy ceases. By emphasizing the creative nature of vision and imagination, it is constrained to construct a world view. This is the alluring but dangerous task of the philosopher as explorer. Not all philosophers have attained the virtues of the liberal man enumerated above. However, these virtues of the truly free man have been represented in the life and work of the great philosophical geniuses as in few other figures in world history. If these virtues of the liberal man are worth cultivating the study of philosophy is one of the indispensable means of attaining that goal of education.

Attaining the attitude of the philosopher is one of the important reasons for studying philosophy as part of a liberal arts curriculum. It is not the most important reason for studying philosophy today. Philosophy has always appealed to a limited number of men in every age who were concerned about problems that were not answered satisfactorily in the context of the teachings accorded by their social environment. In certain eras of history, for example, in Greece of the fourth century B.C. and in eighteenth-century Europe, the number of men who could not find satisfactory answers in the authorities current in their societies increased to such an extent that it included

most serious-minded men and women. On these occasions philosophy has been forced to emerge from the lecture-room, the school, and the salon in order to provide a center for debate and discussion removed from the domination of the babel of authorities. In such periods of transition, philosophy provides a means by which man can attack the problems of his age with renewed energy. It serves to keep open the opportunities for the construction of a new foundation for civilization on a higher level of truth. There are indications that the present age is one in which philosophy must play this indispensable social role in the redirection of Western civilization. Every thinking man and woman today must become a philosopher in his own right if he is unwilling to submit to any one particular intellectual pressure group.

It is some consolation to lovers of philosophy to realize that philosophy would still be read, discussed, enjoyed, and advanced by some wayward philosophical spirits even though it did not have the educational value and the historical importance that we have attributed to its study. There seem to be some people who are driven by a desire to answer the persistent problems of life and its meaning to their own satisfaction. They cannot restrain themselves in this obsession without endangering their own personal well-being. These men are inveterate philosophers. They can be found in every age and in every community. For these men, philosophy is the serious task of cultivating wisdom for life and death. They usually find their philosophical quest maturing as a religious attitude.

Why do people discuss philosophy, read the writings of the philosophers, write treatises on philosophy? The answer is as simple as the answer to the problem as to why Bach composed or why Galileo experimented or why Keats wrote poetry. The philosopher is a man. He exists among us and has existed among us for many years. The literature that he has produced is unbelievably extensive. Books labeled "philosophy" that

come out year after year give assurance that he is likely to be with us for some time. No man can consider himself an educated man who does not have at least a casual acquaintance with the peculiarities of the philosopher and his work.

PHILOSOPHY DEFINED

Most books that aim to introduce the reader to a new field of study begin by offering a neat, clear-cut definition of the new science. This procedure cannot be followed in philosophy for the simple reason that philosophy has no specific type of subject matter which differentiates it from all other fields of investigation. There is no special subject matter that the philosopher studies as the chemist studies matter or the biologist living organisms. Consequently, our task of definition requires that we identify the philosopher rather than the subject matter of philosophy.

We have already mentioned some of the characteristics of the philosopher in pointing out the educational values that have been associated with the study of philosophy. The critical student, however, may be ready with some objections at this point. Is not the scientist interested in attaining universal knowledge? Do not the sciences emphasize training in acute, stringent thinking? Is not the theologian concerned about cultivating wisdom for life and death? Are there not men in every community who have never studied philosophy but who are men of wisdom, men who are recognized by their acquaintances as good, common-sense philosophers? It is evident that before we can define philosophy and before we can answer these questions we must devote more attention to the task of differentiating the philosopher from his associates.

The philosopher has the same point of departure for his investigations as the theologian, the poet, the scientist, or the small-town patriarch who is concerned about solving life's problems. He is concerned with the common human problem

of coming to terms with reality at its fullest, richest, deepest. He is concerned with the common human task of taking the tangled web of human experience, the complex pattern of nature, man and God, history and society, life and death, and endeavoring as best he can to find the order in that tangled skein.

The philosopher differs from the theologian in that he is more daring and venturesome. The theologian is limited by a certain religious outlook, a church or historical tradition. His work is determined by his tradition. The philosopher differs from the scientist in that the interests of the philosopher are more comprehensive. He is not content to limit his efforts at understanding reality to one method. Furthermore, he is not content to become a specialist in one limited field of reality, whereas the scientist is almost always compelled to become a specialist. The philosopher differs from the poet because he is not dependent on emotions as an aid in plumbing the depths of reality. Furthermore, he is definitely suspicious of the poet's habit of becoming intoxicated with language.

Despite their differences with theologian, poet, and scientist, nearly all philosophers take either theology, science, or poetry as their point of departure; and their philosophical writings are influenced by this fact. The discerning reader, however, does not have to read the literary products of the philosophers very extensively before he is aware that they have a distinctive quality. The works that can be labeled as philosophical show quite clearly that the writer has such a high regard for free inquiry that he refuses to recognize the ordinary limitations imposed by theology, science, or poetry. Certain periods of the history of thought appear to be dominated by the intellectual efforts of the theologian, the poet, or the scientist. In these periods the philosopher is likely to be disguised as a theologian, poet, or scientist. Many of the Greek philosophers write like poets. Augustine and Aquinas are philosophers dominated by

theological interests. Kant and Whitehead have their point of departure in science.

Perhaps it would have been to the advantage of the student if the philosopher had been satisfied to remain a peculiar type of theologian, poet, or scientist. Then there would have been no special subject known as philosophy to crowd the curriculum. For better or worse, however, history records that the philosophers were among the first to organize into schools of professional scholars. At a very early time the Greek thinkers were responsible for setting themselves apart as men who had a special function in society, namely, the function of teaching mankind the best way of discovering truth, the best way of life, and the nature of the universe as a whole. These professional philosophers developed a specialized vocabulary for their science. They classified philosophy into a variety of related subjects. They called attention to the basic problems of philosophical debate and inquiry. As a matter of fact, the Greek philosophers did such a thorough job of organization that philosophy as a specialized subject has come down to us today as the oldest of all scholarly pursuits, using the oldest of all technical vocabularies.

In the original Greek the term "philosophy" meant "the love of wisdom." The Greeks recommended the study of philosophy as a means of increasing wisdom among men. Socrates, the most typical of all Greek philosophers, discovered at the beginning of his philosophical quest that one who would learn how to philosophize must become a humble seeker. The wise man knows the limitations of his knowledge, but his humility does not decrease the enthusiasm with which he seeks for further knowledge. Furthermore, the wise man is one who has a wide grasp of experience at hand for solving problems. This experience may be his own, as is usually the case with the patriarch as philosopher; or it may be the accumulated wisdom of the ages transmitted by written or spoken symbols. Finally,

the wise man is one who knows how to live for the attainment of values. He is recognized by his fellows as a personality whose acquaintance is worth cultivating. He sees relationships that others do not grasp. He has inventive genius or prophetic gifts or intuitions of unsuspected truths. He is a man of insight.

The previous discussion gives us some idea as to what philosophers have done, or at any rate hoped to do. In the light of this interpretation we may attempt a definition of philosophy. *Philosophy is the quest for universal knowledge, using the method of free and open inquiry, having as its goal the increase of wisdom among men.*

The scientist is disqualified as a philosopher in this definition because he is a specialist, the theologian because he is not free to follow a method of open inquiry. The poet is eliminated because he can be a poet without taking serious cognizance of his ethical responsibility to disseminate wisdom for life and death. The patriarch as philosopher is disqualified because of the limited range of interests and knowledge at his command. Most of us, like the small-town patriarch, are wise men in a very limited way. Our range of experience, especially in our vocational field of interest, is sufficient to enable us to solve problems in this limited field. A wider range of wisdom is required for leadership today, whether that leadership involves the guidance of one's own life, the guidance of one's family, or the guidance of a nation.

THE TASK BEFORE US

There are many ways in which one could be introduced to the study of philosophy. The history of philosophy offers an admirable survey of the variety of answers that have been given to the problems of existence. The fact that the history of philosophy shows so much variety in unity, in so far as there are so many convincing answers and daring attempts at solutions to a set of basic problems, makes the history of philosophy a

fascinating way to approach the study of philosophy.

Another approach is through the intensive study of the philosophy of one of the great figures who produced a philosophical system that deserves detailed investigation. This approach has the advantage of bringing us into the presence of a philosopher in a direct, personal way. We become acquainted with his life and as a result gain insights as to the impact that life has had upon the philosopher's thinking. We read his works in their totality so that we can understand the full implications of the philosopher's thought. If we choose one of the great philosophers for our investigation, this approach will open to us all the various fields of philosophical interest and will bring to our attention the basic problems in these fields. It is a great satisfaction to be able to know one philosopher well. Henceforth one is never entirely alone in the wilderness of philosophical exploration.

A third means by which one may be introduced to the study of philosophy is through interest in one particular field of endeavor. This approach is adequate only as one pursues that interest to the point where one is dissatisfied unless one can relate that particular field to all other phases of life in a meaningful way. We have already pointed out that the philosopher is a peculiar type of poet, theologian, or scientist. He may also be a peculiar type of artist, educator, politician, lawyer, economist, or businessman. By this we mean that the philosopher may begin his quest by endeavoring to discover to his own satisfaction the ultimate significance of the field of endeavor in which he knows most and is best qualified. There is such a thing as a philosophy of law, a philosophy of education, a philosophy of religion, a philosophy of art, a philosophy of morals, and a philosophy of politics. All these are fields of philosophic inquiry that have arisen because men who were deeply concerned about the implication of their field of interest began to think about these interests in relation to the totality

of man's interest. It is for this reason that many find that they have become philosophers without knowing it. They set out to clarify their thinking in some realm of ideas as the result of some practical interest in their own profession or hobby perhaps, and then discover that the problems of their own particular field of interest broaden out on closer inspection to become problems of a general philosophical interest.

We do not hesitate to recommend any of these three approaches to the study of philosophy for the man who has the leisure and perseverance to follow them. The historical, the biographical, and the departmental approaches are all of value. All of them contribute to an understanding of philosophy as a quest for knowledge and wisdom growing out of an attitude of open inquiry. However, we shall use a more direct approach. We shall offer a survey of the entire field of philosophy. This survey will give the student some insight into the philosopher's three primary interests, namely, his interest in methods of inquiry, his concern to bring all knowledge within his purview, and his concern to attain wisdom for life and death. We shall endeavor to provide the reader with a guidebook to the fascinating land of philosophy, hoping thereby to stimulate him to carry on his own explorations. Our guidebook will be quite inadequate, to be sure, for no guide can claim infallibility in this partly explored land of philosophy. However, it can be of service in a number of ways if we fulfill our task satisfactorily. First of all, we can give the student some idea as to what equipment he will need for his task of exploration, that is, we can acquaint him with the basic tools required for philosophical investigation. We may be able to offer some helpful suggestions in the use of this equipment. If he is co-operative, we may be able to suggest ways by which he will be able to try out his equipment in some practical, trial explorations. The chapters on the general theme of "Tools of Philosophy" will be devoted to this task.

In the second place we hope that we shall be able to give the student some idea of the highways that traverse the land of philosophy. These highways constitute the various departments of philosophy. Acquaintance with the departments of philosophy will make the student aware of the expansiveness and comprehensiveness of the philosopher's quest for total knowledge. As we have already noted these highways were surveyed for us many years ago by the Greek philosophers. By now they are so well marked and so frequently traveled that it is almost impossible to enter the land of philosophy without proceeding along these ways. You are certainly not obligated to enter the land of philosophy for your explorations and your work as prospector by these well-marked roads, but you may save much valuable time and effort if you are acquainted with these highways. Moreover, you will find that the old-timers in the land of philosophy will take it for granted that you are familiar with these highways and you will be considerably embarrassed and inconvenienced if you know nothing about them.

It is our task in the third place to point out some of the outstanding landmarks along these highways. We can call your attention to points of interest along the road where travelers met disaster in the past. We can call attention to mountains and valleys still unexplored. We can point out the excellencies and also the imperfections of some of the lofty structures that have been constructed by explorers in the past. You will find that many of the difficulties that faced the old explorers are still at hand. You will find that some of the mansions and inns along the way will allure you by the harmony of their architecture and the richness of their furnishings.

Philosophy is not only a quest. It is also, in another sense, the accumulated result of that quest. We aim to give the student some knowledge of these accumulations of past philosophical inquiry by presenting in concise form the conclusions attained by master explorers in the land of philosophy. Part

Three of the book, entitled "Landmarks on the Highways of Philosophy," will consider the various departments of philosophy in greater detail and will bring to your attention material regarding the life and work of one of the great philosophers in each of these fields.

We trust, however, that readers will not be satisfied with knowledge as to the methods and the facts of philosophy. They too, it is hoped, will want to become explorers in philosophy. We shall not be surprised or grieved if some are aroused for the first time in their lives to an awareness that they must become explorers. When that time arrives they will also desire to attain knowledge of the application of philosophy; that is, knowledge as to how the discipline of philosophy can answer problems for the individual and for his civilization. Part Four of the book, entitled "Problems of Philosophical Living," aims to stimulate the reader to attain knowledge of this type.

CHAPTER II

The Highways of Philosophy

In this chapter we shall consider the various departments of philosophy as highways by which one may enter the land of philosophy. The departments of philosophy include the following: logic, epistemology, philosophy of science, cosmology, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of history, philosophy of religion, metaphysics, and theory of value. The student who desires to enter the land of philosophy to take up his quest for wisdom may direct his thoughts into four channels. He may think about *thinking.* He may think about *man.* He may think about *nature.* He may think about *God.* The philosophic disciplines of logic and epistemology involve thinking about thinking. Ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy of history arise from man's thinking about man. Cosmology as a division of philosophy arises out of man's thinking about nature. Philosophy of religion results from man's thinking about God.

LOGIC: THINKING ABOUT THE TOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

The discipline of logic, which we shall consider in the second part of this book, is indispensable in that it affords tools for the philosopher's investigations. Without the tools of language, reason, and observation one is not very well equipped to think straight about either nature, man, or God. Logic as the science of correct thinking has inspired many contributions of philosophers through the ages. Aristotle was one of the earliest

writers in this field. His most important works were on logic, include the treatises *Categories, De Interpretatione, Prior Analytics, Posterior Analytics, Topics,* and *Sophistici Elenchi.* These were collected into one volume by his followers and given the title, *The Organon,* indicating that this work was the indispensable instrument for thinking. It is the most influential volume ever written on logic. It was the textbook of logic throughout the Middle Ages. Even today textbooks that emphasize deductive logic are usually based on Aristotle. Francis Bacon's work, called *Novum Organum,* introduced the inductive method into logic, a method that was later systematized by John Stuart Mill in his great work, *System of Logic.*

Symbolic logic, which investigates the formal structures of reasoning by using algebraic symbols rather than words, has had a rapid development during the past century. A. N. Whitehead and Bertrand Russell have made one of the most important contributions in this field in their three-volume work, *Principia Mathematica* (1910-13). Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) was probably the most influential of American logicians. He devoted a lifetime to the study of logic, and his *Collected Papers* has stimulated many new insights in logic.

EPISTEMOLOGY OR THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: THINKING ABOUT THE ADEQUACY OF THINKING

The student who has become acquainted with the tools of philosophy in the discipline of logic finds that he cannot enter on the highways of philosophical investigation without doing some further thinking about thinking in another field. At a very early date philosophers began to carry on critical investigations regarding the nature, grounds, and limits of human knowledge. Men like the Greek, Protagoras (*ca.* 480-410 B.C.), the Englishman, Hume (1711-76) and the German, Kant (1724-1804) refused to allow any philosopher to take knowledge for granted. They emphasized the need for critical analy-

sis of knowledge. It is easy to see that this field of philosophy is a kind of arena in which philosophers carry on a continuous struggle. Epistemology stands as a kind of inspection bureau before the highways of philosophical investigation. All who would be philosophers must drive up to this bureau so that a precise, merciless inspection can be made of their intellectual equipment. Their tools for knowing are investigated. Their ability to use these tools is questioned. Their hopes for making discoveries are often pronounced groundless or over-ambitious. The experts in the field of epistemology are difficult men. Indeed they might be considered as very obnoxious men if it were not for the fact that they are doing a very important, if thankless, task. It is their job to prevent mankind from indulging in wishful thinking in expecting an easy victory in the quest for knowledge and wisdom. Experience has indicated that the victory is never an easy one and that conquest of the darkness of ignorance is never fully completed. The battle must be renewed with each succeeding generation.

Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to stop at the way-station of epistemology to examine their intellectual equipment. The epistemologists shrug their shoulders and predict disaster. They are not beyond saying "I told you so" when the explorer comes back to them torn and bleeding and asks their aid in the revamping of his intellectual tools. On the other hand, some philosophers claim that the only task of philosophy is to think about thinking. They would confine philosophy to analytical philosophy; that is, to the analysis of the methods of gaining knowledge. Logic and epistemology are consequently equated with philosophy by these men. The highways of philosophical investigation are regarded by them as speculative philosophy and a sign is placed before these highways reading something as follows: "Travel at your own risk! These highways of speculative philosophy lead only to the dismal swamp of meaninglessness." Few adventurers heed

these warnings of the Logical Positivists, the school of philosophers who are most active today in emphasizing the importance of analytical philosophy.

Epistemology is a very important division of philosophy, but it is not the whole of philosophy. A fully rounded system of philosophy requires thinking about nature, God, and man as well as thinking about thinking. Too often epistemology discourages the philosopher so that he is afraid to broaden the scope of his thinking to include the universe. He sacrifices scope in order to attain clarity. Philosophy would be only a branch of the methodology of science if all philosophers followed this example. And indeed the type of epistemological investigation known as philosophy of science has gained special prominence in the past fifty years. The use of the scientific method has brought such remarkable results that some philosophers have developed a special discipline for the purpose of studying and criticizing the methodology of science and interpreting the results of the application of that method.

The following are among the philosophical classics in the field of theory of knowledge: *An Essay on Human Understanding* by John Locke, David Hume's *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding,* Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason.* Among the influential works that have appeared in the twentieth century could be listed the following: Edmund Husserl's *Phenomenology,* C. I. Lewis' *Mind and the World-Order,* John Dewey's *The Quest of Certainty.* The following collections of essays are especially important for the American student: *Essays in Critical Realism, The New Realism,* and *Creative Intelligence.* Philosophy of science is a rapidly growing discipline. Important works in this field include Karl Pearson's *Grammar of Science,* Henri Poincaré's *Science and Hypothesis,* and C. D. Broad's *Scientific Thought.* It should be noted that philosophy of science does not confine its investigations to a study of the methodology of science. Emphasis is

also placed upon the understanding of the nature of the universe as seen from the results of the application of that method. Most books on philosophy of science contain materials relating to cosmology as well as to epistemology. Consequently one is at liberty to consider philosophy of science as thinking about thinking or thinking about nature depending upon the emphasis of the individual writer.

Logic, epistemology, and philosophy of science are preliminary disciplines for the philosopher. They prepare him for travel on the great speculative highways of philosophy. They prepare him to think straight about nature, man, and God. Before we proceed to travel along these highways with some of the great philosophers as guides let us consider in brief the nature of the philosophical disciplines that make up these highways.

ETHICS: THINKING ABOUT MAN AS A MORAL CREATURE

Socrates was the first philosopher to concentrate attention on thinking about man rather than on thinking about nature. He abandoned speculation in physics and astronomy in order to follow the injunction of the Delphic oracle, "Know thyself." A host of new problems arose when the philosopher directed his attention toward thinking about man. He began to ask questions about the relationship of body and soul, the nature of good and evil, the relative values in the various systems of education and government, the meaning of history, and the nature of beauty as associated with man's welfare and well-being. As a result of the philosopher's discussion of these and similar problems, three clearly defined philosophical disciplines were developed; namely, ethics, philosophy of history, and aesthetics.

Ethics is the study which considers the rightness and wrongness of man's actions and attitudes. The philosopher is concerned to discover norms for action that will lead to the increase

of goodness in the life of man. The philosopher uses the results of sociological investigation to clarify the various types of ethical systems as they have become codified in the legal systems of various cultures. He uses the results of psychological investigation to understand what goes on in the inner life of the personality when laws or group customs are broken. However, he cannot regard his work as completed with this investigation. He must go on to draw conclusions as to what is the good life for all men. He must strive to discover the *summum bonum,* the highest good. Since the concept of a highest good is associated with the idea of God, it is only natural to expect that ethics would be very closely associated with philosophy of religion.

There is a larger body of literature in the field of ethics than in any other field of philosophy. The schools of Greek philosophy that followed Socrates such as the Stoics, Epicureans, Cyrenaics were concerned primarily with ethics. The French philosophers of the eighteenth century such as Montesquieu, Rousseau, Voltaire were primarily ethical philosophers. British philosophy has been especially blessed with ethical writers in men like Hobbes, Cudworth, Shaftesbury, Reid, Bentham. American philosophers from Emerson to Josiah Royce and John Dewey have made their chief contributions in this field. Among important works that have appeared in the twentieth century are: G. E. Moore's *Principia Ethica,* T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics,* John Dewey's *Human Nature and Conduct,* Nicolai Hartmann's *Ethics* and P. A. Kropotkin's *Ethics: Origin and Development.*

PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY: THINKING ABOUT MAN AS A SOCIAL CREATURE

Man is not only a thinking being, and a moral being. He is also a social being. As a social being he is a product of history. He is a part of a society that has undergone change, a society

that has developed under a variety of influences, natural and cultural. Not only is he a product of history. He is also a producer of history. The decisions that he makes, the way he utilizes his energy in time produce changes in the social process which are recorded as history.

The philosopher as a lover of wisdom is aware that wisdom about history is extremely important. He asks questions such as the following: Is there a plan, an order in history? Does history have a purpose, a goal? What factors contribute to the making of history? Can man control these factors? As in the case of philosophy of science, the philosopher is interested in the methodology of history. However, most philosophers who have written in this field have emphasized philosophy of history as a speculative rather than an analytical discipline. This is because history is as much an art as it is a science. The historian can never repeat past events or control them for experimental purposes under laboratory conditions. The speculative nature of philosophy of history is in evidence in the classical works in this field, for example, Augustine's *City of God,* Hegel's *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* and Karl Marx's *Capital.* The crisis in Western civilization that has been in evidence in the twentieth century has stimulated considerable work in the field of philosophy of history. Among the recent significant works are the following: Bury's *The Idea of Progress, The Meaning of History* by N. A. Berdyaev, Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West,* P. A. Sorokin's *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* Paul Tillich's *The Meaning of History,* Ortega y Gasset's *Revolt of the Masses,* and A. J. Toynbee's six-volume work, *A Study of History.*

AESTHETICS: THINKING ABOUT MAN AS A CREATURE OF SENSATIONS

The term "aesthetics" is derived from a Greek word which denotes knowledge of objects of sensuous experience. The life

of man is bound up with the life of sensation. There is a constant impact of sights, sounds, odors which contribute to or detract from man's well-being. The emotional pattern of a man's life is conditioned to a considerable degree by his physical surroundings. Music has been used as a therapeutic aid in hospitals. Color has been found to be of considerable help in the treatment of certain types of mental illness. Music, architecture, painting, poetry are devoted to the creation of works that will make man's life more pleasant and agreeable.

The philosopher has noticed that men differ in their opinions of what is pleasant and unpleasant, beautiful and ugly. He has also noticed that there is a tendency for certain norms for the beautiful to become established so that certain works of art that are guided by these norms are regarded as beautiful over a long period of time and by many diverse peoples. As a result the philosopher has been constrained to carry on investigations into the ultimate nature of beauty. Only through the attainment of wisdom about beauty can the sensuous nature of man be made creative just as man's moral nature can be made creative through attainment of wisdom about good and evil. Aesthetics as an investigation into the nature of beauty has arisen as the philosopher's attempt to attain wisdom with regards to man's sensuous experiences.

The artists who have been philosophically inclined have made contributions to aesthetics in all periods of history. Important contributions have also been made by critics of the arts, for example, in Lessing's *Laocoon,* Ruskin's *Modern Painters,* and Taine's *The Ideal in Art.* Classical philosophers usually treated aesthetics in conjunction with other subjects as is the case with Kant in his *Critique of Judgment* and Schopenhauer in his *The World as Will and Idea.* Among the important works in this field produced in the twentieth century are: *Aesthetic* by Croce, Santayana's *Reason in Art,* Richards' *Principles of Literary Criticism,* Ducasse's *Philosophy of Art.*

COSMOLOGY: THINKING ABOUT NATURE

The first philosophers of whom we have record in Western civilization were the sixth-century, Ionian Greek philosophers of Asia Minor. Men such as Thales, called the father of philosophy, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Heraclitus began their philosophic quest by thinking about nature. They were the great theoretical physicists and astronomers, the Einsteins and Eddingtons, of their day. They asked questions about the nature of the universe, its origin and its transformations. They sought for a simple comprehensive key to the system of order that they observed in nature. They were men who studied the heavens above and the earth beneath.

In every age there are philosophers who follow the example of the Ionian Greeks. They find the highway of cosmology the most alluring approach to the study of philosophy. Look on the world of nature, the starry heavens, the changing seasons, the forms of mineral, plant, and animal life and you will find that a multitude of questions arise to stimulate inquiry. What is the origin of the universe and of what is it made? What is change? Is there order in the universe and if so what is the nature of this order? What are time and space? How do living organisms differ from inanimate things? The men who tried to answer these questions were the first philosophers. They were also the first scientists.

Today one cannot think about nature without taking into consideration the discoveries that have been made in the sciences of astronomy, physics, chemistry, geology, and biology. The wealth of information offered by these sciences makes cosmology a fascinating study. In this study the scientist becomes a philosopher and the philosopher recognizes the contributions of science as indispensable for his own constructive task. Great names in science such as Galileo, Newton, Darwin appear in every history of philosophy. In the twentieth century this trend has been even more noticeable. Scientists such as Mach,

Driesch, Poincaré, Eddington, Jeans, Whitehead have made important contributions in the field of cosmology. Among the important works in philosophy of nature that have appeared in the twentieth century have been *Space, Time and Deity* by Samuel Alexander, *Process and Reality* by Whitehead, *Creative Evolution* by Bergson.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: THINKING ABOUT GOD

When the philosopher Kant published a work entitled *Religion within the Bounds of Reason Alone* in 1793, he was making explicit a distinction between philosophy of religion and theology that had gradually arisen among thinkers in the eighteenth century. Philosophy of religion is the attempt to understand the nature of God and the significance of religion in the life of man apart from recourse to any specific revelation. For theology, philosophy of religion is a preliminary intellectual discipline that is of value only in so far as it clarifies problems that have their ultimate solution in revelation.

The philosopher, in common with the theologian, has recognized that wisdom about nature and about man is never completely adequate unless that wisdom is bound up with some system of final ends and goals that is supremely worthful. He is always in quest of some *summum bonum,* the highest good. He knows that wisdom as knowledge is inadequate unless it is wisdom for living. Living a life of wisdom is motivated by devotion to God. However, the secular philosopher of religion feels that he is obligated to employ all means within his power to understand the nature of God. For him devotion is possible only through understanding.

In the Middle Ages philosophy of religion as an intellectual pursuit was closely affiliated with theology and was called natural theology as in the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas (1225-74). In the modern world, philosophy of religion has enjoyed complete independence and has become a

separate discipline for most philosophers. Since the appearance of the work of Kant mentioned above, philosophy of religion has interested many thinkers and a large body of literature has been produced in the past two centuries. The development of such studies as comparative religions, the history of religions, and the psychology of religion has offered a large fund of factual material that has aided in stimulating an interest in religion. Works such as James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* in the field of psychology of religion and Frazer's *Golden Bough* in the field of comparative religions cannot be ignored by the philosopher who is constrained to think about God and man's relationship to God as seen in religion. Among the important works that have appeared in this field in the twentieth century are: Rudolf Otto's *The Idea of the Holy,* Friedrich von Hügel's *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion,* W. E. Hocking's *The Meaning of God in Human Experience,* E. W. Lyman's *The Meaning and Truth of Religion,* and Charles Hartshorne's *Man's Vision of God.*

METAPHYSICS

The Greek term *meta* means to follow after. As a prefix in the term "metaphysics" it is used to indicate that a certain collection of Aristotle's writings followed his writings on physics. The term can also be used to mean above, or higher than. For many years philosophers preferred the latter interpretation of the term for they regarded metaphysics as the highest of all sciences. They were convinced that metaphysics as ontology, or the science of being, could come to grips with a higher form of reality through the use of pure reason in a way that was impossible for any other science. Some philosophers, especially the Neo-Thomist who are modern followers of Thomas Aquinas, still maintain this position. Idealistic followers of Hegel are also prone to regard metaphysics in this light. In recent years, however, the tendency among philosophers has

been to regard metaphysics as the most general of all disciplines.[1] Metaphysics generalizes about all the knowledge that is available to the philosopher and unifies that knowledge into a comprehensive theory of the universe.

Great metaphysical geniuses are rare in the history of philosophy, but this does not mean that the ordinary man who travels the highways of philosophy can neglect metaphysical formulations of his philosophy of life. Sooner or later the man who has investigated all the highways and byways of the land of philosophy must leave the valley roads. He must climb one of the mountain heights that are found in the land of philosophy. From this vantage point he must survey all the roads he has traversed in the light of universal principles. He must organize his thinking into a world view, a way of life. He must venture in faith to offer this world view as wisdom for life and death. And yet, if he is a true philosopher, he will know that this world view must be regarded as a hypothesis to be tested in the hard school of ultimate reality and, if necessary, modified accordingly.

Modern philosophy has not been conducive to the production of works on metaphysics. From the point of view of our interpretation of metaphysics the well-rounded but not very well-co-ordinated systems of philosophy of John Dewey and Alfred Whitehead constitute the best examples of modern attempts at metaphysical construction. The work of Jacques Maritain, especially *The Degrees of Knowledge,* affords a good example of modern metaphysical construction from the point of view of the Thomist position. Apart from textbooks on metaphysics, the most helpful work for students is probably S. C. Pepper's stimulating book *World Hypotheses.*

[1] Cf. Everett W. Hall, "Metaphysics," *Twentieth Century Philosophy* (New York: Philosophical Library Inc., 1943), pp. 145-94.

AXIOLOGY OR THEORY OF VALUE

If one follows one of the central highways dealing with thinking about man into the land of philosophy, one sooner or later finds that all traffic on the highways of aesthetics, ethics, and philosophy of history comes together at an intersection that constitutes a bottleneck for philosophy. All the wisdom contributed by the various departments of philosophy is seen to be of no avail *unless this wisdom can be of value for the life of man.* The philosopher is confronted with the question: What determines value or worth in goodness or in truth or in beauty or in history? Furthermore many who have taken the highway of cosmology and philosophy of religion find that they too have come to this same bottleneck. Strictly speaking the latter might have avoided this difficulty by closing their eyes to the needs and difficulties of mankind in order to think impersonally about nature and about God. Darwin was able to think about nature in this impersonal way. Spinoza pursued philosophy of religion in the same spirit. Today few men who philosophize about nature are able to avoid the necessity of asking the crucial question: To what extent does the world of nature support human values? Few men who think about God are able to avoid the question: How does God fulfill values for man?

In order to straighten out the traffic congestion that centers about the problem of value a new philosophic discipline has appeared in recent years called axiology or theory of value, the term axiology being derived from the Greek word *axios* meaning value or worth. The philosopher Nietzsche took as his life work the task of showing that a "transvaluation of all values" was essential in the modern world. The chaotic state of civilization in recent years has tended to make many philosophers agree with Nietzsche on this point even though they may disagree with him on the method by which old values are to be supplanted by a new system of values. For example, there

must be a transvaluation of the values commonly associated with nationalism if the nation is to continue to live in an atomic age. How can we hope to bring about a transvaluation of values in our civilization if we have no philosophy of value?

The modern philosopher is constrained to provide a working philosophy of value for the modern world. The result has been that this new field of philosophic exploration is eliciting the attention of more and more philosophers. More thought and energy is being devoted to writing books and articles in this field than in any of the other fields of philosophy. The probabilities are that this trend will continue. It is interesting to note that in so far as the philosopher is successful as a pathfinder in providing a satisfactory theory of value for modern man, he becomes an important figure in the world of practical affairs rather than the reclusive scholar. John Dewey's life and work offer evidence of a living example of this fact. Dewey's theory of value has had practical implications of a revolutionary nature not only in America but in countries as far removed from American cultural outlook as China.

Among the important books that have appeared in this field in recent years are the following: R. B. Perry's *The General Theory of Value,* W. M. Urban's *Valuation,* Samuel Alexander's *Beauty and Other Forms of Value,* John Dewey's *Theory of Valuation,* Hugo Munsterberg's *The Eternal Values,* D. H. Parker's *Human Values,* H. O. Eaton's *The Austrian Philosophy of Values,* N. O. Losski's *Value and Existence,* John Laird's *The Idea of Value,* H. N. Wieman's *The Source of Human Good.*

CONCLUSION: SELECTING A ROUTE

Before this chapter is concluded it is imperative to clarify three important points. First of all, we trust that it is evident by now that there is no sharp line of demarcation between any of the philosophical disciplines. All attempts at classifying these disciplines must be regarded as matters of convenience

rather than of necessity. The student may find it an interesting exercise to attempt his own classification of the departments of philosophy on a different basis than the traditional historical approach adopted in this chapter.

In the second place, it must be emphasized that many of the disciplines of philosophy are closely related to other studies. Mathematics is the handmaid of logic. Pyschology can make contributions in epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Sociology, history, and social psychology offer basic material for ethics and the philosophy of history. Psychology of religion and the history of religions are adjuncts to philosophy of religion. Aesthetics is closely associated with the fine arts. A system of cosmology is impossible apart from the natural sciences. Axiology and metaphysics appear to be unique in this respect for they cannot be associated directly with any of the other sciences. Indirectly, however, they are related to all realms of thought and discovery. Theory of value is concerned with investigating all interests and all realms of thinking that involve human welfare. Metaphysics is concerned with discovering and interpreting the ultimate meaning of the universe.

Perhaps the above affirmations are obvious. A third point, however, is debatable. The student is likely to ask some crucial questions at this juncture. Are all the highways of philosophy of equal importance? What, after all, is the goal of philosophy? Is it inquiry for the sake of inquiry? Is its goal that of the co-ordination of all knowledge into a system of metaphysics? Is its goal the development of a way of life that will increase wisdom among men for everyday living?

Practically all philosophers would refuse to accept the dilemma latent in these questions. The objectives of philosophy enumerated in our definition cannot and must not be separated. The philosopher maintains that it is one of the virtues of philosophy that it is both theory and practice, meditation and action, criticism and speculation, inquiry and fulfillment. De-

spite the fact that the philosopher strives valiantly to maintain this breadth of interest, it must be admitted that the student is right in asking these questions. As a matter of fact, philosophers do emphasize one or the other objective in philosophy. The reader has a right to know where the emphasis will be placed.

The chapters that follow endeavor to present philosophy in as broad a scope as possible, keeping in mind the total picture of philosophy as inquiry, world view, and a way of life. We place the greater emphasis, however, on the contributions that philosophy can make toward the increase of wisdom, as a way of life. Our philosophic quest has led to the conviction that philosophy culminates in decisions about value and that value decisions culminate in religion. This conviction finds expression in the emphasis placed on values, ethical decision, and religious affirmation. We trust that this conviction is something other than a mere bias, but whether conviction or bias the reader is henceforth warned to be on his guard.

Perhaps a simple illustration will serve to clarify our point of view. We have noticed that hiking in mountainous country affords a variety of inducements for different hikers. Some hikers are interested primarily in organizing the hike, planning the route, collecting the necessary equipment. They are experts at campcraft. Other hikers are interested in attaining the distant peaks. They are happiest when they have reached the cold, invigorating, impersonal reality of the heights. A third class of hikers may be concerned about the equipment. They may be exhilarated by the experience of attaining the lofty peaks. Their chief concern, however, is to move on beyond the heights to the mountain valleys with their promises of new scenes and unfulfilled possibilities.

For us, the upward climb of the philosopher is not a culminating achievement in itself. It is rather a transition from one level of experience to a richer and fuller level of experi-

ence. We do not regard the task of philosophy as primarily that of critical analysis or of metaphysical speculation. The primary task is to lure men on to go in quest of wisdom for the creation and fulfillment of values in the practical world of man's everyday concerns.

PART TWO

The Tools of Philosophy— Thinking about Thinking

CHAPTER III

Language as a Tool for Philosophy

We are now about to take up the somewhat tedious task of preparing our tools for our exploration trip in the land of philosophy. Some readers who have had training in logic or scientific method may not need the discipline that is required in the next three chapters dealing with analytical philosophy or thinking about thinking. They may find the material of these chapters dull and superficial. We give them permission to omit this preparatory section of our guidebook. Others who are carefree vacationists on this voyage of exploration and who regard the study of philosophy as a hobby are also given reluctant permission to proceed down the highways of philosophy Most of us, however, will find it both instructive and helpful if we put off our journey for the time being in order to gain some information about the philosopher's tools for investigation. No matter how inadequate that information may be it will nevertheless prove useful.

The liberal arts of the trivium, namely, grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic, were recognized for many centuries as the basic tools for all philosophers. In the terminology of today we could describe these basic tools as nothing more or less than first, the ability to read and to talk, that is, the ability to use language correctly; and, secondly, the ability to reason. A third basic tool, that of observation, was added to the equipment of the philosopher with the development of natural science. The

philosopher was the first to recognize the importance of these tools and he has been interested in sharpening them and in advocating their use ever since. If a man masters these tools of language, observation, and reason, his thinking about any subject is likely to be worth considering.

WHY THE PHILOSOPHER IS INTERESTED IN LANGUAGE

Language in the form of speaking, writing, reading has always been recognized as one of the chief tools of the philosopher. Plato's *Dialogues* are among the greatest of the philosophic classics. They carry us back to the days of Greek philosophy and introduce us to the art of philosophizing by means of the spoken word. Dialectic as practiced by the Greeks involved question and answer, the clarification of concepts by definition, the development of ideas by discussion. This dialectic method of philosophizing is a method that requires an abundance of leisure, for the philosopher's debate goes on endlessly. It is a method, however, that is inseparable from philosophy; for wherever philosophers are found, there one will find discussion, the give and take of interminable debate. The art of talking as a philosopher, that is, the art of dialectic discussion is not easily mastered. It requires discipline in definition of terms, discipline in the elimination of personal bias, discipline in the recognition of the fallacies that arise from the distortion of language.[1]

Since the time of Aristotle philosophers have presented their views to the general public in the form of essays or treatises. A considerable body of literature has arisen in this way. In order to read this literature the student must become acquainted with the philosopher's tool of language. He must master the vocabulary of the philosopher. This task has been complicated by the fact that philosophical terms have a long history of

[1] See Appendix I.

changes in meaning due to the varied adaptations of the terms made by different philosophers at different periods in the history of philosophy.

The student will find it imperative that he learn the art of thoughtful reading. In the study of philosophy he must come to grips with minds that are endeavoring to express ideas that are both profound and comprehensive. This means that the philosopher must necessarily use terms that are abstract and general. Psychologists recognize one's abiltiy to think in terms of generalizations as one of the component elements of intelligence. The average student is taught to read by means of concrete terms. He learns to read the sentence: "This is a house." Having mastered the ability to read in concrete terms he is satisfied that he has learned to read and is in a position to proceed with his education. Then he is given a reading assignment, let us say, on the problem of housing. He runs across this sentence:

> And precisely because architectural form crystallizes, becomes visible, is subject to the test of constant use, it endows with special significance the impulses and ideas that shape it: it externalizes the living beliefs, and in doing so, reveals latent relationships.[2]

The result is that our hypothetical student is lost. But will he admit that he cannot read, that he has never learned to read? By no means. He is more likely to conclude that the writer is lost, not the reader, otherwise he would not write such jargon.

The philosopher must use abstract terms. Language is one of his tools, and if he has mastered this tool, as is usually the case with the great philosophers, his language makes sense. The student of philosophy, like the philosopher, must learn to play the game according to the rules which means he must learn to use the tool of abstract, philosophic language.

[2] Selected at random from Lewis Mumford, *The Culture of Cities* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1938), p. 403.

Mastering the tool of language in order to read the great philosophers is not the only reason why the student must learn to read if he is to philosophize. Since philosophy is the most comprehensive of all disciplines it is imperative that all realms of knowledge be made available to the student of philosophy. The library is one of the most accessible gateways to an immense variety of fields of knowledge. To be unable to use this great storehouse of knowledge is to limit one's philosophic quest in a way that is unworthy of the ideal of the philosopher as a universal man.

Since language is such an indispensable tool for the philosopher, it is natural to expect that he should devote considerable effort to sharpening this tool. He has proceeded with this task in three ways: first, by calling attention to some of the many ways in which language can be misused with disastrous results for the philosopher's quest for truth. In the second place, he has attempted to develop techniques for the definition of terms in order to provide means for the clarification of language. In the third place, he has attempted to develop a techinque for the general analysis of discourse.

PITFALLS OF LANGUAGE

Many of the pitfalls in the use of language were recognized and named at an early date by the Greek philosophers trained in the techniques of philosophical dialectic. These pitfalls can be recognized most readily even today when we think of the ways language is used in a heated argument to distort the truth or to prevent it from coming to light. It is impossible to list all the errors which may arise in the use of language. Language as an instrument for man's thought is as varied, complex, and mobile as the thought of man. It serves the erroneous thinking of man quite as adequately as it serves man's quest for truth. However, we can list some of the most obvious misuses of language which have come to the attention of the philoso-

pher in his attempts to sharpen the tool of language for philosophical investigation. There are two chief reasons why language is misused: first, because of the inadequacies of language itself which make for a variety of kinds of confusion; second, because of the bias and self-interest of man which incline us to use language as a means to attain some end other than truth.

A. Language Misused because It Is an Imperfect Instrument

Francis Bacon, the English philosopher, was keenly aware of the inadequacies of language when he wrote as follows:

> For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do the definitions or explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.[3]

Here is a list of some of the inadequacies of language that tend to handicap man in his quest for truth. Awareness of the nature of these handicaps is the first step the philosopher must take in overcoming them.

(1) *Language has emotional overtones.* This means that it is difficult to use language in the quest for truth without allowing emotional elements to become involved in that quest. The philosopher has discovered from many sad experiences that arousing the emotions is not conducive to straight thinking. The emotional overtones of language can be observed most specifically in the spoken word where voice and gesture contribute toward arousing emotions as well as toward presenting ideas. In every age and in every social group certain words carry emotional overtones that make it inevitable that emotions

[3] *Selections*, ed. M. T. McClure (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928), pp. 289f.

will be aroused whenever these words are used. Every term, however, is subject to this tendency of language to develop emotional connotations, depending on how it is used and the attitude of the user. The term "religion" cannot be used very often in an article or a discussion before one is aware that the user is emotionally sympathetic, indifferent, or antagonistic toward religion.

(2) *Language is vague.* It has been the common experience of mankind that the more difficult and more important ideas can be communicated only after considerable effort because there is no precise instrument at hand for such communication. Logicians have been so much concerned with this fact that they have endeavored to develop an artificial language of symbols. All of us struggle with the vagueness of language every time we endeavor to direct a stranger to some familiar landmark in our community. The difficulty of avoiding vagueness is infinitely increased when we endeavor to express ideas relative to the landmarks in the realm of the good, the true, and the beautiful. The philosopher is no more adequately equipped to deal with this handicap of vagueness than any other person who is acquainted with his native language. In many cases the literary artist far surpasses the philosopher in native ability along this line. Where the philosopher differs from the other members of the community is in his patience and persistence. The philosopher is always struggling with the problem of how to make our ideas clear. Partial understanding suffices for ordinary purposes, but for the philosopher partial understanding is a call to action in the field of clarification. The philosopher's struggle against the handicap of the vagueness of language has never ceased. It can never cease as long as there is no other means for communicating ideas but language.

(3) *Words are ambiguous, that is, one word may have many meanings.* Anyone who has endeavored to cope with a punster is aware that this is one of the handicaps of language. Since it

is recognized by everyone it ought to cause little difficulty. No one is likely to go to the Stock Exchange to buy bear steaks if he hears that there is a bear market at Wall Street. More than one friendship, however, has been seriously strained in arguments about "socialism," where one friend argues against totalitarian communism defined as socialism and the other friend argues for the ideal democracy of the future defined likewise as socialism. The term "weasel words" has been given to ambiguous words of this type. They cause more trouble than is commonly realized.

(4) *Words may be used in such a way that terms referring to a class are mistakenly regarded as referring to all individuals of that class.* Let us say that we accept the common judgment that lawyers tend to be dishonest. At election time we may be unconsciously influenced to vote against a scrupulously honest candidate because he is a lawyer. This fallacy of division, as it is called by logicians, would not arise if we were not prone to commit the opposite fallacy of composition, that is, jumping to conclusions about a class after we have observed a limited number of individuals that make up that class. The fact that all common nouns can be used as generalized class terms makes language an ally of bad psychology. Psychologists point out that we have a tendency to build up stereotypes regarding what we erroneously consider to be a typical member of a class. We think of certain characteristic traits as inseparable from the typical farmer, teacher, Negro, artist, politician. Very often we take over these stereotypes from our social environment without doing any observation of our own. Every individual artist that we meet is expected to be somewhat eccentric for that trait is part of the usual stereotype of the artist. Every politician is a somewhat hypocritical backslapper for we have accepted the stereotype which attributes this trait to the typical politician.

(5) *Words may be used in such a way that relative terms*

are mistaken for absolute terms. We say that our neighbor Mr. Smith is a United States citizen. This statement is absolutely true or false. It is a matter of either-or. We think of terms used in the way the term "United States citizen" is used in the above sentence as absolute terms. On the other hand, if we say, "Mr. Smith is a good citizen," the term "good citizen" is a relative term, that is, it is relative to some standard that enables us to set up a scale of the relatively good, bad, and indifferent citizens.

At first glance this handicap of language appears to be comparatively harmless. It was not so innocuous in an age that based its system of logic on the Aristotelian postulate that A is either B or not-B. This type of logic tended to regard all terms as absolute terms. When this logic was put into practice in community affairs, it resulted in some conclusions that we trust would not be welcomed today. The Albigensian sect of southern France could not be Christian and non-Christian at the same time according to the logic of thirteenth-century Europe. Logic made it impossible to recognize that the Albigenses were Christian in some respects while they tolerated non-Christian views in other respects. Logic must go its inexorable way. They must be regarded as non-Christian. Once this conclusion had been arrived at, other ways of misusing language could be employed against the puzzled Albigensians. The term "heretic" was attached to them, a term that certainly had more emotional overtones in the Middle Ages than it could possibly have today. Moreover, misdirected use of language made it imperative that the term "heretic" be applied to *all* who were members of the class of Albigensians. History records the result of this misuse of language. A crusade was preached and carried out so successfully that men, women, and children were indiscriminately destroyed with a good conscience by the participating crusaders.

A moment's thought suffices to make us aware that most of the descriptive terms that we use are relative terms. In most

cases, however, this realization will not prevent us from ascribing absolute truth-values to terms that are only relatively true as predicates.

(6) *Words may be used in such a way that abstract terms are mistaken for concrete terms.* A concrete term is one that refers to an object that is, has been, or can conceivably be perceived. Most common nouns are of this type. Abstract terms are terms that refer to ideas that arise as generalized descriptions of a complex bundle of perceptions. Terms such as liberty, goodness, love, nationalism, sweetness, inertia, the ether are abstract terms. We have already pointed out that ability to use abstractions characterizes the intelligent man. Thinking in abstract terms enables man to use a kind of shorthand in dealing with ideas that the lower animals cannot possibly utilize.

However, abstract terms interfere with straight thinking when they are used in such a way that they lose touch with reality. When this occurs the word is mistaken for the reality symbolized. The term "hypostatization" has been applied to this misuse of language. The politician who talks at length about democracy may have no concrete idea as to what a democratic society can do for his constituency in terms of the values of everyday living. The adolescent who lingers over the words "love, love, love!" as the magic of being in love is presented by the radio crooner, is likely to be in love with the idea of love. The concrete experiences that give meaning to the term "love" are likely to be misunderstood and oversimplified. Too frequently arguments, especially arguments involving "isms," engender heat but little light because they are arguments about abstractions. Too frequently men are called upon to work, suffer, and die for an abstraction that bears a lofty name only to find that the concrete realities symbolized by that abstraction have nothing in common with high idealism but a name.

(7) *The adequacy of language as an instrument for trans-*

mitting ideas is limited by selection and emphasis. We mean by this that no one is ever given an opportunity to have his full say on any matter. The psychology of selectivity is inevitably at work on the part of the interpreter who reads or listens. The interpreter selects certain elements as important and emphasizes these elements. He neglects certain phases of the discourse. He unconsciously ignores phases that are not in line with his interests. A writer or speaker may be remarkably gifted in transmitting his ideas. He will be ideally successful, however, only if he has an audience of interpreters who are perfectly trained to guard against the fallacy of selection and who have no ulterior personal reasons for distorting emphases. An ideal audience of this type will never be found unless it be at a convention of mathematicians where the language of mathematics supersedes the natural language.

On some occasions the process of selectivity is used in an artificial way to distort language. Scriptural passages can be taken from their context to give rise to the proverb that even the devil can quote Scripture to serve his ends. Advertisers are experts at misquoting to serve immediate needs as can be seen readily enough by reading the quotations from book reviews that are used to advertise books that are not treated very kindly by the reviewers. History records instances in which distortion of language by selectivity has changed the course of history, as for example, the famous incident in which Bismark made emendations in the Ems telegram received from the Kaiser in order to precipitate war with France in 1870. However, the deliberate use of language in order to misrepresent the truth brings us to a second list of ways in which language can be misused.

B. Misuse of Language because of Biased Self-Interest

We use the term "bias" to designate the state of mind which permits any set of interests to take precedence over an interest

in truth. The lawyer is interested in winning a case for his client rather than in truth. He uses language to attain this end. The advertiser is interested in selling a product rather than in the truth about the merits of the product. He employs the tricks of his trade to attain that end. The religious fanatic is interested in making converts. The end may justify the means in his estimation with the result that he may not hesitate to use language in any way possible in order to win the allegiance of his hearers. In all of these cases there is present a conscious or unconscious urge to use language to achieve ends other than truth.

The urge to misuse language in this way is always present, for every man has his biases. The philosopher as a man who is motivated primarily by a bias for truth must be trained to recognize the ways in which truth is endangered where language is used for the furtherance of self-interest. We shall list a number of the most important of these techniques. It is worthy of note that many of the dangerous techniques listed depend for their effectiveness on an appeal to the emotions and an appeal to the subconscious power of suggestion. Since man is motivated to a great extent by his emotions and by unconscious suggestion, these techniques are powerful instruments. Sometimes they are instruments for good. However, they are always potential instruments for evil wherever reason and straight thinking are lacking to stand guard over the emotions and to direct suggestions into fruitful channels.

We are ordinarily inclined to misuse language either to sustain or to establish a bias. When opposition to our biases arises or when there is an attempt made to investigate our preconceived ideas, we immediately consider that we have been attacked personally and we rise to meet the attack. The most effective methods of sustaining a bias that has been well established is to use language to sidetrack objections. The method for sidetracking objections depends upon the psychology of

attention for its effectiveness. Psychologists emphasize the fact that attention is short in duration and directed to a great extent by our interests. This means that if the individual who is endeavoring to sustain a bias appeals to the emotions, the attention of his audience will sooner or later be directed away from the point at issue. If he can set before them time and again certain irrelevant interests that are more dominant than the interests at issue, he is likely to achieve the same end. Here are a number of ways in which language can be used to sustain a bias by sidetracking undesired investigation or opposition.

(1) *Language may be used to appeal to reverence for the past.* Calling to our minds the good old days, the virtues of our ancestors, the authority of established custom and institutions arouses emotions that make it difficult for us to examine the criticisms that are being offered against the established bias.

(2) *Language may be used to arouse a sense of fear of the evil consequences that may result if innovations are permitted.* The greater the tendency toward superstition, the easier it is to use this method.

(3) *Language may be used to arouse sympathy for the established bias.* The more sentimental the audience, the greater are the possibilities for distracting attention from the main issues by showing how the aged, the sick, the unfortunate, the innocent child will be wronged if the established bias is not maintained.

(4) *Language may be used to distract attention by using the vulgar but effective method of mudslinging or calling names.* This method serves to arouse anger in an opponent, in which case his attention is distracted. It also serves to fix a stereotype upon the opponent in the eyes of the audience so that they are inclined to condemn his ideas without examining the evidence.

(5) *Language may be used to distract attention by drawing out the extreme consequences of the opponent's position and*

thus showing that they are inadequate or disastrous. In this way the attention of the audience may be directed away from the more moderate position that is actually being offered.

(6) *Language can be used to distract attention by using homespun proverbs, catch phrases, clever puns, witticisms.* It is difficult to take the ideas of a man seriously if you have just laughed at him. It is even more difficult to think rationally about the subject at hand if you have established a psychological set to react humorously toward a certain situation or personality.

All of us can recall instances in which these techniques have been utilized by speakers and writers. For example, let us say a representative of a businessmen's organization is arguing in favor of free business enterprise unhampered by governmental regulations. He uses language to arouse a sense of pride and reverence for the great pioneering tradition of the past. He arouses fear for the future safety of our bank accounts, our stocks and bonds, our jobs, our civil liberties if governmental regulations are permitted. He recalls to our minds the aged, the widow, and the common man who are benefited by investments in public utilities. If he is sufficiently aroused, he may begin calling his opponents "reds," "braintrusters," "union racketeers." He points out to his audience that, if the opposition were logical, they would establish communism in America and that, if they feel that way about it, they had better become Russian citizens. He ends by affirming that "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" and that he prefers the progress that has come with free enterprise to some future utopia that is promised by governmental regulation of business. By the time the speaker has finished our attention has been sidetracked dozens of times from the real issues. The established bias in favor of free business enterprise remains undisturbed.

The most effective method for establising a bias that has not been accepted heretofore is to use language to glorify a

bias so that it will be accepted without thinking or investigation. The way to get premises accepted which will further the establishment of a bias is to use the suggestive power of language. The suggestive power of language is so great that it is almost certain to have some effect upon us—either positive or negative. If the suggestions are repeated sufficiently frequently the probabilities of success are increased. If the individual who makes the suggestions is in rapport with the interpreter, that is, if the interpreter is inclined to be impressed favorably by either the manner or the prestige of the one making the suggestions, the goal desired is likely to be attained and the new position accepted without investigation. Here are a number of ways in which language can be used to establish a bias.

(1) *Language can be used to build up suggestions in favor of a bias by means of repetition.* The same idea can be presented again and again as a slogan. The same idea can be repeated many times in different contexts without the interpreter being conscious of the repetition.

(2) *Language can be of service in establishing a bias by contributing to the prestige of the one who is offering suggestions.* Sometimes this prestige is established by testimonials from other sources of authority. Sometimes it is established by the confident manner of the speaker or writer. The radio announcer who has a voice that reverberates with confidence is certain to gain in prestige value as far as his sponsors are concerned. Sometimes prestige is enhanced by claiming false honors, titles, and authority especially if the audience to whom the appeal is being directed is an ignorant one.

(3) *Language can contribute toward the establishment of a bias by serving as an instrument for the guidance of crowd behavior.* We want to feel the security that comes with going along with the crowd. If a bias can be presented as a popular movement, we dislike to feel the insecurity that comes with

loneliness. Language can be very effective in persuading us to join the parade.

(4) *One of the ways in which we can be persuaded to adopt a bias is by the unobtrusive connection of the new bias with ideas that are already acceptable.* If we accept four or five statements as true, the speaker has built up a positive attitude which inclines us to accept the sixth statement as equally true.

(5) *Sometimes we are induced to accept a bias when language is used to build up an imaginative picture of what might be or what ought to be true together with the suggestion that it must be true.*

Let us say a representative of labor is endeavoring to have a bias in favor of governmental regulation of business adopted by his audience. He repeats the idea again and again that big business must be curbed if democracy is to continue and that the federal government is alone sufficiently powerful to achieve this desired end. He cites the testimony of professors of economics from great universities and speaks of his own training in this field. He quotes the speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, Abraham Lincoln, William Jennings Bryan, Franklin D. Roosevelt. He speaks with confidence and vigor never for a moment suggesting that there may be another side to the question. He points out that all the great countries of Europe have adopted the principle of governmental control of business and calls upon America to join the parade of progress. It is only the "piker" who lives in the past who refuses to join the progressive trends that are in the making. He cites a number of statements as to what constitutes democracy and the American way of life and then suggests that governmental regulation of business is one of the elements in the American tradition. He draws a glorious picture of the ideal America of the future and then calls upon us to vote for and work for governmental regulation of business in order that we may attain that ideal.

We have cited only a few of the misuses of language that

arise because of biased self-interest. There are many more, for the ways of arriving at error are manifold and can never be adequately labeled. It is clear that the methods that are cited as useful in sustaining a bias can also be used with some degree of effectiveness in establishing a bias and vice versa. This means that our classification is arbitrary. No better practice could be afforded the student in recognizing these tricks of language than for him to develop his own classification on the basis of his own personal observation.

The philosopher must be specially trained to recognize the misuses of language. He must also be trained in the science of using language accurately. In order to achieve that end, philosophers have emphasized knowledge of the techniques of definition of terms and the techniques for the scientific analysis of language as indispensable equipment for the philosopher.

METHODS FOR CLARIFYING LANGUAGE BY DEFINITION

No one is ever 100 per cent effective in attaining clarity of expression of ideas through the use of language. All that the trained thinker can do under the limitations of language is to recognize these limitations and to strive valiantly to overcome them by every means at his command. There is no one way of defining terms that is effective under all circumstances. Everything depends upon the term, the context of the discourse, the ability and training of the users of the term, the degree of mastery of language. A term is defined when a verbal sign that has meaning for the user is understood to have like meaning by the interpreter. We can never be absolutely certain that a term is understood exactly as we mean to have it understood. However, we are not without some means of checking on our success in defining a term. We can check our success by having our hearers adopt for their own purposes the term which we have used. When they in turn use this term in the context of their speech, we can check as an interpreter on their usage.

If we have been misunderstood and if we recognize that there has been misuse of a term, the discrepancy can be pointed out and another attempt can be made at definition. Here is a list of ways that we can use in our efforts to make our ideas clear.

(1) *Definition by the use of synonymous terms.* Logicians frown upon this method of definition, but despite this fact it is the method commonly used for making our ideas clear. There is no reason why it should not be used, providing we realize that no conclusion can be drawn from a verbal definition. If someone uses a somewhat unusual term like "synonym," it helps considerably if he translates that to read "having like meaning." The same is true for the terms in any technical vocabulary, including the vocabulary of slang.

(2) *Aristotelian definition.* You look up the meaning of the term, "logic," in the dictionary and find that it is defined as "the science of correct thinking." This method of defining terms was advocated by Aristotle and has come into general use. It consists of two steps: first, relating the term to be defined to some larger class, in this case "science" in general. The second step consists of describing how the term to be defined differs from other members of the general class. In our example, logic is shown to be a particular type of science differentiated from all other types of science since it is the science of "correct thinking." This type of definition helps to bring order into any discussion. It is clear that its success depends upon previous mutual understanding of the meanings of the class terms and of the differentiating terms. This mutual understanding is not always present, in which case attempts to use the Aristotelian definition must be abandoned and other ways adopted for defining the term.

(3) *Definition by example.* This is the stumbling, hit-and-miss method that we usually resort to when asked to define a term. We give examples, we gesticulate, we draw a diagram. The procedure is very unsystematic. Sometimes this method is

confusing because it emphasizes only the lowest common denominator of meaning in a term. If we define democracy by describing democracy as the privilege of having free elections, we are likely to be embarrassed later on in the discussion when we find our European friend limiting the use of the term to mean free elections and nothing else.

(4) *Scientific definition.* Mathematics has always been the tool that the scientist has used to make his ideas clear. The scientist uses mathematics to describe with accuracy the position of the thing defined in relation to other things in a certain system. Sometimes this relationship can be described in terms of how the thing defined came into being, in which case the genetic method of defining is used. It is clear that, despite the fact that the scientific method of definition is the most accurate, it is not likely to be of great service in the clarification of language as commonly used.

A NOTE ON SEMIOTIC OR SEMANTICS AS A METHOD FOR CLARIFYING LANGUAGE

The greatest strides in developing a general technique for the analysis of language have been made in recent years. Although philosophers such as Leibnitz, Locke, Bentham, and Charles Sanders Peirce recognized the possibilities along this line, philosophers in general did not accept this task as their responsibility until they were aroused in the twentieth century to a realization of the devastating attack that can be made upon the truth by means of the mass suggestion of propaganda. Today many philosophers emphasize the analysis of language as a special discipline known as semiotic or semantics.

If one looks over the rows of books in a library, books written in various languages, books from different cultures and different ages of man's history, books showing an immense variety of subject matter and interests, the idea of language analysis may seem an impossible undertaking. A similiar reac-

tion will no doubt result if one turns the dial of a radio from one station to another and listens critically to the wide variety of speeches that are offered over the air. Language analysis aims to yield ways and means by which order and clarity of understanding can be established in the midst of this variety and confusion. Work on the task of developing a general technique of language analysis is still in the experimental stage. The following paragraph may serve to introduce the reader to some of the important books in this highly technical but none the less very practical field of contemporary philosophical investigation.

Four influential groups of philosophers have made contributions to the development of a technique for the general analysis of language. One group, influenced by Alfred Korzybski's *Science and Sanity,* has attempted to apply the methods of language analysis to psychiatry and mental hygiene. Hayakawa, a disciple of Korzybski, has offered a popular treatment of semantics in his *Language in Action.* Stuart Chase's *Tyranny of Words* emphasizes the importance of semantics for social reform. The Cambridge school of English analysts has produced many notable works in language analysis, the best known being *The Meaning of Meaning* written by C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards. European philosophers who are heirs of the philosophical traditions of Ernst Mach (1838-1916) have been specially concerned with some of the more technical phases involved in the analysis of language. Rudolf Carnap's *The Logical Syntax of Language* is a representative work of the Vienna school of analytical philosophers. Of greater interest to the American student are the investigations that have had their sources in the American pragmatic tradition. Charles Morris' *Foundations of the Theory of Signs* and his *Signs, Language and Behavior* are works of an American pragmatist which give promise of establishing language analysis as a recognized technique for the philosopher.

CHAPTER IV

Observation as a Tool for Philosophy

Language is the philosopher's tool for the communication and criticism of ideas. The philosopher is also concerned, however, to have at his disposal tools for gaining knowledge. It is one of his tasks to understand the various ways available for arriving at ideas. He must know how to use these ways of knowing. He must be acquainted with their strength and weakness.

The two basic tools for knowing are reason and observation. The total process by which we use language, reason, and observation for the purpose of attaining ends, that is, for problem solving, is designated by the psychological term "thinking." In this chapter we shall be concerned with observation as the tool for gaining knowledge and in the following chapter we shall consider reason as the tool for the elaboration and interpretation of observations.

Man is unique in that he is the only creature who combines observation and reason with the gift of language. It is man's ability to use language that enables him to store up memories of his experiences and then reformulate these experiences and observations at a later date. Moreover, he need not depend solely upon his own observations. He can utilize the observations of past generations passed on to him by the written and spoken word. It is man's ability to use language that enables him to have constructive insights that grow out of the vague

musings associated with imagination. Even though he may not be aware of the source of these constructive insights he can grasp them when they arise and encase them in meaningful language in the form of poetry or scientific hypothesis. It is man's ability to use language, especially the language of mathematics, that enables man to pursue the task of scientific exploration. It is clear, on the other hand, that language is in turn dependent upon observation. When the child begins to ask the question: "What is it?" we are made aware of the primacy of observation. In the end observation must be recognized as man's ultimate tool for gaining knowledge, but without language and reason that tool would be of little use.

The philosopher, like the psychologist, is interested in the investigation of the physical make-up of man which enables man to experience the external world. However, he is not so much concerned with man's general awareness of the external world as he is with the use to which man puts this awareness for the development of convictions. Man is inclined to base his convictions on observations attained from three sources, namely, personal experience, authority, and scientific investigation. The philosopher must study these three types of observation as sources of convictions. Only through such an investigation can he assess their comparative strength and weakness.

OBSERVATION AS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE

A. Observation as Perception

The way we look upon the universe in all its variety is determined by our sense experiences plus the mental activity by which sense experiences are interpreted in a meaningful way to yield ideas. A host of colors, shapes, sounds, odors, vague impressions impinge upon our senses every minute of our conscious experience. We experience these sensations as a vague kind of physiological awareness when our attention is wandering or when we are daydreaming. When we concen-

trate attention so that we really notice something, this complex of vague impressions is experienced as a perception rather than as a mass of isolated sensations. Perception is the peculiar ability that man possesses which enables him to order his sensations. The objects in a room would be a mere conglomeration of sensations if we did not possess this ability. As it is, we order our sensations into perceptions and then catalogue these perceptions by the use of language. We give names to the objects that we observe. We describe them and compare them with the observations of others. By this process we build up from early childhood series of ideas that serve us in our efforts to come to terms with our environment. This type of perception is the lowest common denominator of observation.

It is obvious that good observation on this level depends upon the possession of normal sense organs and good general health. Good health and normal sense organs provide normal sensations that make it possible for one to compare one's perceptions with those of the majority of human beings in one's environment. In addition good health encourages one to be physically and mentally alert so that one is continually broadening the scope of one's observations.

Another fact that should be noted about observation on this level is that in a sense one's perception of the external world is uniquely personal. The individual constructs his own world by building up his system of ideas on generalizations that arise from many perceptions experienced from infancy throughout the span of life. Very gradually one's system of perceptions becomes stabilized as convictions in so far as they aid us to adjust to our environment and to attain desired ends. These convictions become fixed as habits by which we find our way in a complicated world of objects and persons.

B. Observation as Insight

Occasionally poets or scientists may give us an account as to how they happened to arrive at certain insights that have

been unusually original or fruitful in their fields. The poet may say that the idea for his poem came to him as an inspiration while he was lying down for an afternoon nap and that whole stanzas came to him in a few moments as final and complete. The scientist may report that the idea for an untried hypothesis for the cause of a disease suddenly occurred to him while on a fishing trip far away from his books, his records, and his laboratory apparatus. In both cases the experience of insight is sudden. Usually it occurs in periods of relaxation. In no case does it occur without a previous period of preparation involving considerable manipulation of ideas related to the subsequent insight. This type of intuition characterizes the genius. All of us, however, have these insights occasionally so that we recognize them as rich and creative elements in our experience. We find that they generally carry with them a high degree of conviction.

Although observation as insight appears to be very mysterious it is scarcely more mysterious than observation as perception. Psychologists do not know exactly what mental and physical processes are involved in either case. It is impossible to observe by physical means what goes on in the nervous system in the act of perception just as it is impossible to observe the complicated nervous mechanism involved in the act of insight. The mental processes appear to be similar in both cases. For insight, however, the generalization that comes to us as a unique, creative insight is not dependent directly upon sense impressions but rather upon the mental manipulation of ideas and images. These ideas and images are related in new and original ways to yield a new structure of meanings.

The convictions that arise from perceptions become convictions only after they serve to aid us in our adjustment to our environment. We know that our senses deceive us occasionally. We recognize our perceptions as illusions in these cases after checking our experience by repeated trials over a period of time

or by calling upon the witness of others. In a similar way insights are creative only in so far as they are checked by others. The poet writes his poem and offers it as an insight that can bring a similar meaningful experience to others. The scientist proceeds to test the hypothesis that arose as an intuitive insight. Only after testing his insight can he hope to have it accepted by others as a conviction, even though the insight alone sufficed to yield conviction for him personally.

C. Mystical Intuition

Convictions arise as the result of a third type of personal observation, namely, mystical intuition. Convictions attained through this type of observation are comparatively rare, for mystical intuition is generally experienced by only a limited group of religious persons. There is no type of observation that is more personal than that based on mystical intuition. The experience is so unique that the mystic encounters serious difficulty when he tries to describe his personal observations. It appears that he and he alone can regard his experiences as weighted with such meaning that they elicit immediate conviction. However, wherever men rise to the heights of mystical intuition, they are unanimously in agreement as to the finality of the experience. They become men of conviction with respect to the importance of their unique experience. Consequently it is very unwise to consider mystical intuition as of no value as a tool for knowing. If we take this negative attitude, we too may find ourselves confronted with the reality of the experience. If that were to happen, we would in all probability agree with the other mystics in considering it the best tool for knowing. The mystic is convinced that it yields the assurance and wisdom which philosophers continually seek in vain through other means.

By and large, mystics have made many contributions to philosophy. In most cases the mystics who contribute to philoso-

phy are not entirely dependent on the mystical experience. They arrive at their convictions through the mystical experience. In order to express these convictions in a philosophical way, that is, in a way that others will find convincing, they are compelled to resort to some other way of knowing. This, for example, was the case with Spinoza (1632-77) who depended on logical reasoning in conjunction with mystical intuition. Jacob Boehme (1575-1624) is an example of a philosopher who depends almost entirely upon mystical intuition as a way of knowing. His writings are almost unreadable. Despite that fact his books contain suggestive ideas that no student of philosophy can ignore. Occasionally mystics give us an account of the technique that they employ for arriving at mystical intuition, for example, St. John of the Cross, a Spanish mystic of the sixteenth century. In no case, however, is it possible for the mystics to offer accurate observations on the experiences that led them to have the convictions which they affirm as ultimate.

In some cases it is difficult to draw a sharp line of distinction between observation based on what we have called insight and observation based on mystical intuition. The experience of mystical intuition always involves intense emotion whereas insight may or may not involve emotions, depending upon the nature of the ideas that are being shaped into a meaningful pattern; and depending, too, on the temperament and mood of the subject. More important than this as a means of distinguishing the two experiences is the fact that the experience of insight increases one's sense of being an individual while the opposite is the case for the mystical experience. The experience of insight heightens one's sense of power. It intensifies one's personal ego. Men who are especially gifted with ability to utilize this way of knowing frequently give less fortunate individuals the impression that they are self-centered, egotistic personalities. This was the case, for example, with the poet-

philosopher Goethe and the philosopher-scientist Galileo. There is nothing more characteristic of the mystic's way of gaining knowledge than the fact that he considers it essential that his own personality be submerged in some greater, all-absorbing object. All personal desires of sense, will, and intellect must be eliminated before the mystical experience attains results.

Although the mystics have made rich contributions to philosophy by using their own peculiar type of observation as a means of establishing convictions, serious criticism can be leveled at a number of points against mysticism as a way of knowing. The most obvious disadvantage rests in the fact that so few men can use mystical intuition as a way of knowing. Since the experience is so uniquely personal, it is impossible to have the experience of the mystic checked by any external means. As a result these convictions cannot be accepted as knowledge by others. Moreover, the highly emotional character of the experience associates it with abnormal rather than the normal phases of human existence. Highly emotional states, similar to all appearances to those of the mystic, can be encouraged by artificial means by drugs, by Yogi practices, by mass suggestion of crowd psychology in a religious revival, or by magical practices among primitive peoples. This does not disprove the validity of the mystic experience as a way of knowing. There can be no doubt, however, that it arouses suspicion among the non-mystics who constitute the large mass of philosophers.

OBSERVATION THROUGH GROUP EXPERIENCE—AUTHORITY

We have said that perception can be considered the lowest common denominator of observation. Perception is the source of many of our convictions. Perceptions that aid us in our adjustment to our environment sooner or later become accepted as authorities to guide us in our daily living. We know where

to find the breakfast table after a time and we build up a set of habits that will carry us to the breakfast table every morning with unerring accuracy. Our lives in all their detailed contacts with the external world are largely dependent upon the authority established by perceptions. We are also dependent upon authority of a different type for convictions that involve whole systems of ideas of a more complex nature, for example, convictions about principles of conduct, attitudes, ideals, beliefs. These convictions are accepted on the authority of the experience of the social group to which we belong rather than on the authority of elementary perception. We observe how others act and think and we observe the reactions of approval or disapproval evidenced by others of our group when we accept or reject established convictions. The result is that this type of observation of the behavior of our social group conditions us to accept on authority systems of ideas that the traditions and experiences of the group consider worthy of transmission to each new generation.

Authority becomes established as the stored-up observations of the group. It is transmitted from generation to generation by processes of education and indirectly by more subtle processes of group suggestion. It serves to stabilize the hard-won gains of knowledge in the past, but it may also stand in the way of attempts to attain new knowledge. Authority is especially important as a stabilizer of truths in such fields as religion, law, and history. The tested experience of the group in the fields of religion and law must be given more weight than the experiences of the individual or of a limited number of individuals if a civilization is to maintain its unity and its continuity and balance over a period of years. Institutional stability helps to carry a civilization through cycles of decay. It may also serve to sustain a civilization in periods of productivity. In the field of history, knowledge of the past is almost entirely dependent upon authority as far as written records are

concerned. The trained historian is one who is an expert in the critical comparison of authorities.

Authority as a source of knowledge is of great value as a timesaver. If we could not depend upon authority as a short cut to knowledge on occasions when action is required, we could not accomplish very much in the limited span of a lifetime. We have to depend upon the authority of our doctor when he gives us advice about our health. We depend upon the authority of old citizens when they give us directions for finding the post office in a strange town. We are prevented from making many mistakes by depending upon the authority of our parents in the formative years of our life.

The chief disadvantages of authority as a way of knowing are two in number. In the first place, authority is inclined to depend too much on group prestige. It tends to give the impression that it is self-verifying when this is actually not the case. It is not sufficient proof to point to the fact that everyone accepts something as true. Authority must be subject to some external check from time to time or no progress will be made in the field in which that authority is being applied. Authority must be sufficiently flexible to permit re-examination wherever this is possible by personal perception, scientific observation, or reason. A second disadvantage of the method of authority is that too great dependence upon this method encourages laziness. When this laziness becomes emotionalized, it leads to dangerous consequences. All of us are inclined to accept the convictions of our group. After a time these convictions become habitual ways of looking at things as fixed attitudes. Attitudes can be changed. Very often they ought to be changed. In some occasions it is of utmost importance that they be changed.

Too often, however, when attitudes have been established because of an emotionalized attachment to authority, any suggestion that these attitudes be changed is regarded with horror.

The individual is convinced that his whole personality will disintegrate if he is faced with the prospect of changing his attitudes. For example, most Americans have accepted a set of ideas regarding the sovereignty of their nation on the basis of authority. These ideas have become emotionalized as attitudes regarding patriotism. The threat of atomic war makes it imperative that our attitudes regarding national sovereignty and a world federation of nations be radically changed. The man who is accustomed to depend upon group authority and who has grown intellectually and emotionally flabby because of this dependence will struggle desperately to avoid changing his attitudes for fear of the inner disintegration of his personality. He will hark back time and again to the comfort of old authorities despite the fact that he is faced with a new situation that makes it imperative that old authoritarian attitudes be re-examined. Dependence upon the observation of group experience is inevitable for all men. It is not inevitable, however, that man should regard authority as the only way of knowing and that he should regard this authority with so much awe that he refuse to check it from time to time with other means of knowing which are at hand as a part of his intellectual equipment.

OBSERVATION AS SCIENTIFIC METHOD

The scientific method is nothing more or less than a very complex and intricate type of trained and controlled observation. All of us are interested in the results achieved by this method for we are living in the greatest age of scientific discovery the world has ever known. Modern science is an important element in the intellectual atmosphere of our time. It is in our blood to such an extent that we do not often stop to consider that the scientific development is a radically new emergent in the history of man. Our own people, the men of Western culture, are responsible for this development in the

past five centuries. For better or worse, it is our contribution to world history.

It is impossible to explain why Western man should have developed this mysterious faculty of trained and controlled observation in such a way as to give rise to modern science. The unique development of science in the Western world can be regarded as the result of the merging of two streams of influence. The first stream of influence had its source in Christian circles in the attitude of childlike wonder with which Christian mystics, especially the Franciscans, looked upon the world of nature. These men emerged from the monk's cell in the Middle Ages to view the external world in a different way than man had ever viewed it before. During the Renaissance men were instilled with an attitude of curiosity and skepticism through the rediscovery of the work of the ancient Greek philosophers, writers, and artists. The combination of these two traits, childlike wonder and curiosity tempered with skepticism, operating in the hearts and lives of men of unmatched genius gave rise to the scientific attitude.

The men who discovered the scientific method were motivated by some inner drive to know the mysteries of the world of nature. The method of observation evolved by such men as Roger Bacon, Galileo, Leonardo da Vinci was later popularized by Francis Bacon. It is a composite method involving: (1) identification of a problem, (2) the setting up of a hypothetical solution to a problem, (3) logical deduction of the possible consequences of this hypothesis, (4) a process of testing these consequences by observation. Fertile hypotheses generally arise through intuitive insight. They may be based on authority also in so far as accepted ideas or the results of previous observation are utilized in new situations with the hope that they may prove useful as explanations. The third step, that is, the process of logical deduction, involves the use of the tool of reason which philosophers such as Aristotle had

clarified long ago and which we shall discuss in the next chapter. By means of this tool of reason the scientific observer reasons that *if* hypothesis A is true, *then* factors a, b, c, and d will logically follow. This process of reasoning enables him to choose for testing that hypothesis which most adequately fits the totality of facts involved in the problem under investigation.

The final step is the step which most definitely characterizes scientific research. In this step the investigator seeks to set up experimental situations by means of which his hypothesis can be subjected to controlled observation. The success of his method depends to a large degree on the investigator's ingenuity in setting up these experimental situations. It is obvious that it is the trained observation of the scientist which enables him to formulate and clarify problems. Moreover, it is obvious that it is trained observation which enables him to isolate the significant facts which have bearing on his problem in order that fruitful hypotheses may arise through intuitive insight. The process by which trained and controlled observations are utilized concurrently for the testing of hypotheses is not so obvious.

A. Mill's Methods for Testing Hypotheses

John Stuart Mill formulated the methods by which hypotheses could be tested by observation. The methods most frequently used are the method of agreement and the method of difference. The theoretical principle involved in the method of agreement has been formulated as follows:

> Nothing is the cause of a phenomenon in the absence of which it nevertheless occurs.[1]

We hear it commonly affirmed in the autumn that the trees lose their leaves because of the frosts. If we examine this situation carefully over a long period of time we shall find that there is

[1] Edwin Leavitt Clarke, *The Art of Straight Thinking*, (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1929), p. 168.

regularity of agreement between trees losing their leaves and the presence of autumn frosts. Can we say that the frosts cause the trees to lose their leaves? Inquiry of travelers who have resided in the tropics where frosts are never known will suffice to establish instances in which the trees lose their leaves regularly without the presence of frosts. We must conclude that frosts cannot be the causal factor because there are occasions on which trees naturally lose their leaves despite the absence of frosts.

The method of agreement is a method of trained observation that is most useful in dealing with hypotheses that cannot be tested in the laboratory. Laboratory controls, for example, cannot be established for studying the effects of frost on forest trees or for dealing with the phenomena of the heavens. It is important to note, however, that this method functions best in disproving a hypothesis rather than in verifying the hypothesis. We can never be sure that we have examined all cases, so that we cannot know for certain that the two apparently related factors are *always* present or that they are the *only* related factors. Sometimes, however, science makes considerable progress through the disproof of accepted ideas by the use of trained observation in the method of agreement. One of the earliest instances of the use of the method of agreement in this way is to be found in Pliny. After due process of observation Pliny rejected the belief in astrology on the ground that masters and slaves, kings and beggars are known to have been born at the same time.

In order that hypotheses may be verified it is necessary to control observation under laboratory conditions. The most effective method for this purpose is the method of difference. The theoretical principle of this method has been stated as follows:

If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs,

and an instance in which it does not occur, have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ, is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause, of the phenomenon.[2]

Pasteur had demonstrated that the poisonous property of the air depended upon bacteria. Dr. Lister of the Glasgow Infirmary considered it a hypothetical possibility that one might prevent gangrene in a wound by applying some material capable of destroying the life of the bacteria in the floating particles of the air. He used carbolic acid for this purpose in his ward and then compared the results with other wards. Gangrene decreased rapidly in his wards while other wards across the hall had the usual high percentage of gangrene infections. The method of difference utilized under circumstances in which controlled observation was possible resulted in a great medical discovery.

The method of difference is pre-eminently the method of experimental science. It is subject to application in many different ways, and it is frequently combined with the method of agreement as a means of checking a hypothesis which has been established by that method. It will be noted that the success of the method depends, first, upon the ability to keep all factors under control, second, upon the accuracy with which only one condition is varied at a time and the results recorded. In the case of Lister's experiment, conditions in all the wards were kept uniform. Only one difference was brought to bear at a time in the experimental ward, namely, the use of carbolic acid. The high degree of freedom from gangrene in Lister's ward could be causally connected with only one factor, the use of carbolic acid as an antiseptic.

B. Classification and Statistics as Aids to Observation

Brief mention must be made of two other types of trained observation that are important in scientific procedures. One

[2] John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic,* Bk. iii, Ch. viii, sec. 2.

of the preliminary steps of all scientific investigation involves the collecting and classifying of data. The botanist collects and classifies plants. The geologist classifies rocks, minerals, and strata of the earth's surface. The bacteriologist examines and classifies bacteria. Science becomes systematized knowledge and problems are clarified because certain rules for good classification which have been formulated by the logicians are adhered to by workers in all scientific fields.

The rules for good classification can be summarized as follows: (1) The classification must be exhaustive, that is, there must be enough classes to cover all the data. (2) The classes must be exclusive, that is, there must be no overlapping of classes. (3) There must be only one basis of classification. For example, if we are classifying the religious affiliations of Americans, our classification must include Buddhists and Christian Scientists. Moreover, the classification must not include fraternal orders, for Baptists and Methodists will also be discovered to be members of fraternal orders, giving rise to confused overlapping. Finally, the classifier must not begin his classification on the basis of doctrine and then shift to another basis, for instance, church government.

In recent years sciences such as sociology and psychology have made rapid advances by using the statistical method. These sciences have to deal with the actions of human beings, and the behavior of human beings is notoriously unpredictable. By using statistical techniques the investigator can observe trends more accurately than it would otherwise be possible. Moreover, the investigator can use statistics to clarify the extent of the relationship between any two sets of factors. For example, by figuring out correlations the sociologist can judge the extent of the relationship of poverty to drinking or of juvenile delinquency to various age groups. Mathematics has always been an indispensable aid to trained and controlled observation. It is only recently, however, that social scientists

have realized that observation by mathematics can be a valuable tool in dealing with the unstable factors of human psychology and social change. Like all other methods of gaining knowledge the statistical method is subject to misuse. It must be recognized that conclusions are reliable only in so far as the investigator has an adequate sampling of instances both with regard to the fairness with which he selects instances and the extent to which he has information on a sufficient number of cases. One can easily misuse statistics by overlooking cases that do not support one's own preconceived opinion.

C. Methods for Observation in the Social Sciences

Three other types of trained observation are used by the social scientist. The case-study method trains the observer in gathering facts about an individual. The observer gathers evidence about the individual from as many different angles as possible. He endeavors to describe the varied influences in the life of an individual as fully and accurately as possible without thinking of any one of these influences as an explanation for the attitudes and behavior of that individual. The survey method trains the observer in gathering facts about a social group. The survey usually endeavors to gather facts about a particular phase of the life of a social group such as health, education, crime, recreation, or housing. The observer follows a carefully prepared survey schedule which guides him in his quest for information. Only after all available data has been collected can the social scientist feel free to draw generalizations from his study, and even then these generalizations must be recognized to have limited application since they can consider only the factors that have come within the range of the survey. Other crucial factors may have been neglected or slighted in the survey.

The historical method has been remarkably successful in enabling us to reconstruct the past. The historian is dependent

upon the authority of the written word or of the traditions of a people to a great extent. He has discovered, however, that he can arrive at conclusions regarding the past which have a greater probability of truth if he combines this method of authority with a technique involving comparison of all available data bearing on his problem. Data is gathered on the art products and the artifacts of a period by unearthing the remains of ancient cultures. Fashions and techniques of writing are compared. Information is gathered regarding the social situation of an era. Various texts that are available are compared to determine their date and their authenticity. By this comparative method the historian can check on authorities and draw conclusions as to their reliability. He need not be dependent completely upon the limited set of facts presented by one authority.

For example, a tablet from Assur-Bani-Pal's library may record that five hundred thousand Hebrews were slain and carried into captivity during a certain campaign of an Assyrian king. Here is the voice of authority. Must the historian depend upon this data? By using the comparative method he can consider additional information such as the references in Old Testament history. Knowledge of the social situation among the Hebrew tribes may lead him to believe that the total population could not have exceeded this number. Knowledge of the tendency of Assyrian kings to exaggerate their exploits so that they would excel all predecessors may be of additional help. The extent to which he can bring a large mass of data that is relevant either directly or indirectly to bear upon the situation in a comparative way will determine the reliability of his final judgment. The trained observation of the historian cannot enable him to go beyond probability in his reconstruction of the past, but he is no longer dependent upon authority alone.

CHAPTER V

Reason as a Tool for Philosophy

We are living in an age in which the truth of observation, especially the observation of the senses, is held in greater esteem than the truth of reason. This was not always the case. In the sixth century B.C. the Eleatic philosophers of the Greek colonies of Sicily opposed the Ionian natural philosophers on this point. The Ionians emphasized observation as the tool of philosophy. The Eleatics had become entranced with reason as a tool for philosophy. They found that they could not always trust the observation of their senses but that the results of logical and mathematical reasoning were always true and self-evident. By and large the latter group has exerted the most influence in the history of philosophy. Philosophers have been inclined to trust reason rather than sense experience. It is only in comparatively recent times that the two tools have been combined to form the scientific method.

THE NATURE OF REASON

In the previous chapter we have explained how our general awareness of the universe is ordered by perception. This process of ordering proceeds one step further in the human mind. Percepts are ordered into general classes so that we think of all members of a class as possessing certain universal characteristics. Reason is a short-cut method of inferring truth by a process of recognizing the relationship existing between

classes independent of immediate experience. Reasoning is the process by which one idea is discovered to be necessarily related to another idea. Consequently, reason can be defined as the tool for the elaboration and interpretation of observation by comprehension of the relationship existing between ideas.

Observation is the basic tool for gaining knowledge. However, we cannot claim to possess knowledge until we can interpret the significance of our observations. For example, a physician collects a mass of observations regarding the illness of a patient, but this does not mean that he can automatically diagnose the case. An elaborate process of reasoning goes on in his mind in which he reasons that certain symptoms are like other classes of symptoms previously recorded. Or he may reason that if this observation points to a certain disease then certain other symptoms must also be found in the same case. After this elaborate process of reasoning checked by additional recourse to further observation the physician arrives at his diagnosis. Reason is not the only element in intelligence but is certainly a very important element, for without reason man would lack the capacity to profit from observation and experience.

In order to arrive at true conclusions it is necessary that our observations be true to the facts of the case. In addition it is essential that our reasoning be valid. By valid reasoning is meant that we recognize a relationship as existing between ideas only in the cases where there actually is such a relationship. In the example cited in the above paragraph the doctor may go astray in his diagnosis by poor observation; for example, he may mistake smallpox for chickenpox. On the other hand, although it is not very likely in this case, the physician may go astray in his diagnosis because of invalid reasoning. He may say to himself that if this is a case of chickenpox the child should have been sent home from school and since the child was sent home from school the disease must be chickenpox.

There is no logical necessity which relates the idea of being sent home from school with the idea of chickenpox and only with that idea.

It is clear from this rather crude illustration that we are more likely to arrive at false conclusions because of faulty observation rather than because of faulty reasoning. Therefore we have considered observation as primary. This is not always the case, however, and the logician is especially interested in the cases where we go astray because of invalid reasoning. If our observations are true, we may arrive at true conclusions even though our reasoning is invalid. If we reason that all fish swim and that since bass swim they must be fish, we have arrived at a true conclusion in spite of our invalid reasoning. On the other hand, if our initial observations are false, we are not likely to arrive at true conclusions no matter how logically valid our reasoning may be. The men of the Middle Ages were remarkably acute at logical reasoning. However, as long as they believed in demons as responsible for insanity, their reasoning could not arrive at true conclusions for the understanding and treatment of mental illness. This does not mean that we can depend entirely upon observation and pay no attention as to whether our reasoning is valid. If muddled thinking leads to correct conclusions, as is sometimes the case, we are lucky. There is no assurance, however, that this same habit of muddled thinking may not lead to disastrous conclusions at any moment despite the accuracy of our observations.

The great abiding enemies of the philosopher who is in quest of truth are verbal confusion, false beliefs, and invalid reasoning. The chapter on language as a tool for philosophy gave us some information as to how verbal confusion can be overcome. The previous chapter on observation showed us how beliefs can be checked by directed and controlled observation. In this chapter we shall indicate some of the methods employed by the logician for the analysis of reason so that

invalid reasoning can be recognized and checked. The logicians have developed elaborate procedures for classifying and analyzing the various kinds of relationships that can exist between ideas formulated as classes and propositions. They have also been concerned to analyze the ways in which we go astray by inferring the existence of a relationship of ideas when no such relationship actually exists.

ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING

Aristotle discovered long ago that reasoning proceeds by combining two or more ideas which are related thus giving rise to a third idea which is different from either of these two ideas and yet somehow a joint product of both. He claimed that two or more ideas and the conclusion that is implied by connecting these related ideas is the fundamental unit of all reasoning. The fundamental pattern of reasoning is the syllogism, said Aristotle, as seen in the following example:

> All men are mortal.
> Socrates is a man.
> Therefore: Socrates is mortal.

What is the nature of this syllogism on analysis? We have stated in the first sentence that the idea "all men" is related to the idea of "mortality" in such a way that it is always a part of mortality or contained in mortality. In the second sentence we have affirmed that the new idea "Socrates" is related to the idea of "men" in such a way that it is included in the idea of men. In the third sentence or conclusion we note that the idea "Socrates" must necessarily be contained in the idea of "mortality." This is all very simple indeed, for if X is included in Y and Y in Z, X must be included in Z. Aristotle found, however, that the many ways in which ideas could be related made human thinking in the form of the syllogism anything but simple.

Aristotle discovered that there were four primary relations,

one of which must always be present. A class may be totally included in another class as when we say "All men are mortal." It may be partially included in another class as "Some men are mortal." It may be totally excluded from a second class in which case we would say "No men are mortal." Or it may be partially excluded, as "Some men are not mortal." It will be noted in our example of the syllogism that one term, "man" is found in the first and second statements but omitted in the conclusion. This means that the two terms in the conclusion can be related to form a conclusion because they were previously shown to have a common relationship to this mysterious third term. Aristotle rightly considered this third term, called the middle term, as extremely important.

Now the complicated nature of human reason is seen in dim outline when we realize that syllogisms differ considerably depending on the position of the middle term, that is, as to whether the middle term is subject or predicate in each of the first two premises. For example, we may have a syllogism proving negative conclusions in which the middle term is a predicate in both premises as follows:

All metals are elements.
Wood is not an element.
Therefore: Wood is not a metal.

Or a syllogism may prove a limited conclusion by having the middle term serve as the subject of both premises as follows:

Sioux are warlike.
Sioux are plains Indians.
Therefore: Some plains Indians are warlike.

The confusion grows apace when we realize that these ways of using the middle term can be combined with the various types of primary relationships of inclusion and exclusion in the major and minor premises to offer as many as two hundred fifty-six possible types of syllogisms. Fortunately there are only

thirty-six significant types of syllogisms. Of these only nineteen are valid.

The logician is entranced by this complicated pattern of human reason progressing by syllogistic deduction and has given us an analysis of the logical process which either enthralls or exasperates students. At the moment, however, we are concerned primarily with the ways and means by which we can use logic as a tool which will enable us to keep on the straight and narrow path in our quest for truth. Ability to analyze the syllogism is of considerable value for the philosopher for without that ability he will not be able to tell exactly when and where he has wandered off the highway of straight thinking.

Aristotle was on the right track when he affirmed that we reason by means of syllogisms. That does not mean, however, that our deductive reasoning takes on the neat pattern of premise following premise in perfect order to yield a valid or invalid conclusion. Actual reasoning is like the flight of the swallow rather than like the flight of the crow. The conclusion may come before the premises. Premises may never be fully stated or may be taken for granted.

You are seated in Grand Central Station trying to reason out how you can get in touch with a friend who came to New York a few months previously and whose address is unknown to you. Notice how your ideas are telescoped together into an unrecognizable mass as you endeavor to solve the problem: You try "Information" on the telephone exchange only to learn that your friend is not listed on the New York exchange. A long chain of ideas has been related in your mind in a complicated way in a very few minutes, giving rise to this plan of procedure; but the syllogisms involved certainly are not very precise or orderly. You say that it was a good idea at any rate and begin seeking for other mental relationships that may yield a better idea. How about a city directory such as you

use back home on such occasions? Yes, a new city directory is usually published at the beginning of each year and your friend came to New York in September. But, no, that won't do! New York is too large for a city directory. They don't even publish one for Chicago. The process of reasoning by syllogism without bothering to formulate syllogisms goes on and on until finally you think about a friend of a friend of your friend who may be the middle term in a chain of related ideas which will ultimately bring a successful solution of your problem.

The first step in applying the logician's technique for the analysis of the syllogism involves the very laborious task of putting an argument into syllogistic form. For most complicated series of arguments this task is difficult indeed. The trained philosopher must work at this task until he can recognize the structure of arguments and apply the rules for the testing of valid syllogisms with almost automatic accuracy. Those of us who are not professional philosophers may with a little practice learn enough about the syllogism to recognize most of the common fallacies that occur because of invalid reasoning.

FALSE STEPS IN REASONING

A very casual acquaintance with the nature of the syllogism will teach us, first of all, to be on the lookout for assumptions that are taken as a premise for an argument and yet never explicitly stated. A long argument may lead to the conclusion that labor unions ought to be outlawed. A little analysis of the syllogistic reasoning involved may enable us to discover, for instance, that both parties in the argument take for granted a premise that is never specifically stated, namely, the premise that all labor leaders are racketeers. The recognition of this hidden assumption may lead us to realize that since only some labor leaders are racketeers our arguments in favor of outlawing unions may not be as valid as we had originally supposed.

Acquaintance with the logician's technique of arranging arguments in the form of syllogisms and then testing the syllogism for validity should enable us to detect another type of fallacy that frequently arises. This fallacy, called the fallacy of the undistributed middle, can be easily detected in the following example:

All dogs are mammals.
All cats are mammals.
Therefore: All cats are dogs.

Would we have noticed a fallacy in the argument if it had proceeded in the following manner?

All dogs are mammals.
All collies are mammals.
Therefore: All collies are dogs.

From time to time certain individuals become excited over the possibility that Communism may be spread in certain institutions of higher learning through the teaching of radical professors. The argument may run something as follows: "Communists are the worst radicals the 100 per cent American has to oppose these days. I talked to my nephew the other day and he had a lot of radical ideas that he had picked up at X college. If those professors at X college are not a crowd of Communists, I miss my bet. Something ought to be done about it. Some of those fellows admit that they are radicals. We ought to call in the FBI for an investigation and run those Reds out of the state." Put into syllogistic form the argument is as follows:

All Communists are radicals.
Professors at X college are radicals.
Those college professors are Communists.

Add a little fiery oratory to this argument and one can easily see how it would carry weight in many communities.

Once we analyze this syllogism, the fallacy of the argument becomes quite clear. In the first or major premise we are re-

ferring to only *some* of the middle term, "radicals." In the second or minor premise we likewise refer to only some of the middle term "radicals." Now there is no way of being sure that in both cases we are referring to the same portion of the middle term. In other words there is no possible way of knowing or of inferring that there is an interconnection of relationships which would enable one to affirm a relationship on logical grounds between college professors at X college and Communism. Most logic books use circles to diagram the relationship between classes in a syllogistic argument. The student will find it helpful to become acquainted with this practice. It will enable him to see in a graphic way whether or not a syllogism is valid. However, as we have previously pointed out, much of the difficulty associated with the analysis of a chain of fallacious reasoning resides in the fact that it is a tedious task in many cases to put many arguments into regular syllogistic form.

The most common form of syllogistic argument takes the form of an if-then statement for the major premise and results in what logicians call a hypothetical syllogism after the following manner:

If a Republican were president, the government would not show indecision.
But we do not have a Republican president.
Therefore: The government will show indecision.

In this type of syllogism the first part of the hypothetical statement introduced by such words as "if," "supposing," "assuming" is called the antecedent. The other part which states the resulting consequence is called the consequent. Fallacies in logical reasoning can be easily recognized for this type of syllogism by applying the following rule: In a hypothetical syllogism one must either affirm the antecedent or deny the consequent in the minor premise in order to reach a valid conclusion. In the example we have cited above this rule has

been violated. We have denied the antecedent in the minor premise by saying that we do not have a Republican president. The result is that the conclusion is invalid. A little thought will make it clear that this argument is invalid apart from the application of our rule. There are other possibilities for having a government that would not show indecision apart from the condition of having a Republican president. As a matter of fact the hypothetical syllogisms do not differ essentially from the type of syllogism previously studied in the way in which they lead to invalid conclusions. In both cases error arises when a relationship of ideas is assumed to exist that is not actually present.

A third type of syllogism frequently found in arguments takes the following form:

Either I go to college or I do not get an education.
I do not have an opportunity to go to college.
Therefore: I cannot get an education.

This type of syllogism called the disjunctive syllogism is related to the hypothetical syllogism for the first premise could be stated in hypothetical form. Few errors are committed in deducing conclusions from the major premise in this type of syllogism. The error arises when we assume that the alternatives are mutually exclusive when that is not actually the case. In the example that we have cited we know that there are other possibilities. One can get an education without going to college and there are some who go to college who are not educated. Persuasive speakers are very fond of this disjunctive type of argument. They can lead us astray into fallacious thinking because language is so vague that we cannot always tell whether or not the alternatives are mutually exclusive.

REASONING BY ANALOGY

We have seen that man's ability to reason is dependent upon his ability to recognize relationships of inclusion and exclusion,

his ability to recognize implications in if-then propositions, his ability to recognize alternatives in either-or propositions. One element in reason which we have heretofore neglected must now be considered, namely, our ability to reason by analogy. Logicians have been intrigued so much by the intricacies of the syllogism that they are inclined to forget that the like-as propositions of analogy are also important. Man's ability to reason by analogy is almost as important as his ability to reason by syllogism. As a matter of fact the two are so closely connected in the active process of reasoning that they rarely operate independently.

Is there life in the universe other than that on our particular planet? This is an interesting speculative problem. We might reason as follows: Our little world is a comparatively insignificant unit in a universe that is moved by an orderly system of law rather than by chance. If this universe is ruled by a creative mind there must be some purpose in this immense creation. The most complicated forms of matter on our planet are living organisms. It is not reasonable to think that the immense energy evidenced in the universe beyond our planetary system is mere waste energy in the order of creation. It is more likely that other planetary systems in the immense expanse of space give rise to living organisms. This speculative argument is based on deductive reasoning.

However, an argument of a more convincing nature may arise from reasoning by analogy. It is pointed out that the planet Mars resembles our planet in many respects. Does it resemble our planet with respect to those characteristics that enable our earth to support life? Since astronomers answer this question affirmatively, we are inclined to conclude that Mars probably resembles our planet in an additional way, namely, by supporting living organisms. Since there is no way of checking this possibility at present, we can only accept the argument as interesting speculation.

Many of man's most original ideas arise through his ability to see resemblances that are ordinarily neglected. Stringed musical instruments were invented because some forgotten genius was able to recognize that certain characteristics of the bow were similar to certain situations in nature which produced agreeable sounds. Darwin's ability to think in terms of like-as enabled him to see similarities in Malthus' theory of population and certain phenomena in biology which furnished the basis for his theory of evolution. Pavlov's insight in formulating like-as propositions in the comparison of the behavior of a dog and the behavior of a human being under certain circumstances was the basis of his famous psychological discovery of the conditioned reflex. Auenbrugger's ability to think of the respects in which the human chest containing fluid was similar to a partially emptied wine cask led to the diagnostic technique of tapping the patient's chest in examination for tuberculosis and pneumonia.

One of the reasons logicians are inclined to neglect analogy as an important element in human reason is because analogy is subject to such frequent abuse. Men are inclined to enjoy the delightful process of reasoning by analogy to such an extent that they fall into grievous errors. False analogies can be constructed at a moment's notice to prove almost any idea that a speaker or a writer is proposing. An analogy cannot be trusted if a conclusion is based on a very few resemblances or if the resemblances are superficial and unimportant or if so much emphasis is placed upon resemblances that important differences are forgotten or ignored.

Analogies are especially dangerous when they are used in arguments in such a way that they make a very complicated situation appear more simple than is actually the case. Political cartoonists are experts at presenting complicated political situations in a graphic way by means of analogy. A politician may win his point when he affirms that it is unwise to change horses

in the middle of the stream, but the analogy is weak from the point of view of the logician. The situation of a nation changing its political leadership in time of stress involves many more complicating factors that are not present in the situation of a horseman changing mounts in midstream. Reason by analogy can be used with considerable freedom in our quest for new ideas and for purposes of illustrating difficult ideas. If we are wise, we shall be suspicious of the use of analogies in arguments and in all situations in which the element of persuasion is paramount.

PART THREE

Landmarks on the Highways of Philosophy

CHAPTER VI

Immanuel Kant And the Landmarks in Epistemology

The highways of philosophy described in the second chapter are now open before us. All of these highways give promise of leading us to the lofty heights of truth. Most of us feel the call of the open road and we want to be up and away. Even though we cannot see the distant peaks because of the vast terrain ahead and because of the mist and tempests that are found at all times lingering over the land of philosophy, we are convinced that the mountain peaks are there. We know that others who have traveled these highways have returned with many precious gems of truth that have enriched the life of man. We have heard rumors of the wonderful landmarks that have been constructed by the pioneer investigators who have followed one or another of these promising highways. Furthermore we feel that we are pretty well equipped to undertake the journey. The basic tools of language, observation, and reason are neatly packed away in our knapsacks. These tools have been improved considerably by the pathfinders in philosophy and we have reasonable assurance that they will see us through the difficulties that may arise. To be sure we have not had a great deal of practice in using them. We have merely handled them in a rather haphazard way, more or less as a child manipulates a new toy. Nevertheless we have considerable reason for believing that the only way we shall ever learn

proficiency in their use is by putting them to work as aids for solving the problems that will inevitably confront us on the road ahead. Imagine our disappointment then when we find that the highways of philosophy are blocked by a board of inspectors made up of analytical thinkers who insist that we do some more thinking about thinking before we can proceed on our way.

We notice that one of the important members of this board of inspectors is a Scotchman named David Hume. He appears to be a man who is rather free and easy in his approach. He occasionally leaves his game of billiards to point out some interesting passages in his book on *Enquiry Concerning the Human Understanding.* The president of the board of inspectors, however, is in deadly earnest. He is a small, unprepossessing, precise man by the name of Immanuel Kant. His book on *The Critique of Pure Reason* is the most important book on epistemology in philosophical literature. It is this book that he uses as a basis for questioning us about the nature of the truth which we consider as the goal of our quest. He wants to know whether the attainment of truth is possible. To what extent is the human mind capable of attaining truth? is the question that concerns him.

IMMANUEL KANT: THE PHILOSOPHER AS CRITIC AND ANALYST

It could hardly have been expected that a German professor at the University of Koenigsberg in the eighteenth century would have been interested in these critical problems to the extent that he became the authority on theory of knowledge. German philosophy was dominated by the rationalistic philosophy of Leibnitz which had no doubts whatsoever of the ability of the human reason to come to terms with ultimate reality. Kant had been trained in this philosophical tradition. Moreover, the intellectual movement known as the Enlighten-

ment which had started in England and France in the seventeenth century had reached its peak in Germany during the lifetime of Kant. It was an age of reason and this movement preached the gospel of reason. In many respects Kant was a product of this age. Why should he ask embarrassing questions about the validity of reason?

The mystery of Kant's interest in epistemology becomes all the more incomprehensible when we consider his personality. This retiring, hardworking professor had only one real joy in life and that was the joy of using his acute reason for the solution of problems of all types. He never traveled over forty miles from his native city. His methodical bachelor's existence resembled the life of a monk rather than the life of a modern man. There was this difference, however. Kant's whole life and energy were directed to intellectual rather than religious pursuits, for he found little comfort in the routine of formalized religion. These interests covered a wide field including the natural sciences such as physics, chemistry, geography, astronomy. He was especially proficient in mathematics. Ethics and theology, politics and art were among the subjects that were considered with originality in his philosophy. Nevertheless, this man who lived by and for the intellect has attained recognition among philosophers as the man who subjected the intellect to the most stringent of all critical examinations.

Kant is frequently considered the philosopher's philosopher since he appears to write for the philosopher rather than for the public in general. His vocabulary is technical, his style is turgid and verbose, his ideas are theoretical presentations with little effort at illustration. It is not likely that he will ever be read with much pleasure by any but philosophers. Despite this fact, it can be seriously questioned whether the philosophers really have a right to claim Kant as their exclusive property. He was actually a scientist in the early part of his intellectual career. As a teacher he lectured in such fields as

mathematics, natural science, physical geography, anthropology, and logic. He even gave a course on the science of fortification. It was not until he was forty-six that he became recognized as a philosopher in his own university and received an appointment as professor of logic and metaphysics. It is worthy of note that he read practically no philosophers except the Englishmen and Rousseau and Voltaire and that he had no interest in the history of philosophy. Comparatively few books on philosophy were in his library and many of those had apparently been given to him after he had become famous throughout Europe.

The simplest explanation of Kant's interest in the critical analysis of knowledge is that he had the humility and caution of the scientist and saw more clearly than anyone of his time the necessity of making this same scientific spirit of humility and caution part of the equipment of the philosopher. Kant is an example of a thinker who became a philosopher almost against his own will. His interest in his own particular field led him to widen the horizon of his thinking until he saw the necessity of dealing with all philosophical problems as a humble and cautious scientific thinker. With labored precision his argument leads him into the fields of ethics, aesthetics, and religion until he ends in the *Critique of Judgment* with the cautious presentation of a world view or metaphysics that endeavored to solve one of the most important problems that confronts modern man, namely, the problem of how to reconcile science and religion.

Kant was the type of thinker who hated dogmatism, and yet as a student at Koenigsberg he had been led to accept without question the current philosophical dogmatism of his day. Eighteenth-century philosophers were divided into two camps, the one affirming absolute faith in reason to attain truth, the other emphasizing sense experience as the source of knowledge. German philosophy under the guidance of Leibnitz and

his disciple Wolff was the center of rationalism. English philosophy under the leadership of John Locke was predominantly empirical. Kant had accepted the rationalistic dogmatism of Wolff as a matter of course. Nevertheless as a scientist he was made constantly aware of the importance of experience in the attainment of knowledge.

Kant says that he was aroused from his dogmatic slumber by reading the works of David Hume. The inevitable had happened. Hume's slashing persistent attacks on the validity of reason made Kant aware that the philosophical position that he had taken for granted was nothing but another variety of dogmatism. Moreover, Hume's attacks had also included refutations of the empiricist position. Hume had come to the conclusion that knowledge was an illusion and that the philosopher's quest for truth was a vain and fruitless effort. As a result he had turned his attention away from philosophy as a comparatively young man and had become famous as a literary figure writing essays and history after the manner of the typical eighteenth-century man of letters.

Immanuel Kant was not the kind of man who could follow in Hume's footsteps. His entire life was bound to an interest in intellectual pursuits. If Hume were right, this intellectual life that he had chosen was no better than the life of the man who lived on the level of the animal or who was satisfied with any one of a hundred varieties of dogmatism. Hume had presented a challenge that had to be met if the foundations of all scientific and philosophical endeavor were to be maintained. Kant accepted the challenge with all the seriousness of his sturdy character. His life work was henceforth determined for him. The persistence with which he worked at his task made him one of the greatest of all philosophers, for as he worked unsuspected sources of intellectual power were opened to him. His capacity appeared to increase with the difficulty of his problem.

When he was forty-six, Kant finally received the coveted post of a regular professor at the University of Koenigsberg. Previous to that time he had been associated with the university as a *privat docent* or private lecturer. His lectures had proved to be very popular but he had confined his attention for the most part to logic and scientific subjects. Henceforth as professor of logic and metaphysics he would be expected to lecture on subjects of a more philosophical nature. In his *Inaugural Dissertation* Kant presented some of the main ideas that had resulted from his thinking about the problem of knowledge up to that time. Eleven more years were required, however, before these ideas were tried and tested by the remorseless criticism of his own energetic intellect and finally elaborated into a book, *The Critique of Pure Reason.* Even then it was a strange, clumsy giant of a book, full of repetitions and weighted with a ponderous terminology. But for those who bothered to read the book, and the readers were confined then as now almost entirely to the philosophers, the book was recognized as the greatest of all classics in the field of epistemology.

Kant set out to investigate the possibilities of knowledge in his *Critique.* He took nothing for granted except the presupposition that as a man he was endowed with the capacity for critical analysis. He wanted to know whether there were different kinds of knowledge, the extent to which these different kinds of knowledge were applicable, and the relative degree of certainty in the various types of knowledge. First of all he examined knowledge attained through sense experience. His investigation of this problem was revolutionary for he concluded that the senses can never give us certainty of knowledge with regard to the external world. The external world must be accepted as a reality but our interpretation of that reality as experienced through the senses is shown to be determined by the structure of the human mind which organizes the data of experience. All knowledge based on observation must conse-

quently be regarded as only probable. Does this mean that all scientific exploration is in vain? No, says Kant. Since there is a common structure in the mind of man, the laws of nature can be established as common property in line with the experience of mankind in general. Can we be certain that these laws of nature constructed by man's intellect correspond to the structures of nature as it really is? Kant replies that we can never be certain that this is the case. We must assume that it is, however, otherwise sense experience would be impossible and meaningless. Man is concerned with sense experience as it is for man. If man can order that sense experience in such a way that he can make predictions about nature that are useful for his life, he must certainly be encouraged to continue that ordering process. Consequently Kant humbles the scientist on the one hand and at the same time gives all possible encouragement to scientific research.

Kant next turns to an analysis of the method of gaining knowledge by reason. This was the method advocated by Wolff and the German philosophers of Kant's day. These philosophers were convinced that this method enabled them to attain knowledge of the nature of God and of the general structure of the universe. Kant shows in detail that this rationalistic method is unsatisfactory, and that the claims of these philosophers that their metaphysical knowledge is superior to the knowledge of the senses are unfounded. In the section of his book dealing with the antinomies Kant shows how the application of the rationalistic method to metaphysical problems leads to contradictions. The universe can be proved to be either limited or unlimited, caused or uncaused, purposeful or without purpose. To the embarrassment of the rationalists Kant gives adequate arguments on both sides. He concludes that metaphysical speculation cannot yield knowledge and that efforts along this line must be redirected.

Kant had insisted throughout his book that knowledge can

be valued according to the extent of its certainty and the extent of its applicability. Knowledge of the senses serves a practical end. Knowledge claimed by metaphysical speculation is neither certain, as he had shown in the antinomies, nor of any practical use for the simple reason that it degenerates into dogmatism. Kant felt that his critical method had clarified the philosophical atmosphere since he was able to show what could and what could not be accomplished through these methods of attaining knowledge. However, he did not stop at this point. His investigations had led him to believe that there was another realm of knowledge in which truth could be attained which was both certain and practical.

Kant was convinced that the moral law within was as certain as the mathematical order in the heavens. He wrote: "Two things fill my mind with ever new and increasing wonder and awe, the oftener and the more persistently I ponder over them —the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." No man ever had a higher respect for duty and justice or a greater respect for human personality than Kant. He was convinced that the sense of right and wrong that comes to man in his relations with his fellow men was not the result of sense experience but rather the result of intuitive insight in understanding the structure of the moral will. These structures are capable of rational analysis and are seen to be principles of human conduct that *must* be true for all time and for all men. Moreover, the truths arrived at through moral intuition are pre-eminently practical. They are the guides which enable man to exert freedom of the will in such a way that social harmony will result so that personal and social values may be increased indefinitely. The results of this final phase of Kant's argument are quite unexpected and certainly revolutionary. The plodding, skeptical thinker had arrived at the conclusion that certainty of knowledge in the realm of moral values was possible. Indeed this knowledge was the

most certain knowledge that man was capable of attaining and at the same time it was the most important and satisfying of all knowledge.

We shall not carry our discussion of Kant's philosophy any further. The Kant who found it necessary to postulate the existence of God and the immortality of the soul as necessary for the sustaining of the realm of moral values ceased to be an epistemologist and became a metaphysician. We have followed the course of Kant's thought sufficiently to enable us to draw some conclusions regarding the importance of his work in the theory of knowledge.

Kant's life and work demonstrated to philosophers of all time that the quest for truth must be a cautious, tedious quest. He taught humility and caution to the philosopher. Every man who pauses at the inspection station of epistemology before he proceeds on his philosophical quest finds later on that he is grateful to the little professor for teaching him these necessary lessons. Moreover, Kant taught philosophers the important lesson that truth must be practical if it is to be meaningful for man. The philosopher must return from the mountain peaks with his precious gems of truth and must learn to test those gems of truth in a practical way before setting an absurdly high value upon them.

Kant had shown that man's truth was relative to his manhood and that man is not equipped to come to terms with absolute truth. This recognition of the relative nature of truth may drive some timid souls to flee from the quest for truth as a hopeless quest. Kant never intended that this should be the case. For the courageous Kant offers encouragement. He gives us exact information about our tools for gaining knowledge so that we know what they can do and what they cannot do. He instructs us as to what tools are most effective in the various realms of truth so that we know how to gain truth in the phenomenal realm of fact and in the noumenal realm of the

spirit. Most important of all, perhaps, is the fact that his life and work enable the explorer to avoid the distastrous crevasse of dogmatism. The unsympathetic poet, Heine, is remembered by philosophers for remarking that no life history of Kant was possible for he had neither life nor history. We shall leave the reader to judge as to whether this characterization is correct. We suspect that the reader's judgment will be colored by the relative degree of importance which he attaches to the life of the intellect as compared to the life of the senses.

LANDMARKS IN EPISTEMOLOGY— TYPES OF THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

In a sense it can be said that Kant's work was definitive in the field of epistemology and that everything that has followed Kant has been on the order of commentary. Kant stands as the culminating figure of a group of philosophers who were primarily interested in epistemology. This group includes such prominent names as Descartes, Locke, Bishop Berkeley, Condillac, Hume. Two of the best known theories of truth, the correspondence theory and the coherence theory, arose from the work of these men. As we have seen, Kant tried to come to terms with both these theories in that he carried on a thorough analysis of sense experience which was the basis for the correspondence theory of Locke and also analyzed pure reason which was the basis for the coherence theory of rationalism. Even to this day, however, philosophers are inclined to divide into two groups depending upon whether they emphasize the truth of the senses or the truth of reason as primary.

A. Correspondence, Coherence, and Pragmatic Theories of Truth

According to the correspondence theory of truth a belief can be tested as true or false to the extent that it corresponds to a fact. The proposition that your long-lost necktie is in your roommate's traveling bag where he left it after his last trip is true or false depending upon whether the tie can ac-

tually be found at the designated place. This is the common-sense view of truth. Philosophers who emphasize this theory of truth are usually called realists. They arrive at convictions by trusting the evidence afforded by their senses regarding the reality of the external world.

Those philosophers who depend upon their senses are likely to arrive at convictions too hastily. They are inclined to accept only the obvious. The result is that they are in constant danger of offering an oversimplified picture of the universe. Data that does not fit into this simplified picture is ignored as meaningless. For example, when we say that a painting is beautiful or that a charitable act is good, there is no way of checking these beliefs if we hold to a strict correspondence theory of truth. These beliefs cannot be tested by comparing them with any reality that is directly observable. Moreover, what are we to say regarding certain scientific theories that are mathematically coherent but do not permit of direct testing by observation? Are these theories of no value as relatively true compared with other theories that lack this consistency? We must return to Kant and affirm that the correspondence theory serves as a test for only certain kinds of beliefs.

According to the coherence theory of truth a belief is true because it harmonizes with a given body of knowledge. Thus the Copernican theory of the solar system is more acceptable than the Ptolemaic system because it harmonizes all the available facts more neatly and rationally. Philosophers who emphasize the coherence theory of truth are inclined to be idealists, that is, they arrive at convictions by relying upon a system of ideas personally apperceived as a meaningful whole. Those philosophers who depend upon reason are inclined to trust dogmatically in their own processes of reasoning. Too often they are tempted to affirm their own convictions as the final truth of the universe. They are on firmer ground if they offer their convictions as poetic truths or as hypothetical truths. Then

they can appeal to others for a check on their insights as does the poet, or they can look hopefully to the future trusting that ultimately their insights will be verified by means not available at the moment.

It may be merely coincidental that the theory of truth which emphasizes the practical value of a belief as a test of truth has had its most important advocates in America. On the other hand it may be in keeping with a national characteristic that American philosophers such as William James and John Dewey should reject the correspondence and coherence theories in favor of a theory which considers a belief to be true in so far as it is an instrument for solving our problems. This pragmatic or instrumental theory of truth claims that a true belief is one that leads to satisfactory consequences. Charles Sanders Peirce, one of the founders of pragmatism, considered pragmatism as a means by which we could make our ideas clear. If ideas have no differences in their practical consequences, they must really mean the same thing according to Peirce. Other pragmatists such as John Dewey have considered pragmatism as a method by which the philosopher can test beliefs of a moral, economic, political, and aesthetic nature as to their effectiveness for social living. It is in these two fields of logic and social philosophy that pragmatism has made its greatest contribution. Like the other theories of truth, pragmatism has its limitations when it lays claim to being the only theory of truth. Not all true ideas are useful and not all useful ideas are true. The scientist will vouch for the first of these statements and the advertising expert for the second.

Despite the fact that the history of philosophy has indicated that no one theory of truth is adequate to account for all the realms of truth, philosophers continue to fight the old battles of epistemology over again with each new generation. The correspondence theory has appeared in one form or another in the works of philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, A. K.

Rogers, R. W. Sellars, and George Santayana. The coherence theory has been advocated in modern times by men like F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet in England; Edmund Husserl, Wilhelm Windelband, and Ernst Cassirer in Germany; and Josiah Royce in America. The pragmatic theory has had many interpreters in America and is represented in the writings of Boyce Gibson, A. W. Moore, Charles Morris, and Sidney Hook.

B. The Quest for Truth a Joint Enterprise

Considerable progress has been made in recent years in epistemology by approaching the problems of knowledge from the point of view of philosophy of science and psychology. A division of labor has resulted from Kant's distinction between the truth of fact and the truth of value. Philosophy of science has carried on elaborate investigations sharpening the tools of scientific research for gaining knowledge in the realm of facts. Philosophers interested primarily in the truth of value have found it helpful to approach their task from the point of view of the psychologist. Social psychology, as represented in such men as George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), has been especially important in opening new insights as to the nature of knowledge as it is related to the self as a product of social conditioning. Needless to say this sharp distinction between the truth of fact and the truth of value must be maintained primarily as a methodological procedure. In the end, values must be recognized as based on facts and the facts that are of value must be recognized as the most important for man.

The student has been forced by epistemology to re-examine his tools for gaining knowledge. He has reached the point where he is aware that the philosophical method is a composite method. Skepticism is part of that method for it is one of the motivations that causes us to seek knowledge. We search for knowledge after we doubt. Clarification of language is part of that method for we can make no progress if we cannot make

precise what was confused. The authoritarian method of group experience is part of that composite method of philosophy for without authority we cannot utilize past knowledge. Insight is part of that method for it teaches us to recognize our own personal insights as unique and consequently partial but nevertheless of great value as possible hypotheses.

In the case of mystical intuition we are made aware of the fact that new insights may come in unexpected ways and that the initial obscurity of these insights does not necessarily discount their ultimate value. We have learned to regard sense experience as the basic source of knowledge. On the other hand, we are ready to admit that in some cases reason enables us to gain knowledge before the facts, for example, in scientific prediction of future events. We are free to admit with the pragmatists that knowledge is a human activity and that putting knowledge within the context of the practical interests of the individual and his social group helps us in our quest for knowledge.

It is the philosopher's task to go in quest of knowledge that yields clarity, conviction, and extension. He is not satisfied with knowledge that yields conviction alone if that conviction is arrived at by excluding possible realms of unexplored truth, that is, if it is attained by sacrificing extension. He is not satisfied with knowledge that has a high degree of extension in the mastery of many obscure realms of truth if that knowledge cannot be clarified by making it productive for human living. He is not satisfied with common-sense beliefs that have a high degree of conviction and at the same time lack both clarity and extension. Since most of our convictions are of this latter type, the task of the philosopher in his quest for truth is a dangerous task. He is considered an atheist, a skeptic, a hairbrained visionary, a revolutionary, an impractical juggler of ideas, a corrupter of the young, and a nuisance in general. However, the society that tolerates a goodly number of the clan of epis-

temologists in its body politic is not likely to remain an uncritical self-satisfied society for a very long period of time. Men like Hume and Kant are needed in every age and in every nation.

CHAPTER VII

Socrates and Plato And the Landmarks in Ethics

We pointed out in our previous reference to ethics (p. 22) that the early Greek philosophers were interested primarily in thinking about nature rather than in thinking about man. We are inclined to forget this emphasis among the Greeks once we have been privileged to get a glimpse of the profundity of the Greek mind as it deals with the problems associated with thinking about man. In this chapter we shall consider the two Greek philosophers who were largely responsible for shifting the emphasis of philosophy from thinking about nature to thinking about man. These philosophers are Socrates and Plato. Their work was so closely integrated that we can account for their revolutionary influence most adequately by considering them together.

No doubt some will be inclined to point out that the Hebraic thinkers represented in the Old Testament had thought profoundly about man centuries before the Greeks. This is true, to be sure, for the first of the great teachers to leave permanent landmarks along the highway of ethics were the Hebraic prophets, most of whom lived in the seventh and eighth centuries before Christ. These men affirmed that the good life depended upon the extent to which men and nations maintained the covenant relationship which existed between God and man. However, ethics was a religious problem rather than

a philosophical problem for the prophets. Man's quest for righteousness did not involve man's understanding of good and evil, in their opinion, but rather man's will to do the good and his consciousness of guilt when he failed. Socrates differed from the Hebraic prophets in that he emphasized the importance of the *understanding* of the nature of the good. Through this emphasis he brought the problems of ethics to the direct attention of philosophy. These problems have maintained their central position in philosophy ever since the revolutionary work of Socrates was carried to completion by his disciple Plato.

SOCRATES: THE PHILOSOPHER IN QUEST OF THE GOOD LIFE

The Greek philosophers who preceded Socrates were interested in philosophy of nature and in logic. Socrates reversed this tendency by proclaiming that the task of philosophy was the study of mankind. Socrates had studied natural philosophy under Archelaus. He turned away from this study as fruitless speculation and substituted investigation into the nature of the good life. Socrates found that this investigation involved basic problems regarding the nature of the soul. Can man know the nature of the good through reasoning processes? Is the soul of man constituted in such a way that man can do the good once it is known? What is the relationship of the soul to that which is ultimately good in the universe? These are some of the problems that concerned Socrates.

Like most of the Greek philosophers Socrates had an almost boundless faith in human reason. As the gadfly on the backs of the Athenian populace he went from one group to another applying the principles of acute reasoning for the purpose of clarifying moral issues. He refused to be satisfied with customary beliefs or with half truths. His arguments compelled people to think about questions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, good and evil. Socrates came to the conclusion

that man could know the nature of the good through reason but that few men were willing to apply rational principles to the study of ethics. He took it upon himself to show how false ideas about the good arose among supposedly wise men because they refused to apply reason. Moreover, he gathered a body of young men about him and proceeded to stimulate them to inquire as to how the rational man could become a wise and good man. As far as Socrates was concerned, straight thinking led to righteous living, and righteous living led to happiness. According to Socrates no harm could come to the righteous man in life or in death.

In addition to possessing a keen intellect, Socrates was endowed with a second quality that made him a great moralist. This quality was not found so commonly among his co-workers in philosophy as the quality of keen intelligence. Socrates was gifted with an unusually sensitive conscience. This sensitivity of conscience was coupled with an invincible sense of moral responsibility. Socrates said that he had an inner voice that warned him when he was about to do something wrong. It was this inner check that made him refuse to participate in an illegal trial of Athenian generals when this trial was ordered by the *gauleiters* of a dictatorial government led by the Thirty Tyrants. Later on, at his own trial this same inner voice guided him to defy a democratic government which attempted to force him to betray his mission and retract his basic convictions.

Socrates believed that man was intellectually capable of knowing the good and morally responsible for doing the good. This view presupposed a view of the soul which was a radical innovation for that time. The philosophers of the Ionian tradition regarded the soul as a small portion of the primary substance, whether that primary substance be fire as in Heraclitus or fire, earth, air, and water as in Empedocles or atoms as in Democritus. This meant that at death the soul naturally returned to its original substance. If man is nothing but a part

of this elemental stuff, it is obvious that there is no reason why he should be held responsible for acting one way or another. In the end, his acts cannot be regarded as purposeful for there is no purpose in moral decisions that can possibly distinguish these decisions from anything else that happens during the course of the gradual cyclical changes undergone by the primary substances. Under the Ionian view of the soul man might be intellectually capable as a higher form of the primary substance in understanding the processes of natural law. There was no reason, however, why he should be regarded as morally responsible, endowed with a conscience, and as capable of acting in a way that made his acts ultimately significant and purposeful. Socrates' view that the soul was a conscious self which man can make good and wise was regarded by many of his colleagues as strange teaching for a philosopher.

Another group of pre-Socratic philosophers, the Pythagoreans, had a more lofty view of the soul than the Ionians. They regarded the soul as divine, a fallen god imprisoned by the body and by association with matter. The divine soul was compelled to endure this imprisonment as punishment for prenatal sins committed in a previous incarnation. This doctrine of the Pythagoreans bears a certain resemblance to the teachings of the Hindu thinkers of ancient India. It differed from the Hindu teaching, however, in that it provided a means by which the divine element of the soul could be awakened from its slumbers. The body in which the soul was imprisoned could be purified by ritualistic and ascetic practices. Even more important than this was the fact that the soul could be awakened from its slumbers by a purely intellectual appreciation of the validity of mathematics and the mystical meanings associated with numbers and geometrical patterns.

Socrates agreed with the Pythagoreans that the soul was divine. He also agreed that the divinity of the soul was associated with man's unique ability to use reason. However, he was

convinced that that which most definitely related the soul of man to the divine was man's moral conscience. Moreover, the intellect was instrumental in arousing the divine in man not through the appreciation of the purely rational nature of numbers but rather through the clarification of the nature of the moral law.

Socrates was too cautious a thinker to make a complete break with his fellow philosophers by supplementing his doctrine of the soul with a religious affirmation regarding the destiny of the soul. The biographical data is confusing at this point, but there is no conclusive evidence that he ever affirmed a belief in one God who was essentially moral and who acted through the moral conscience of men to attain his ultimate purpose in the universe. Much of his teaching, however, pointed toward such an affirmation.

It remained for Plato to take the decisive step of affirming a belief in a purposeful God who created the universe as an architect creates a noble structure. He affirmed, moreover, that this God was a rational God and that man's reason was endowed with the capacity to understand the rational processes in God's creation and to fathom its purposes. Moreover, man was possessed with moral responsibility and the freedom of the will that enabled him to be a co-operative agent in God's creative work. It was only natural for Plato to take the inevitable step and to affirm a belief in personal immortality, despite the fact that this belief was foreign to the earlier philosophic spirit of the Greeks.

A. Modern Man and the Socratic Teachings

The work of Socrates and Plato in ethics does not seem particularly revolutionary to us today because many of the basic principles of their ethical teachings have been absorbed into our cultural heritage through Christianity and through other historical sources. However, the issues that were brought to

light in the ethics of Socrates and Plato are as pertinent today as ever. Many modern men have taken a position similar in many respects to the Ionian view of the nature of the soul. They have said, "Man is what he eats." Or, it may be, they have reduced the soul of man to a complex pattern of reflexes depending upon social conditioning. Some have said that man is motivated in his decisions by no moral principles other than those provided by his own particular social group. Others have said that man is motivated primarily by subconscious, irrational forces over which he has little if any control. These views of the nature of the human soul are affirmed on many sides today. Marxist communism and behavioristic psychology both affirm that man is nothing more than a product of a certain type of social conditioning. Freudian psychology has taught us to believe that the inner core of our personality is rooted in the subconscious and that, whether we are aware of it or not, we are none the less guided by unconscious, animal urges rather than by reason or conscious choice.

If the contentions of these modern Ionians are correct, what are the results? We might list them as follows:

(1) There is no such thing as an inner voice or a conscience which can be recognized as an individual's guide in moral choices. This inner voice is the voice of the group or of one's family rearing. There is no reason in the world why one man's actions should be considered good and another man's actions as bad. Every man can be expected to do as he pleases as long as he can get away with it. If, for example, one's social group teaches hatred for Jews, there is no reason why any one individual should have a sense of moral responsibility which would cause him to hesitate when ordered to pull a lever that would destroy a thousand Jews in a concentration camp.

(2) According to this view, man's moral choices are not related to any ultimate purpose in the universe associated with a personal God or with God's plan for history. If this is so,

why should one indulge in a life of hazardous ventures, strenuous activity, or any form of planned living for that matter? Why not eat, drink, and be merry or take our ease in the way best suited to our natures? Even if our wills are free, as some claim, what is the use of exerting them? The answer is obvious. In the long run there is no use. Mere existence is enough, and the individual who wishes to move beyond the level of mere existence is a menace to the community rather than a benefactor.

(3) If man is motivated in his behavior by subconscious forces that are purely irrational, why should he labor over problems of politics, ethics, education? His thinking cannot serve to guide man in these fields. Why should he not devote his efforts to learning how to manipulate emotions rather than try to reason out a program for his life or for his society? Again the answer is obvious. There is no good reason why man should not cast aside reason in his attempts to set up an ordered society, or to establish international law, or to organize a program for the United Nations. He is on firmer ground if he remembers that he is a creature who thinks with his blood.

It is worthy of note that all types of philosophy or religion which belittle human reason and refuse to admit its applicability in the field of ethics directly or indirectly co-operate with anarchistic or autocratic forces which would set caprice or authority in the place of law in the regulation of man's affairs. Both the mystical and authoritarian phases of religion tend to neglect the need for a rational approach to ethics. The mystic prefers to trust his emotions and to distrust rational processes. The authoritarian is inclined to oppose change in ethics even though the need for change is demonstrated through reason and experience.

Other modern thinkers who have exerted influence of a negative kind in the field of ethics resemble the Pythagoreans in their views as to the nature of the human soul. They regard

the soul as capable of being saved either through ritualistic techniques or through the miraculous return of Christ. Salvation does not necessarily involve moral transformation or the heightening of moral responsibility and sensitivity for these individuals. They are imbued with a sincere religiosity but this religiosity seldom becomes more than an elaborate pose as long as it is not recognized that the divinity in man is related to man's unique sense of moral responsibility. This type of amoral religiosity is most clearly in evidence in non-Christian circles as, for example, in many of the highly developed religious sytems of India.

The Greek philosophers who followed Plato retained the idea that man could know the good. However, with the exception of the Stoics, they forgot Socrates' doctrine of the inner voice. They failed to assert man's moral responsibility. The Christian tradition has affirmed the moral responsibility of man, but has always been in danger of rejecting the idea that man is intellectually responsible for the clarification of the nature of the good through reason. Both these emphases are necessary today. The modern followers of Socrates and Plato must stand in opposition to all the views listed above that tend to make man something less than he really is. Ethical teachers are needed today who can affirm with utmost clarity and conviction that man is an immortal soul related in a mysterious way to God's ultimate purpose for his creation, endowed with intelligence which can be creatively utilized in man's quest for the good life, and possessing a sense of right and wrong which makes man morally responsible for his personal acts and decisions.

B. Road Signs for the Ethical Reformer from the Life of Socrates

The life of Socrates demonstrates quite clearly that the thinker who endeavors to bring about a revolution in the morals of a community is likely to meet opposition. Socrates

was accused of being irreligious and of corrupting the youth. In affirming a higher standard of morals than that demanded by the common religious ideas and moral codes of his community he was confronted with ridicule and hatred. The playwright Aristophanes wrote a comedy about him called *The Clouds* in which he lampooned Socrates as an impractical visionary, a crank, and an impostor. When Socrates' program for educating the youth of Athens began to gain results and to win followers, his efforts were misunderstood. His enemies misconstrued and distorted his teachings to the point where the fears of the conservative groups were aroused to aid and abet the moblike fury of the ignorant. When Socrates ridiculed the efforts of the conservatives to discredit his work, he was condemned to drink the poisonous hemlock. The story of his trial and heroic death is one of the great stories in the annals of philosophy as told by Plato in the four dialogues: *Euthrypho, The Apology, Crito,* and *Phaedo.*

The trial and death of Socrates also demonstrate a fact that has been proved true many times in the history of man's quest for the good life. New and advanced principles of living can be established only if they are embodied in the life of a man who lives what he teaches. Socrates' behavior at his trial and on his deathbed gave such ample evidence of the sincerity and truth of his teachings that no one with an open mind could fail to understand the import of those teachings. The followers of Socrates had crystal-clear evidence as to the significance of his theoretical teachings. Henceforth, they had no alternative but to apply these teachings in their own lives or to betray their beloved teacher. Apparently Socrates made more true disciples during the course of his trial and condemnation than ever before. These same devoted disciples were responsible for elevating Socrates to a point attained by few in the history of philosophy. Socrates wrote no treatise on ethics or on any other philosophic subject. His philosophy was written in the

book of life and his disciples have perpetuated the philosophic spirit of their teacher in all ages and among all peoples.

THE LIFE AND WORK OF PLATO

The life of Plato was not as eventful as that of Socrates, and his personality was certainly lacking in those characteristics which made Socrates such a striking figure. However, Plato demonstrates in his life and work that the thinker who is endeavoring to bring about ethical innovations in his community must keep in mind certain basic principles if his work is to be significant. These basic principles can be listed as follows: (1) A rational system of ethics must not only be based on the rationality of man but it must also be rooted in the system of order of the universe as a whole. (2) Ethics is indissolubly related to philosophy of education, for it is essential that a means be provided for educating the youth to appreciate the values of a higher way of life. (3) Ethics attains its completion in a philosophy of politics, for it is only through politics that a way of life discovered by the philosopher and the religious genius can be put into practical operation in the life of the community. Plato was eminently successful in his own lifetime in establishing the first and second of these principles of his ethics. His failure to establish the third principle was not due to a lack of will or of effort on his part.

Plato established the first principle listed above by developing one of the most daring systems of philosophy ever conceived by the mind of man. He affirmed that the key to the order in the universe was not to be found in the energy and matter of the material universe but rather in certain patterns of ideal perfection. He called these ideal patterns "ideas," and he conceived that it was the eternal reality of these ideas which gave order to mathematics, to the processes of nature, and to the moral life of man and society. For Plato the soul was the source of motion which moved the chaotic world of matter

toward the system of order exemplified in the eternal ideas. God as the highest soul was the ultimate source of motion which moved the entire universe toward the fulfillment of ideal patterns in nature and in the life of man. The fact that man possessed a soul made it possible for man to strive vigorously and successfully for the fulfillment of ideal patterns of goodness, truth, and beauty.

Plato endeavored to establish the second of the principles listed above by starting a school in which he hoped to train leaders who would rebuild the life of the decadent Athens of his day on a new moral foundation. Plato was an aristocrat with independent wealth. He did not have to haunt the public square as did his teacher Socrates in order to find an audience and a substitute for a lecture room. Such tactics were not very well suited to the aloof and aristocratic Plato. He moved into the suburbs of Athens and took over a gymnasium named after the hero Academus. Here he established a school called the Academy. In this school Plato taught his doctrine of ideas with the hope that his teaching would revolutionize the life of his time through the influence of his pupils. It was also a school of scientific and mathematical research. Plato had intended in addition to make it a school of politics in which a new type of politician would be trained for service in the state. In this last hope he was disappointed. He had done his work so successfully, however, that the Academy lasted for a thousand years. It was finally closed by order of the Emperor Justinian in the year A.D. 529.

The best-known literary work of Plato is *The Republic.* The fact that Plato should put forth his greatest efforts in writing a large work that attempts to present a model for the ideal state indicates the extent of Plato's interest in the philosophy of politics. Plato showed how the ideal state that he visualized had its philosophical justification in the doctrine of ideas. When philosophers who understood the implications

of the doctrine of ideas became the rulers then the ideal state would become a reality. History indicates that there were weaknesses in Plato's philosophy of politics which made it impossible for his theoretical ideas to be carried out in practice. The students at Plato's Academy were no more successful as politicians in reinvigorating the life of Athens than were politicians untrained in the doctrine of ideas. As a matter of fact most of his students seemed to lose interest in politics. They became more and more enamored with the abstractions of mathematics, turning their backs upon the realities of politics which involved the crude, irrational forces at work in human society.

Plato's own experiences as a city manager were also disappointing. There are indications that he had an opportunity to apply his theories in the management of the city of Syracuse in Sicily. Dion, the son-in-law of Dionysius I, the ruler of Syracuse, was a friend and follower of Plato. Plato appears to have left his work at the Academy on two occasions to go to Sicily on Dion's invitation in order to attempt to put his theories into practice. The venture was eminently unsuccessful on both occasions. However, Plato certainly had reason to believe that his theory had never been given a fair trial. The crude and unimaginative Dionysius II whom Plato tried to teach did not take readily to the doctrine of ideas. The world remained as it had always remained, a world in which kings were never philosophers and philosophers could not become kings.

The principle which Plato established, namely, that ethics finds its fulfillment in politics, remains as part of our philosophical heritage despite Plato's failures as a stateman. No system of government can be established without having ethical implications. When Plato's most eminent student, Aristotle, came to write his famous treatises on ethics and politics, the two treatises dovetail in such a way that it is difficult to tell

where the one ends and the other begins. Modern writers on ethics are prone to forget this basic principle of Plato. Too frequently they regard ethics as a respectable subject for the consideration of the philosopher but politics is relegated to the level of the thinking of the ward heeler and the lobbyist. The history of the world in the twentieth century demonstrates the soundness of Plato's principle. Moral collapse goes hand in hand with the degeneration of political ideas. The philosopher can no more ignore politics than he can ignore ethics. The good life is not merely a matter of individual effort and decision. It is also a matter of political responsibility and social co-operation.

Not all of the followers of Socrates were in agreement with Plato in his interpretation of the ethics of the master teacher. Many of them claimed that Plato had overemphasized the religious side of Socrates' personality and had neglected the practical and skeptical implications of his teachings. As a result other schools which sought to understand the nature of the good life arose alongside Plato's Academy. These schools offered a variety of answers to the question: What is the highest good? The debates that ensued on this problem have never ceased among philosophers. It is clear that these debates are by no means of a purely theoretical nature. The way a man decides this question as to the nature of the supreme good will determine to a large degree the kind of goals that he considers worth striving to attain. These goals in turn will determine the way he acts and the kind of personality that he cultivates. In the pages which follow we shall offer a classification of the ways adopted by philosophers in answering this crucial question of the highest good.

LANDMARKS IN ETHICS—WHAT IS THE SUPREME GOOD?

If we observe people, we find that their needs are not satisfied merely by attaining the basic necessities of food, clothing,

and shelter. They can be observed striving after entertainment, knowledge, power, social position, money, honor. If we observed the individual exerting so much concentrated and continuous effort for the attainment of these goals, we might be inclined to think that he considered them the highest good. In most cases we would find that our judgment was incorrect. Most individuals would not say that these goals are ultimate goals. They would regard them as means to more important ends toward which they are directing their lives. When we question individuals as to what these more important ends are we receive a great variety of answers. Fortunately for our purposes of classification, we find that a comparatively few fundamental focal ideas have formed the bases for a way of life for many men in different cultures and different ages. These ideas were at first in a confused state as they came to light in the lives of individuals seeking to live the good life. In time, great thinkers arose to formulate the basic ethical systems around these focal ideas. Let us take a bird's-eye view of some of these important systems of ethics.

A. The Kingdom of God as the Supreme Good

Some philosophers have agreed with the theologians that the supreme good is the kingdom of God. This kingdom is variously regarded depending upon the religious background of the moralist. In all cases, however, it is a kingdom that is in the making and that cannot be attained except through God's co-operative efforts. The kingdom is experienced as increased fellowship with God. This experience of fellowship can be recognized as an elevating experience in the processes of daily living. This experience, however, is merely a foreshadowing of fulfillment in the fellowship with God to be experienced at the consummation of the kingdom . This type of ethical system finds it necessary to postulate personal immortality in order to sustain faith and hope in the ultimate con-

summation of God's kingdom. Both Plato and Kant, the greatest philosophical proponents of this view, affirm immortality as a necessary postulate for their systems.

By what means is the highest good to be achieved? Here again various religions and various theologies have different answers to this question. Some religions have worked out elaborate techniques of worship to attain this end. Others have developed techniques of purification and of mystical elevation. Still others have emphasized the cultivation of a certain attitude involving a change of heart. The philosophic moralists who hold this latter position are usually agreed that the supreme good is to be achieved through doing the will of God. As a result the central word in their ethical systems is the word "duty." This is certainly the case with Immanuel Kant. As we have already pointed out, Plato remained a true Greek in so far as he emphasized knowledge along with duty as a means of attaining the highest good. Josiah Royce, the American philosopher, has given us a very noble statement of this position in his book *The Philosophy of Loyalty.* However, we must look to the Christian theologians rather than to the philosophers to find the elaborations of systems of ethics which regard the kingdom of God as the *summum bonum.* Since this concept is one of the fundamental ethical principles in the New Testament it must likewise be held as a fundamental principle wherever Christians deal with ethical problems.

B. Self-Adjustment as the Supreme Good

The second of the great ethical systems in our classification regards the supreme good as self-adjustment to the universe. Adjustment to the universe is experienced as contentment. According to this view, the wise man is the one who knows what can be expected of the universe and who consequently learns to accept his situation. Many great ethical teachers in the history of philosophy could be classified as belonging to this

group. We would have to include Aristotle with his doctrine of the golden mean, and the great Stoic teachers such as Zeno, Marcus Aurelius, and Epictetus. In modern times, ethical thinkers who have been influenced by the doctrine of evolution such as Herbert Spencer, Henri Bergson, and John Dewey would find their place in this group. The same holds true of ethical thinkers who follow the sociological approach as first outlined by Jeremy Bentham and Auguste Comte. Most of the great ethical writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and France based their views on the Stoic doctrine of natural law and the necessity of living according to that law. The same views were entertained by most of the thinkers who furnished a theoretical foundation for the American Revolution and the Constitution. This is certainly true of men like Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin, two of the influential moralists of the day.

The chief means by which this self-adjustment is to be attained are through knowledge of natural law and the practice of self-control. The Stoics of the ancient world tended to emphasize the phase of ethics which called for virtue or self-control. The modern advocates of this view especially among the scientifically inclined emphasize knowledge of natural law. Francis Bacon gave expression to this latter emphasis at the beginning of the scientific movement in Europe when he makes one of his characters in *The New Atlantis* say:

> God bless thee, my son; I will give thee the greatest jewel I have. For I will impart unto thee, for the love of God and men, a relation of the true state of Salomon's House. . . . The end of our foundation is the knowledge of causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible.[1]

This view presupposes that man is capable of understanding the inner processes of nature. Consequently, it tends to flour-

[1] Bacon, Francis, "The New Atlantis," *Famous Utopias*, ed. C. M. Andrews (New York: Tudor Publishing Co., 1901), p. 263.

ish in ages when men have great faith in their intellectual ability. It also tends to be somewhat aristocratic in its appeal. However, the advocates of this position have generally encouraged the multitude to follow this way of life by pointing out that all men can learn to practice the virtues of self-control even though they may not be endowed with unusual powers of intellect. This conviction can be found in many statements of the Stoics as, for example, the following from *The Meditations* of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius:

> Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or pain; and let it not unite itself with them, but let it circumscribe itself, and limit those effects to their parts. . . . External things touch not the soul, not in the least degree.

The type of morality that will be practiced by men who are in quest of self-adjustment will depend to a large degree on their conception of natural law. The Stoics emphasized self-control, considering that all external causes were pre-determined by the Fates. The modern scientific philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and John Dewey may emphasize a morality based on the idea of progress, since they view the laws of nature as impersonal but nevertheless amenable to man's desires. Gotama Buddha, on the other hand, thinks of the doctrine of Karma and reincarnation when he thinks of natural law and consequently develops a morality that will adjust man to a situation where reincarnation is inevitable. The words reputed to the Buddha on his deathbed are surprisingly similar to the words of other great moralists in this tradition.

> . . . To true wisdom there is only one way, the path that is laid down in my system. Many have already followed it, and conquering the lust and pride and anger of their own hearts, have become free from ignorance and doubt and wrong belief, have entered the calm state of universal kindliness, and have reached Nirvana even in this life.[2]

[2] Quoted in *The Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th ed., article "Buddha," IV, 741.

C. Self-Assertion as the Supreme Good

The third of the great ethical systems in our classification regards self-assertion as the supreme good. Self-assertion is experienced as the fulfillment and development of the personality. The means by which the goal of self-assertion is to be attained for the personality depends upon one's view as to the nature of personality. If one regards personality as primarily intellectual, then the development of the intellect is emphasized. If one regards the person as primarily an emotional creature, then the development of emotional sensitivity is emphasized. If one regards the person as primarily a creature of actions, then emphasis is placed on the necessity for affording new fields for creative activity. In any case the central idea in this system of ethics can be expressed as "new experience" or "full experience" or "the well-rounded life."

Regardless of whether one is inclined to follow this way of life, one must certainly admit that it has been presented in a very persuasive way. Most of the great romantic poets have either consciously or unconsciously advocated the way of new experience as the end and goal of life. Rousseau, the master of French prose, and Nietzsche, the master of German literary style, were both teachers of this way of life. The former considered that the self could be most completely fulfilled through the cultivation of sensitivity of feelings. The latter emphasized vigorous activity as necessarily arising from a will to power in man. Power must be attained for the full realization of the personality according to Nietzsche's teaching. Perhaps the German philosopher-poet, Goethe, is the best example of a literary genius who devotes his talent to teaching this way of life. In one of the most important philosophic poems ever written, Goethe's *Faust,* the author runs the full gamut of the ways of achieving self-assertion. The central character of the poem seeks to achieve a fully rounded personality by living through a series of ever new experiences. He begins his quest for self-

realization on the level of thinking by endeavoring to become a master of all the sciences. He then exploits all the possibilities of self-assertion through developing emotional sensitivity. Finally, new experience is again achieved on the level of active participation in practical affairs. The opening and closing theme of the poem is the famous line: *"Im Anfang war die That!"* ("In the beginning was the deed.")

Other philosophers have presented this way of life in a more systematic form than that achieved by the literary artists mentioned above. J. C. Fichte, Friedrich Schelling, G. W. F. Hegel, and R. H. Lotze of Germany, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and B. Bosanquet of England, and R. W. Emerson and E. P. Bowne in America have presented characteristic variations of this ethical system. A striking variation of this position is found in the contemporary school of French existentialists under the leadership of Sartre. Most of these philosophers have recognized that complete fulfillment of the personality involves social co-operation. As a result they have gone far in answering the criticism leveled against the poets, namely, the criticsm that this way of life is egoistic and selfish.

D. Self-Satisfaction as the Supreme Good

The fourth of the ethical systems in our classification regards self-satisfaction as the greatest good. Self-satisfaction is experienced as pleasure and pleasure is equated with happiness. The Greek philosophers developed two schools of hedonistic ethics, as this pleasure theory of the good is frequently called. The first school, the Cyrenaics, emphasized pleasure as exhilaration. They considered that the end and goal of life was the attainment of intensity of pleasurable sensations. The second school, the Epicureans, emphasized pleasurable situations rather than the intensity of sensations. The Epicureans were suspicious of pleasures that were too intense. They stressed the lasting quality of pleasure rather than its intensity. In both cases, however,

the end and goal of life was regarded as pleasure, and these men were convinced that a wise man could attain sufficient pleasure in life to make life eminently worth living. Unlike the Stoics who were their chief opponents they encouraged their followers to give up the futile attempt to understand the laws of nature through reason. Let man devote his energies to active enjoyment of the pleasures afforded by life.

This way of life has had many followers in all ages. It is especially alluring for the youth. What could be more natural, ordinary, and practical than for a man to desire to crowd as much enjoyment and pleasure as possible into every moment of his life? There is no man who does not know what pleasure is. There is no man who does not desire pleasure. Let us eat, drink, and be merry for tomorrow we die. Who has never in some mood or other experienced the truth of these words? Throughout the history of the world thousands have flocked to the temples of hedonism. World literature is full of the writings of the hedonists, some of them being of a very high literary quality. The Roman, Horace, can write in the first century:

> I lie a-bed to the fourth hour; after that I take a ramble, or having read or written what may amuse me in my privacy, I am anointed with oil, but not with such as the nasty Nacca, when he robs the lamps. But when the sun, become more violent, has reminded me to go to bathe, I avoid the Campus Martius, and the game of hand-ball. Having dined in a temperate manner, just enough to hinder me from having an empty stomach, during the rest of the day I trifle in my own house. This is the life of those who are free from wretched and burthensome ambition; with such things as these I comfort myself, in a way to live more delightfully than if my grandfather had been a quaestor, and father and uncle too.[3]

Omar Khayyam, the product of a culture entirely different from the Roman, can write in a similar vein in the twelfth century, and find many sympathetic readers even today.

[3] *Satire*, I, vi, tr. C. Smart (Harper's Classical Library edition).

In the modern world this way of life is advocated on many sides just as frankly, if not quite as beautifully, as by Horace and Omar Khayyam. Many of the movies produced in Hollywood and shown in every town and village in America teach hedonism as a way of life. The same is true of much of the literature that crowds its way into the lives of young people. Highly developed, cultured societies such as our own usually have an abundance of these followers of pleasure. At its highest level this way of life may serve to arouse a keen appreciation of things beautiful. At its lowest level it may lead to complete moral collapse as seen, for example, in the lives of such men as Petronius, aesthete of the court of Nero, and in Oscar Wilde, the darling of the Bohemians of Victorian England.

A more enlightened version of the ethics of hedonism is to be found in the views of the English Utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. These men agreed with the Epicureans that pleasure was the highest good. However, they recognized that self-satisfaction could be attained only through social co-operation and that without a social basis for happiness no lasting pleasure was possible. They said that the greatest happiness of the greatest number was the criterion that determines whether an act or a situation is good or bad. This doctrine appealed to men who were practically minded and who were interested in bringing about social reform. There are many disciples of Utilitarianism today among men who are concerned about increasing the sum total of human happiness.

One would be justified in saying that Confucius, as representative of the practical-minded Chinese, was the first philosopher to give expression to a utilitarian ethics. However, utilitarianism is more characteristic of Western thought. Perhaps the word that comes closer to expressing the Anglo-Saxon idea of the greatest good is the word "progress." Many varieties of pragmatism, humanitarianism, and socialism are de-

pendent on this view of ethics. To the followers of this ethical system, man is fulfilling his destiny as long as he pushes forward in the fields of scientific discovery, social organization, and economic self-sufficiency and as long as these gains are offered to all mankind for the increase of the sum total of pleasure and happiness.

E. Criticisms of the Ethical Systems

None of the four ways of life described above has escaped criticism on the part of philosophers. We have already given hints of the nature of some of those criticisms. It has been pointed out that the ideal of fellowship with God through moral responsibility is meaningless for those who lack religious sensibilities. Moreover, it has been said that the emphasis on immortality and the kingdom of God promises "pie in the sky when we die" and consequently gives man an excuse to ignore present ills that could and should be eliminated by man's own efforts. Critics have pointed out that the ideal of self-adjustment to nature leading to contentment is likewise quite unsatisfactory for man. Man is interested in knowing the laws of nature in order to utilize them for his own ends. He endeavors to transform his environment rather than to adjust to his environment like the lower animals. It is the divine discontent that characterizes man that makes progress possible both for the individual and for society. Furthermore, the moral choices that man is called upon to make discount the ideal of the "golden mean." One cannot choose the "golden mean" in marrying a wife or helping a friend or condemning a criminal.

We have already pointed out the nature of the chief criticism leveled against an ethics of self-assertion which emphasizes the growth of personality through new experience. It cannot be denied but that this point of view presupposes egotism and in turn encourages egotism. When this egotism is equated with a will to power as in the philosophy of Nietzsche, it may be-

come dangerous. And when Nietzsche is in turn equated with the race doctrine of a Nazi party as in twentieth-century Germany, a theory of ethics that made a cult of liberty in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is transformed to the point where it becomes an instrument for enslaving the mass of mankind in order that a few individuals may have opportunity to assert their personalities with reckless, unprincipled daring.

It is a curiosity in the history of philosophy that Hegesias, one of the followers of the Cyrenaic doctrine of self-satisfaction through exhilaration and intensity of pleasure, was responsible for pointing out the ultimate weakness of this position. Hegesias affirmed with great consistency that intensity of pleasure was the end and goal of life. However, since the physical and psychological nature of man made it impossible to maintain intensity of pleasure for any great length of time, and since man's external environment was such that so few intense pleasures were possible, the ordinary life of man was inevitably overweighted with the absence of pleasure. This meant that, since nothing was worth striving to attain but intense pleasures, the enlightened man must necessarily be driven to despair. The best course for him to pursue was consequently to commit suicide since this was the only way for him to avoid the opposite of exhilaration, namely, despair. Hegesias taught this doctrine with such reasonable consistency and with such persuasive eloquence that his young and impetuous followers began to commit suicide. Hegesias was called "the persuader to die" and was banished from the community. There is no evidence, however, that Hegesias followed his own teachings to their ultimate conclusion.

No such conclusive refutation as the above has ever been offered against the Epicureans who affirmed self-satisfaction as the most lasting pleasure or against the Utilitarians who affirmed self-satisfaction as the greatest happiness of the greatest number. It has been pointed out, however, that both these

views depend to a large extent on external factors which are very uncertain and over which the individual has little control. Lasting pleasures that depend upon good health, peace, friendship, may disintegrate over night. The physical basis for self-satisfaction is very weak and uncertain at best. The same holds true for the sociological basis of co-operation upon which the Utilitarians depended. The social psychology of conflict indicates that man cannot be depended upon to co-operate even though that co-operation is to his advantage.

CHAPTER VIII

Karl Marx and the Landmarks In Philosophy of History

In this chapter we shall consider the second branch of philosophy that deals with thinking about man, namely, philosophy of history. In our previous chapter on ethics we concentrated attention on Socrates and Plato as philosophers who entered the land of philosophy through the highway of ethics. We pointed out some of the landmarks that they, together with other philosophers, have left along this way. We noted from time to time in our discussion that moralists who were in quest of the good life for the individual and who tried to come to some conclusion about the highest good were forced to think of the individual's political and social role as a member of society. This was true for Socrates and Plato as thinkers of the ancient world and also of the Utilitarians as modern thinkers.

Evidently, another set of problems than those of personal ethics must be considered when we think about man as a social being. Instead of asking about the end and goal of man's life as an individual, we must inquire about the end and goal of man's strivings as a creator of cultures. We have to consider to what extent history is moving toward a goal and the nature of that goal. We have to consider what trends can be found in history that can be rationally analyzed. We have to consider the extent to which the universe supports man's cultural cre-

ations in the course of history. Philosophers who have entered the land of philosophy by means of the highway of philosophy of history have some very interesting and suggestive answers to this set of problems.

KARL MARX: THE PHILOSOPHER AS OBSERVER OF SOCIETY

The philosopher whom we have chosen as a classical example of a thinker who entered the land of philosophy through the highway of philosophy of history is Karl Marx. We have chosen Marx for illustrative purposes because his has been the most influential of all modern philosophies of history. Moreover, it is of considerable practical value today to have some insight into the nature of the Marxian philosophy of history since this philosophy furnishes the theoretical basis for the policies and program of the ruling groups of a powerful and energetic nation, Soviet Russia. This same philosophy has had considerable influence in circles outside Russia and has been adopted in whole or in part by many political parties and incorporated into their platforms. Moreover, one will find Marxian ideas coming to light in the writings of many literary figures, for example, Dos Passos and Upton Sinclair. The writings of Karl Marx have had such powerful influence that they constitute a new Bible for some groups while for other groups they are regarded as the corrupting voice of an incarnate, destructive demon. In no case, however, can one afford to be indifferent or ignorant regarding the philosophy of history incorporated in these writings.

We are inclined to think of Karl Marx as a dangerous revolutionary or as a daring hero depending upon our point of view. It is true that Marx was the leader of a revolutionary movement, but it is also true that one cannot understand Marx as a man of action apart from Marx as a thinker. Marx was a conscientious student, a careful scholar, but above all else he was a speculative interpreter of history. He was the kind of

revolutionary who used the pen rather than the sword as his chief weapon, despite the fact that he insisted that the sword was a necessary and inevitable means for accomplishing the revolutionary ends that he advocated. A few of the facts regarding Marx's life may suffice to dispel some of the fallacious, preconceived ideas that we might have entertained.

First of all it must be remembered that Marx was not a member of the working class but rather a member of the German professorial class who had turned journalist in order to propagate his ideas. It is interesting, from the point of view of the philosopher, that he received his doctor's degree in philosophy on a thesis comparing the natural philosophy of Democritus and Epicurus. Marx married Jenny von Westphalen, a lineal descendant of the English Earl of Argyle, when he was a radical but promising young journalist. His wife remained with him through thirty years of political exile, spent for the most part in London. She and her seven children bore the brunt of the poverty of a refugee family in order that her husband might spend his days laboring over his abstruse political and philosophical writings in the London public library. Of special interest to Americans is the fact that the family received a share of its support for a considerable time through articles written for Horace Greeley's *New York Tribune.* Marx also contributed articles to *The New American Cyclopedia* edited by George Ripley and Charles A. Dana. On the whole we gain the impression that Marx was a scholar and a philosopher who became a revolutionist rather than a man of action who became a philosopher.

Marx lived in a period in the nineteenth century when great progress was being made in all fields of human endeavor in Europe and America. The French Revolution had done its work in the previous generation, freeing the middle classes throughout most of Europe and giving them the opportunity to bring about progressive changes in industrial and political

life. A new spirit of initiative had sprung up throughout the Western world giving rise to new ideas in science, art, and religion. This new progressive tendency was under the direction of nation states which liberalized their political structures and encouraged colonial expansion in order to give full reign to this spirit of initiative. It was an age in which progress was clearly seen to be so much a part of the nature of things that revolutionary social changes were regarded unnecessary and unthinkable.

The philosophy of history that most adequately expressed the dynamism and the conservatism of the Europe of the middle of the nineteenth century was that of the German philosopher, G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). For Hegel the progressive changes that were taking place in the world could be attributed to spiritual processes at work in the universe. Reality was essentially process but this process was seen in history as the unfolding of an Absolute Mind. The spirit of man as part of the absolute spirit takes concrete form, according to Hegel, in the individual's striving for freedom. The spirit attains ever higher levels of freedom and fulfillment through a process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in which each new synthesis offers new political and social institutions that are an advancement over previous ages. Interestingly enough, Hegel conceived that the ultimate synthesis of the world process had its beginning in the rise of the culture of Western Europe under the guidance of Christianity and that it was reaching its point of culmination in his time in German Prussian civilization.

Hegel's philosophy of history emphasized the dynamic process in history as moving toward inevitable fulfillment in his own age. On the other hand, he saw no reason for expecting or encouraging any basic revolutions in the institutional life of Western man. Not many men outside Germany were inclined to take Hegel's idea of the culmination of Western civilization in Germany in a very serious vein. Many, however,

were ready to accept the entrancing speculative idea that all history was a spiritual process in which man co-operated and that that process had reached its culmination in nineteenth-century Western civilization. With this acceptance one could be profoundly liberal in a theoretical way and basically conservative in practice.

Like all conscientious students of philosophy in his day, Karl Marx was entranced by Hegel's profound speculations on the nature of history. He affiliated himself with a group of young Hegelian philosophers who reveled in the opportunity afforded them to appear in the role of philosophical and religious radicals. It was not long before Marx discovered that this group which enjoyed the intellectual pleasures of being profoundly liberal in a theoretical way had no intentions of going beyond the conservative political and social teachings of the master, Hegel. Marx had certain traits in his personality that made him resemble the prophets of Israel rather than the professors of the aloof tradition of German absolute idealism. He could not accept a philosophy of history that had as one of its basic premises the idea that no more radical changes were necessary or possible in the structure of man's society.

A trip to Paris served to bring to light the prophetic side of Marx's personality. At Paris he came into contact with men who regarded philosophical theorizing as merely a step to practical political action. Here also he came into contact with men who were steeped in the French tradition of sociological theorizing in opposition to the German tradition of metaphysical speculation. Marx became acquainted with the theories of the French socialists and communists. Here too he became affiliated with workers' groups that were concerned with critically analyzing the weaknesses of their society and who were actively engaged in trying to change that society. In this atmosphere the fervent young journalist found himself. Why not take the profound theoretical philosophy of Hegel and modify

it to the point where it could become an instrument for bringing about the revolutionary changes in society that the workingmen's movement was striving to achieve? This was the question that Marx asked and that he endeavored to answer.

Henceforth the life work of Marx followed a consistent pattern. He directed his efforts along three chief lines of endeavor. First of all, he considered that it was his task to lead a world-wide revolution that would establish an entirely new set of institutions in Western civilization. To accomplish this task Marx became an active worker in organizing an international workingmen's movement. It can hardly be claimed that Marx was the sole organizing genius responsible for the workingmen's movement in the nineteenth century. His work along the line of practical political organization was by no means ineffective, however. It can be said that Marx, together with his friend and collaborator Friedrich Engels, was the educator of the workingman. As a writer and journalist he made the workingman conscious of his peculiar status in modern society. This served to develop class consciousness among the workingmen. At the same time he instilled into the workingman's movement something of his own fervent hope for a new and better society. This served to arouse a sense of destiny among the working classes which made them ready and willing to endure hardship and discomfort for the sake of their cause.

In the second place, Marx directed his efforts toward a critical attack against the economic and social inadequacies of Western civilization. His criticisms were, on the whole, trenchant and effective. He pointed out as others were doing, especially in Great Britain, that the new age of the machine did not automatically bring happiness and progress for large masses of the population in the industrialized states of Europe. He criticized the modern, liberal, constitutional governments by claiming that too often they were dominated by an upper-class point of view which made them servants of one particular

economic group rather than of the nation as a whole. He criticized religious institutions as essentially conservative institutions dependent economically upon the upper classes and consequently an ally of the upper classes for the domination of the poor. He criticized the capitalistic economic system by pointing out that it did not function as efficiently as its supporters like David Ricardo and Adam Smith had affirmed but that it tended to develop in the direction of monopolies which made the powerful capitalist more powerful and which forced more and more members of society into a state of virtual dependence upon a few powerful individuals or combines. Not all of these criticisms are justified today as they were in Marx's time. There was sufficient truth in his contentions, however, to arouse men of all classes to look about them with a critical eye and to re-evaluate their society. One need not agree with the Marxist philosophy today to recognize the validity of many of these criticisms. Much of the social progress that has been made in the twentieth century has been made because men were aroused by Marxian criticism to see the points of weakness in their social system and consequently to provide correctives.

The third chief line of endeavor along which Marx directed his efforts was philosophical. By studying the economic and social institutions of Western man from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century Marx hoped to discover a pattern of history which would serve to guide the workingman's revolution which he was convinced was in the making. The result of his thinking about man's society, insitutions, and history was the formulation of a philosophy of history known as dialectical materialism. The philosopher is primarily interested in this phase of Marx's work.

As a realistic philosopher Marx took as his task the problem of analyzing the economic system of Western civilization and the process that gave rise to a new class, the proletarian worker, in whose hands rested the destiny of Western man in

so far as new progressive developments could be expected. Marx carried forward an indefatigable research into the economic problem of the production of wealth. He traced the development of the various techniques for producing wealth as they arose in history. His work as a scientist comes to the forefront most definitely when he attempts to analyze the nature of the productive system of nineteenth-century European civilization, namely, laissez-faire capitalism. This task is pursued with great persistence in Marx's most famous book, *Das Kapital.* This book is of primary interest today for the economist. It is almost impossible to read it in its entirety with understanding if one does not have previous knowledge of the English classical economists together with a detailed knowledge of economic conditions in Great Britain in the middle of the nineteenth century.

As a scholar Marx gathered considerable evidence to prove that the capitalistic system of production was not inviolably a part of the nature of economic reality but that it had evolved from feudalism. Man was consequently free to bring about changes in that system if he desired to do so. In the second place, Marx showed that the capitalistic method of production gave rise to a proletarian class that did not receive advantages from this system. If the system was to be changed, one could expect changes to be effected only by this class. Finally, Marx's analysis of the capitalistic system of production gave evidence to prove that the system tended to result in periodical internal crises or depressions due to overproduction. In order to avoid depressions capitalistic nations were driven, according to Marx, to carry on imperialistic enterprises that led inevitably to imperialistic wars. At this point Marx's enthusiasm as a revolutionist enters the picture as he shows how the proletarian classes can be manipulated and aroused to revolutionary pitch so that they can take advantage of these periods of crisis to seize control of governments and to establish a dictatorship of

the proletariat. Once that has been accomplished the communistic system of production can be substituted for capitalism and a new era of progress will be instituted.

Marx was never satisfied to limit his thinking to the realistic analysis outlined above. If this had been the case, he might have been considered a philosopher of economics but never a philosopher of history. Marx affirmed that this pattern of changes which could be observed in Western civilization was somehow rooted in the structure of history itself. Thus history could be examined by rational means and the processes of change could be predicted with a high degree of certainty.

Marx rejected the basic principle of Hegelian philosophy of history, namely, the view that the dynamic changes wrought in history were dependent upon a spiritual force, the Absolute Idea. The economic life of man determined the process of history rather than the unfolding of some mythical, spiritual principle. The economic techniques that developed in society for assuring man's survival determined the patterns of a society including the way a man thinks and the way he rationalizes his behavior. In all cases, however, there is a tendency for class lines to develop between those who profit by a particular economic system and those who are exploited by that system. It is this tendency for economic systems to develop class lines which makes it impossible for Marx to accept a materialism that is purely mechanistic and deterministic. The tensions between classes give rise to a dialectical process in history which provides for change and progress in history. The dialectical process of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis which Hegel had affirmed as a theoretical explanation of the fact of change in history is consequently accepted by Marx. However, for Marx this dialectical process is not a theoretical process to be analyzed by metaphysical means but an economic process that can be analyzed by a factual study of economic systems and the social trends in classes arising from these systems.

Marx believed that the world process is an open process depending for its direction upon the extent to which the men within a suppressed class become conscious of their destiny to change history by revolutionizing the means of production. As a disciple of Hegel, Marx was constrained to move a step beyond this position in his theoretical philosophy. He, too, could not resist the temptation to regard his era as the most significant in history. The struggle of the workingman against capitalistic society was regarded by Marx as not merely one of many events in the course of history but as the final fulfillment of history. The struggle of the proletariat in Western society was regarded as unique and final, for this final struggle was not merely a struggle between classes to decide which class should control the means of production. It was a struggle against the very principle of ownership.

Marx was convinced that the victory of the proletariat would mean the abolition of ownership. If this revolution could be established, there would be an abolition of all class lines. With the disappearance of class lines the course of history would level off into an ever-ascending plateau of peace and progress. A man-made utopia upon earth would result.

The popular appeal of the Marxian philosophy is dependent to a large degree on this culmination of Marx's philosophy in a leap of faith. His philosophy is based on common-sense materialism, the philosophy of the common man who has lost or who has never had a religion. This same materialism, however, is elevated to the point where it functions as a religion by eliciting an irrational and unquestioning faith in a happy tomorrow.

A. Some Criticisms of the Marxian Philosophy

A number of trenchant criticisms have been offered by both historians and social philosophers against the Marxian philosophy of history. The most obvious criticism is that of the his-

torian who can point out that history has not worked out in the twentieth century as Marx predicted. For example, the revolution of the workers occurred in Russia rather than in the West, contrary to Marx's idea that most of the members of the community must be driven into the proletarian class before a revolution can be successful. There was a smaller percentage of industrial workers in Russia than in any of the great European nations. Moreover, class lines based on special privilege and indirect ownership through bureaucratic control tend to arise under Russian communism just as in all other societies. In like manner, imperialistic tendencies comparable to those of the capitalistic countries have arisen under Stalin.

Furthermore, the historian can point out that the working classes tend to be nationalistic rather than international in their outlook as Marx expected. As a matter of fact nationalism rather than capitalism or the Christian religion has been the greatest barrier in the way of the spread of communism. This is evident in time of war. It is also evident in the peculiar reactionary turn taken by radical movements in Italy under Mussolini and Germany under Hitler in which proletarians and socialists became fascists. There is no way in Marxian ideology of accounting for this peculiar turn of events.

Historians, especially in the Anglo-Saxon countries, have been able to offer considerable evidence pointing to the fact that capitalism has certain corrective techniques as part of its own genius which have upset Marx's predictions in many ways. The most important of these correctives arises from the genius demonstrated by capitalism for increasing production. President Roosevelt is said to have affirmed that the American book that would convert Russia to democracy was the Sears Roebuck catalogue. The Sears Roebuck catalogue is a rather poor substitute for Karl Marx and is not likely to offer serious competition, but the fact remains that Karl Marx is not likely to be taken very seriously in an industrial civilization that is en-

joying an economy of plenty such as some countries have.

Another corrective found in many capitalistic countries is bound up with the genius possessed by democracy for reconciling differences between classes. Where this reconciliation is continually practiced, it is difficult for class lines to become hardened and fixed along economic lines. This is in evidence in America where studies indicate that nearly all Americans consider themselves members of the middle class regardless of their economic status.

Two important social philosophers, Max Weber of Germany and Thorstein Veblen of America, have attacked the Marxian philosophy at crucial points. Weber has shown in great detail that social institutions are not necessarily determined by the means of production, but that the economic system of production is determined to a large degree by religious ideas. His classic work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, shows how religious ideas influenced the growth of capitalism in opposition to the Marxian view that the religion of an era is merely a by-product of economic forces.

Thorstein Veblen's work has tended to discount the Marxian contention that the dynamic process of history is dependent upon the interaction of economic classes. As a social psychologist Veblen considered classes as the product of social conditioning based on the historical continuity of institutions. Psychological rather than economic factors determine whether one is a member of the predatory or industrious classes. The dynamic process of history is determined by the inventive genius of man rather than by the interactions of classes.

LANDMARKS IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

In the preceding pages we have described the philosophy of history of Karl Marx in some detail as one of the important landmarks along this particular highway of philosophy. There are other important landmarks along this road which should

be brought to the attention of the reader. In endeavoring to classify them we find that every philosophy of history must offer an answer to at least three important questions: (1) What determines the course of history? (2) Toward what end does history move? (3) What means are provided in the course of history for attaining this goal?

A. Materialistic Philosophies of History

The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism which we have just considered affirms that history is determined primarily by economic forces. The final goal toward which history moves is capacity production of material goods in the classless society. Once this goal has been attained, other values which are commonly considered as spiritual will automatically arise to make man's life a life of peace and happiness in which the greatest pleasure will be enjoyed by the greatest number. The means provided in the course of history for attaining this goal is the class revolution. We have already outlined how the facts of history are interpreted by Marx as significant proof that history is actually moving toward this goal. Here is one type of interpretation of history, the economic. Other materialistic theories of history comparable to the Marxian, for example, the theories of Lucretius and the French encyclopedists, lack the scope and completeness of Marx's theory. Philosophies of history which emphasize the fact that history is ultimately the product of the interaction of material forces do not have a large number of followers among philosophers. It is difficult to think of history without emphasizing individual men as creative forces in history, and materialism cannot logically tolerate that emphasis.

Although Marx's materialistic interpretation of history has not had many followers among philosophers, his account of the role of classes in bringing about changes in the process of history has had considerable influence even among those

who do not regard classes as a necessary by-product of economic forces. For example, Walther Rathenau in his book, *In Days to Come,* shows how a new period of radical change may be brought about by a new barbarian invasion. This new invasion would not be horizontal, that is, from without as was the case with the invasion of the Roman Empire by the Germanic tribes. It will be a vertical invasion of the masses from within the civilization. This theory is elaborated by the Spanish philosopher Ortega y Gasset in his book, *The Revolt of the Masses.* For him the future process of history in this present age of transition will be determined by the emergence of a new type of man in Western civilization. Whether that future will be catastrophic and disastrous or constructive cannot be determined.

B. History as Determined by the Activity of Mind

A second type of philosophy of history considers that history is determined by the creative activity of mind at work in the universe. We have already given a brief description of the Hegelian philosophy of history which is one of the best examples of this type of intellectual approach. The goal toward which history moves, according to this point of view, is the goal of an ideal pattern of institutions. This ideal pattern of institutions will fulfill, on the one hand, the creative process of unfoldment of the Absolute Idea. On the other hand, it will provide for the full development of the creative possibilities in the spiritual life of man as a part of the Absolute.

Philosophers who hold this particular theory are inclined to answer the third of our crucial questions in either one of two ways. They emphasize the theory that the goal of history is attained through the unfoldment of the Absolute in society or they emphasize the theory that the goal of history is attained through the life and work of great men in whom the Absolute Idea is fulfilled in the process of history. Idealists of the Ger-

man tradition are inclined to accept the former explanation after the manner of Hegel. Philosophers like Windelband, Rickert, Simmel, Spranger, Dilthey, Weber, and Troeltsch hold more or less to this first point of view. They have made remarkable contributions to our understanding of the cultural history of man. On the other hand, idealists of the Anglo-Saxon world, for example Carlyle and Emerson, are inclined to emphasize the importance of the individual as in Carlyle's *Heroes and Hero-worship.*

Two modern writers, Julien Benda and Albert Schweitzer offer interesting variations of this latter point of view. Julien Benda's *The Treason of the Intellectuals* attributes the breakdown of modern society to a loss of nerve among intellectual leaders. There is progress in history only in so far as there are men who urge their fellow men to recognize the superiority of non-material values. With such men as teachers of a civilization men will honor the good even though their acts are contrary to the good. In the modern world the intellectuals have deserted their high calling by attaching themselves to particular materialistic values and ignoring universal spiritual values.

In his *Philosophy of Civilization,* Albert Schweitzer shows that progress in history is dependent upon the extent to which individuals and groups demonstrate the values of a life-affirming ethics in a world of nature that is ultimately life-denying. He points out that all world views based on nature philosophy have ended in deepest pessimism as in India, and that pessimism leads to stagnation and regression in the cultural life of a people. According to Schweitzer Western man is carrying on a hopeless struggle in his attempts to establish an optimistic world view on nature philosophy. He must be taught to affirm his will to live as an ethics of reverence for life in opposition to the life-denying forces of nature. As is well known Schweitzer has himself endeavored to show how this can be

done by the individual by becoming a medical missionary in Africa. Schweitzer's views are found to some degree in the work of his predecessors Alfred Fouillée, Marie Guyau, and Wilhelm Stern. However, his work is eminently original and offers one of the best antidotes to the pessimism found so frequently among thinkers in the modern world.

C. History as Determined by Cultures as Organisms

Another type of philosophy of history which has had many advocates in many different civilizations regards history as determined by the growth processes of a living organism. From this point of view the growth of cultures on the surface of Mother Earth is just as natural as the growth of forests. We see immediately that in this theory the end toward which history moves may be variously regarded depending upon one's views as to the nature of this growth process. As a matter of fact, this theory tends to develop two distinct answers to this problem of the end of history. The one answer is pessimistic because it regards the natural process of growth as moving toward a constant series of cycles of decay and rebirth. The other answer is optimistic because it regards the processes of growth as possessing ever new creative possibilities. In the former case a cyclical theory of history is advocated. In the latter case a theory of history is advocated emphasizing the inevitability of progress. Both theories have had proponents among the philosophers.

The characteristic philosophy of history among both Greek and Hindu philosophers was the pessimistic cyclical theory. The Greeks affirmed that history moved repeatedly through a cycle of ages in which the age of gold, the age of silver, the age of bronze, and the age of iron followed with inevitable regularity under the guidance of the Fates. The Hindus affirmed that history represented a period of the "throwing out" of the absolute reality followed by a period of dissolution.

In both cases the processes of growth are regarded as moving civilizations through a cycle of growth, decay, and rebirth.

The most important modern example of this type of pessimistic cyclical theory is found in Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West.* Spengler considers every culture as a unique, organic, plantlike structure. Every culture necessarily undergoes a period of birth, youth, maturity, old age, and dissolution. Spengler bases his theory on an analysis of classical Greco-Roman culture but offers comparative data from all the great cultures. From an analysis of Western civilization that is both startling and revealing, Spengler draws the conclusion that the European-American civilization which dominates the globe has reached its full growth and has begun to die and sink into the soil again. It has passed through its springtime with Thomas Aquinas and Dante. Its summer has long since fled in the days of Luther, Galileo, and Bach. The autumn has been left behind in the age of Voltaire, Goethe, and Beethoven. And now in the twentieth century we enter the long, dreary time of winter with the basic life force of the civilization exhausted.

In the latter section of his fascinating autobiography, *The Education of Henry Adams,* the author offers a philosophy of history that is even more pessimistic than that of Spengler. He places emphasis on the analysis of the reasons why history must move toward inevitable decline and death. He interprets the scientific theory of entropy to mean that there is a gradual decrease in the energy of the universe which must lead in the end to the running down of the universe and the end of history.

Most philosophers who hold the theory that history is determined by natural processes of growth are inclined to be optimistic rather than pessimistic. They regard the processes of growth as giving evidence of possessing ever-new creative possibilities. Eighteenth-century philosophers of history such as Vico and Herder were optimistic about the future of history

because they had this faith in the creative processes of the universe as evidenced in man's cultural development. However, it remained for the nineteenth century to provide an answer to the crucial question as to the means by which this goal of continuous progress was to be attained. The Darwinian theory of evolution provided this answer by dovetailing into this philosophy of history almost perfectly. The result has been that an optimistic evolutionary philosophy of history has been the most widely accepted philosophy in the past few generations. Herbert Spencer is the most renowned of the philosophers to formulate this position in an acceptable way. He has had many followers and popularizers.

The obvious setbacks to continuous progress which have been experienced in the twentieth century have made it necessary for advocates of this theory to explain the apparent tendencies of cultures to remain stagnant and to regress rather than to progress. Sociological theorists have developed a theory of cultural lag as one of the means of explaining the lack of continuous progress. This theory affirms that progress is made not as a whole but in one or another phase of culture and that the dislocations which arise through this evolution by leaps and starts are overcome only gradually and painfully.

D. History as Determined by the Will of God

Our classification of philosophies of history must include a fourth type if it is to be complete. Many philosophers, especially those rooted in a religious tradition, have affirmed that the course of history is not determined either by material forces, or by those elements within the universe that can be recognized as ideal intellectual forces, or by the processes of natural growth. They have maintained that history is determined by the will of God and that the end and goal of history is the kingdom of God. Philosophers who have held this view are usually in agreement as to what determines the course of

history and as to the end and goal of history. They offer a variety of opinions, however, as to the means that are provided in the course of history for attaining this ultimate goal. Some have said that this goal is to be attained gradually through the providential activity of God until the time of its fulfillment in the heavenly commonwealth. Others have affirmed that this goal is entirely transcendent and that history is unimportant until God himself breaks into time to bring about the end of the world and the end of time. Others have advanced the theory that the goal of the kingdom is to be attained by means of an unresolved conflict between good and evil forces in the world, a conflict in which God, man, and even the forces of nature are involved. These theories may be called the providential, the eschatological, and the dialectical theories, respectively. They have all been advocated by Christian theologians at one time or another.

The most influential of all Christian philosophers of history, Augustine of Hippo (354-430), offers a providential philosophy of history in his great work, *The City of God.* According to this theory all history must be judged in the light of God's divine plan for the redemption of mankind. God sustains the material universe and permits the existence of the institutions of the social order as a means to this end. Human history is significant in so far as it contributes to God's ultimate purposes. For that reason the church must be regarded as the most important of all institutions and as the creator of history. The church has been instituted by God as his providential means for bringing men into his kingdom. The church is the temporal city of God and a prototype of the ultimate eternal city of God in the heavens.

This view of history entranced the mind of man throughout Christendom for a thousand years after the time of Augustine. It inspired the poetry of Dante and Milton. It was incorporated into the magnificent system of philosophy of Thomas

Aquinas in the thirteenth century. It was accepted as the theoretical basis for the political life of the Middle Ages. The Roman Catholic church has based many of its claims for the authority of the church in secular affairs upon Augustine's theory of history. Protestants such as Calvin have held similar positions. It is safe to say that even today no Christian theologian can escape the powerful influence of Augustine in his interpretation of history.

According to the eschatological or transcendent view of history the will of God determines history by direct, catastrophic action. This view may be considered a variation of the providential theory of history. However, this theory does not regard the course of human events as of any great significance. The church as the earthly city of God serving as the providential means for the redemption of mankind is not emphasized. The earthly history of man warns of the imminent end of the world. God will intervene in due time to establish his kingdom by catastrophic means.

This theory of history is a pessimistic God-centered view as over against the optimistic church-centered view represented by the followers of St. Augustine. It is a theory that tends to arise in all religious groups faced with persecution and disaster. It is found in Jewish writings, for example, the *Book of Daniel,* the *Book of Enoch,* and *Fourth Ezra.* The best example in Christian literature is the *Book of Revelation,* a work that has exerted tremendous influence on all Christian thinking. In recent times the theory has appeared in modern dress in the work of certain Russian Christians, especially Bulgakov. By and large, however, this theory of history has been more popular among mystics and among emotional types of Christians rather than among the philosophers or theologians. The result has been that it is rarely formulated in a philosophical way.

The dialectical theory of history affirms that the dynamic

element in history is provided by the constant pressure of the will of God experienced as tension in the lives of men who are evil and who are living in an evil world. This tension constitutes the divine-human encounter which takes the form of a dialogue between man and God. In the events of history this dialogue can be observed as a conflict between good and evil forces. Since evil is so pervasive in the very structure of the universe, there is no assurance that the good will be victorious in the course of human history. This view has its origins in the great Protestant mystic, Jacob Boehme. It has come into modern thought through the influence of the German philosopher Friedrich Schelling. The most important contemporary presentations of this position are to be found in Paul Tillich's *Interpretation of History*, Nicholas Berdyaev's *The Meaning of History*, and Reinhold Niebuhr's *The Nature and Destiny of Man*.

In his philosophy of history, Paul Tillich postulates a tension between form-creative and form-destructive forces at work in the universe. This is the basis for a dialectical process between the divine and the demonic which dominates history. The course of history depends upon the decisions of men as they are confronted with tension situations. Man is always in danger of allowing his own life and the life of his society to become demonic. Tillich sees history not as a movement within nature, but as a movement of man's life set over against the Divine. The center of history is to be found in the revelation of Jesus Christ for it is at this point in history that the meaning of history is decisively disclosed as divine-human encounter.

The philosophies of history that we have been studying in this chapter are frankly contradictory. Which has read the trend of history correctly? Perhaps no one will ever be able to answer this question by philosophical speculation. The hidden womb of history, whether it be within time and space or in super-history beyond time and space, will alone vindicate

one or the other of these philosophies. It is important to note that historians and sociologists, with the notable exception of a few like A. J. Toynbee and Pitirim Sorokin, are in agreement in their indifference to all such philosophical speculation. They say that the course of history gives no evidence of an orderly process that is subject to systematic formulation. This does not satisfy the philosopher who replies that the historian cannot ignore the problem of the meaning of history without running the danger of implying that history has no meaning. In a critical age like the present it is probable that an even greater interest will be shown in philosophy of history than has been the case in the past. Men who have a philosophy of history are likely to be the men who will be the makers of history.

CHAPTER IX

Arthur Schopenhauer And the Landmarks in Aesthetics

We must now consider the third branch of philosophy that has arisen from the philosopher's thinking about man, namely, aesthetics. The highways of ethics and philosophy of history are rather forbidding highways to some people. They emphasize man as a moral being and as a social being. Thinkers who have the temperament of the religious leader and teacher, as was the case with Socrates and Plato, are inclined to follow the highway of ethics into the land of philosophy when they think about man. Other thinkers like Karl Marx have the temperament of the social reformer. When they think about man, they frequently find the highway of philosophy of history an inviting way into the land of philosophy. Some observers, however, like Arthur Schopenhauer, cannot consider man as either a moral or social being. These philosophers have the temperament of the artist rather than of the religious leader or the reformer. Their observations incline them to regard man as primarily a creature of intuitions and of sensations. For these men the way of approach into the land of philosophy is the highway of aesthetics.

In this chapter we shall study the life and work of Schopenhauer as a landmark in aesthetics. We have selected Schopenhauer for special study not so much because of the importance of the system of aesthetics which he developed but because of

the fact that his life and work call attention to the importance of aesthetics in philosophy and at the same time show the danger involved in an overemphasis upon aesthetics.

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: THE PHILOSOPHER AS AESTHETE

Why did Schopenhauer give aesthetics or the philosophy of beauty a central place in his system of philosophy? Why did this nineteenth-century German reject the highways of ethics and philosophy of religion which were so popular among German philosophers of his day in order to travel the less-frequented highway of aesthetics? Schopenhauer would no doubt have considered this an academic question and he hated academic questions as blind alleys which asinine professors of philosophy insisted on exploring. The question is not an academic question, however, for our purposes. In answering this question we may be able to throw considerable light on the nature of the highway of aesthetics and of its relative importance.

First of all, it can be said that Schopenhauer emphasized aesthetics because his perusal of Kant's philosophy had led him to believe that Kant's interpreters Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel had misinterpreted their great master. Like most nineteenth-century German philosophers Schopenhauer regarded Kant's work on theory of knowledge, *The Critique of Pure Reason,* as the point of departure for all subsequent philosophy. The first section of this work deals with Transcendental Aesthetic in which Kant gives an exposition of the conditions under which it is possible to receive impressions from without. A second section deals with the faculty of understanding and shows how these impressions are organized into a coherent world. A third section deals with the faculty of reason as the means by which sensations and understanding can result in creative activity in the world.

Fichte and Hegel emphasized the third section of Kant's

work and came to the conclusion that rational thought was the ultimate principle of the universe. Schopenhauer reacted from this emphasis, not so much because of a deeper appreciation of Kant as because of hatred for Fichte and Hegel. He insisted on the finality of the sense experience as outlined in the Transcendental Aesthetic. There is nothing beyond sensuous experience. The man who desires to grasp reality must not depend upon morality or reason but upon the experiences of the senses. If we examine our awareness of sensuous experience, we shall find that the individual is dominated by an inner drive to experience more and more sensations. He is driven by a will-to-live. This will-to-live as it is experienced by the individual is but a part of a Universal Will which constitutes the process of eternal becoming in the universe.

In reacting from the moralism of Fichte and the rationalism of Hegel, Schopenhauer gave a central place to sense experience. Without an appreciation of sensuous experiences man's life loses its richness of content, and without an appreciation of this rich content of experience there is no appreciation of beauty. Schopenhauer's emphasis forced philosophers to recognize that the experiences which gave rise to desire and to appreciation of the beautiful were of an elemental nature and could not be neglected in the life of man. Neither reason nor moral principles could be considered as having a prior claim on man. Subsequent investigations of the Freudian psychologists tend to substantiate the truth of Schopenhauer's contentions on this matter.

The above paragraphs may have given the impression that Schopenhauer was concerned about aesthetics for purely technical, philosophical reasons. This was not the case. The experience of beauty was elevated in importance until it served as a way of salvation for this sensitive and distorted personality. Schopenhauer is recognized as the great apostle of pessimism in the Western world. His observations of the

life of man and his reflections on his own life led Schopenhauer to consider the Universal Will as a blind, irrational force which drives man to cling desperately to life and which makes of life an endless process of desire, pain, and suffering. There is no way by which the sensitive man can escape this suffering. The suicidal course recommended by Hegesias is of no avail, for man cannot negate the Universal Will by destroying his own life. The only recourse is to negate the will by overcoming all desire. As a result Schopenhauer recommended the philosophy of Buddha and introduced Buddhistic teachings into Western thought for the first time. Temperamentally, however, Schopenhauer was not an ascetic. For his own purposes, he preferred to adopt an aesthetic way of life as a means of temporary release from pain in the appreciation of beauty rather than to adopt the Buddhistic techniques for destroying all desires.

Schopenhauer's life was an unhappy one, not so much because of external misfortune as because of his own headstrong egotism and individualism. He was neglected by his mother who was a rather famous literary and social figure of the day. He was not successful as a teacher. This led him to hate other philosophers such as Hegel who enjoyed this success. His books were ignored. He was obsessed with fears of losing his wealth, fears of sickness, fears of persecution. He kept a loaded pistol at his bedside and would never take rooms on the second floor of a house for fear of fire. He never married or cultivated any close friendships. He was indifferent to the affection of a devoted sister and did not bother to call on his mother from the time of his youth to the time of her death. He had to pay an annual fine for many years to a seamstress whom he had injured by throwing her out of the hallway of his quarters when her gossip with her friends irritated him. This is the record of a man with a peculiarly sensitive and moody temperament. None of the ordinary ways of life could satisfy the

needs of such a temperament. A quest for beauty and the appreciation of beauty were the best antidotes against frustration and despair that he could find.

For his own life Schopenhauer found solace in certain aesthetic elements in Plato's philosophy rather than in the ascetic philosophy of Buddha. Schopenhauer accepted Plato's doctrine of Ideas as a hierarchy of forms that could be intellectually and aesthetically contemplated for their own sake. He consequently distorted Plato's philosophy, for Plato had always considered the forms of the good as superior in the hierarchy of forms to the true and the beautiful. However, there always remained an element of unconscious snobbery in the philosophy of the Greek aristocrat. For Schopenhauer snobbery was not an unconscious trait but rather a consciously cultivated attitude. He felt that the intelligent and cultivated man could escape the wheel of existence by forgetting the practical world through the contemplation of the harmony of form. The artist is gifted above all others in his ability to give expression to the eternal forms. Moreover, the artist presents these forms as worthy of contemplation for their own sake. He has no ulterior motive, no practical purpose. The cultivated man who is able to contemplate form in the work of the artist is able to free himself to a great extent from the constant pain and frustration associated with the phenomenal world. It is only a temporary escape to be sure, for even the eternal Ideas are instruments of the Absolute Will, but it is the only salvation possible for the cultivated, sensitive man.

Schopenhauer's system of aesthetics offers an analysis of the hierarchy of eternal forms as they are presented in the arts. Architecture is the lowest form of art because it deals with the forms of matter and therefore cannot possibly go beyond the harmony and balance of material things. The classical architecture of the Greeks has attained perfection in presenting the abstract forms of matter. Gothic architecture is

of no value because of its lack of form and its dependence upon adjustment to practical needs rather than abstract design. Landscape painting, like architecture, can do no more than show forth the order of Ideas in the material universe. Animal painting and sculpture and the painting and sculpture of the human form rise to higher levels in so far as they portray the order of Ideas in the animate universe where the Universal Will can be seen as projecting itself into the physical activities of living things. Portrait painting is of special value for here we have insight into the order of Ideas in the life of the individual seen as a projection of the Universal Will in the form of desire. However, poetry must be recognized as the art medium which most adequately portrays the projection of the Universal Will in its higher forms in the life of man. The highest type of poetry is tragedy for here we see the Universal Will portrayed in all its power as fate, suffering, and blind hopeless striving for the fulfillment of desires.

Schopenhauer gave a special place to music in his system of aesthetics. He had a keener appreciation of music than of any of the other arts and found almost as much consolation in playing the flute as in the comradeship of his favorite poodle. He considered that music revealed the true nature of the will without dependence upon the Ideas as intermediary revealers of the will as seen in the other arts. For example, he is convinced that the bass notes reveal the Universal Will as seen in nature while the treble clef with its greater freedom in establishing the melody reveals the will as it is projected into the yearning desires of the human soul.

Schopenhauer's philosophical investigations had led him to discern the importance of aesthetic experiences in the life of man. Moreover, his egotistic temperament combined with his pessimistic and sensual nature led him to regard the aesthetic way of life as a way of salvation. Besides these two factors there remains a third factor which was responsible for inducing

Schopenhauer to follow the highway of aesthetics. Schopenhauer had unusual opportunities to develop an appreciation of the beautiful. His environment provided the leisure and the cultural advantages that would stimulate an interest in art and in artistic sensibilities. He was born and reared in an upper-class merchant family which had been long established in the aristocratic merchant class of Danzig. His parents were highly cultivated people who were citizens of Europe and of the world rather than of Germany. They provided ample opportunities for travel for their son. In so far as he had any technical training it was in the field of the classics so that the classical world with its artistic appeal was an open door for Schopenhauer. He had intimate contacts with the leaders in the great center of nineteenth-century European culture at Weimar. It was characteristic of the man that he scorned the literati of Weimar rather than imitated them. If there was to be a king of snobbery, Schopenhauer had no doubts as to who should be king.

Occasionally there are thinkers who become keen observers of their fellow men from the comfortable observation post of a hotel lobby or an exclusive resort. Schopenhauer was a philosophical observer of this type. Unlike other men of the same type, such as Samuel Johnson, he was never able to project his personality to the point where it comprehended the full stream of humanity. Schopenhauer could go no further than to regard humanity as a reflection of his own ego. What he discovered in man on viewing this reflection was not very pleasant. It was more pleasant to understand the works of art which man produced rather than to concern oneself about the men and movements which produced these works of art. An occasional liaison of an extremely temporary nature was the only social contact that he enjoyed with women and these liaisons merely served to substantiate his preconceived opinions about women. An occasional conversation with an English-

man at the *Englischer Hof* where he dined served to show off his superb command of the English language and at the same time to satisfy his needs for intellectual companionship. For genuine solace there always remained the theater, music, and the enjoyment of one's own intellectual life.

A. Road Signs for the Aesthete from the Life of Schopenhauer

What does this brief summary of the life and work of Schopenhauer teach us about the field of aesthetics? It indicates, first of all, that thinking about man is never complete unless we consider man as a sensuous being who enjoys beauty and who is continually in quest of the beautiful. Schopenhauer's pessimistic metaphysical system can be ignored, but there are few who would not profit by an acquaintance with his theory of beauty. The nineteenth century overemphasized the moral side of man's nature. The twentieth century is inclined to view man as primarily a social being. Schopenhauer's emphasis on man as a unique being possessed of the faculty for appreciating the beautiful is a welcome corrective to these one-sided views.

Schopenhauer's life also indicates that if man's faculty for appreciating beauty is to become trained and sensitive, opportunities must be afforded in the environment for the development of the cultural side of man's life. For Schopenhauer narrowness of outlook, provincialism, slavery to the practical, hypocritical moralizing were regarded as servants of ugliness. He considered the Anglo-Saxon world as worthy of scorn for this reason. There could be no flowering of beauty in this atmosphere. Certainly greater attention must be given in the future to providing opportunities in the environment for the cultivation of the beautiful. Forces that stand as barriers to the growth of beauty must be recognized as evil and fought with as much energy as other destructive forces. Schopenhauer has a message here for every American who is forced to live in the midst of the ugliness of the average industrial community.

In the third place, reflection on Schopenhauer's life and work leads us to recognize that the quest for the beautiful cannot stand alone as a way of life. The man who depends entirely upon the sensuous and intellectual appreciation of beauty is in danger of losing his perspective with regards to the importance of his own ego. He is inclined to overemphasize the importance of his own feelings, his own experiences, his own sensations. This may end in a total indifference to the rights and needs of others. It may also end in the peevish petulance which characterizes the life of some who devote their lives to the arts.

The quest for beauty as a way of life has frequently been associated with a philosophy of despair. This was the case for the Cyrenaics of Greece and for Schopenhauer. Man is essentially a moral being and a social being. The appreciation of beauty is an important factor for man's well-being, but it is not everything. Attempts to give the aesthetic way of life the central place sooner or later result in frustration and despair.

LANDMARKS IN AESTHETICS— WHAT IS THE SOURCE OF BEAUTY?

Aesthetics is a comparatively new department of philosophy. The word "aesthetics" was first used by Alexander Baumgarten in 1750. It did not become a common word in the vocabulary of philosophers until Hegel used the term for his investigations on art around 1820. This does not mean that problems relative to man's quest for beauty did not concern philosophers previous to this date. Both Plato and Aristotle, for example, wrote at length about these problems. However, they did not consider aesthetics as a division of philosophy worthy of concentrated study. Even today many philosophers are inclined to regard aesthetics as relatively unimportant. It has only been during the period of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that philosophers have endeavored to broaden the forgotten

pathway of aesthetics into one of the recognized highways of philosophy. They have been eminently successful, for it appears that mankind can bear only a limited amount of ugliness. When that limit has been reached, men of all types and classes are driven to seek beauty as they seek for any of the other necessities of life. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries so many men have been forced to live in the midst of so much unbearable ugliness that aesthetics has ceased to be a subject of concern only to the aesthete, the critic, and the artist. Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the study of aesthetics is still in a transitional state.

A satisfactory system of aesthetics must provide a solution to at least two problems. It must explain how beauty is possible, that is, it must offer a satisfactory analysis of the sources of beauty. In the second place, it must provide a means by which beauty can be distinguished from the ugly, that is, it must provide criteria for judgment so that means are provided for the improvement of taste. Practically all the theories of beauty which have arisen in the past hundred years confine their attention to the first of these problems. This means that aesthetics is still in the descriptive stage. The fact that aestheticians spend so much time considering the nature of art in all its various manifestations is another indication that aesthetics confines its attention to description. Art is the chief means by which beauty is communicated, so there is no question but that these studies on the source of beauty and the nature of the fine arts are important. However, aesthetics must sooner or later rise to a higher level of generalizations so that it can act as an arbiter of beauty and of the arts for our civilization.

Nearly all systems of aesthetics agree that appreciation of beauty is related in some way to sense experience and that it is connected with the emotions. Beauty cannot be communicated without sense experience. The emotional reaction associ-

ated with a sense experience is the means by which we identify an object or situation as beautiful. Although there is agreement that sensations and emotions are indispensable for the communication of beauty, there is no general agreement as to the source of beauty. At least three general classes of theories have arisen endeavoring to explain how beauty is possible. Many theories claim that the source of beauty is to be found in a system of order, a unified pattern or structure which can be perceived as form. Another group of theories considers the source of beauty as primarily subjective and regards beauty as dependent upon some inner psychological drive. When the needs that arise from this inner psychological drive or drives are met we have the satisfying emotional reaction which we recognize as an experience of the beautiful. A third group of theories considers that the source of beauty is to be found in the process of social conditioning. A man learns to appreciate certain things or situations as beautiful because of the influences brought to bear upon his life by the social group with which he is associated.

A. Theories Finding the Source of Beauty in Form

Our brief analysis of the views of Schopenhauer on the subject of aesthetics indicates that he can be classified as representative of the formal theory of beauty. It will be recalled that Schopenhauer was dependent upon Plato's doctrine of Ideas for this part of his theory. As a matter of fact, nearly all theories of form have been influenced to some degree by the emphasis placed by the Greek thinkers and artists on the importance of formal structure in the appreciation of beauty. Wherever the classical influence has been dominant there one will find a strong inclination in favor of the theory of forms as the source of beauty.

When we face the task of classifying the various theories that regard form as the source of beauty, we find that these

theories show surprising disagreement. This is because there is no general agreement as to the way man perceives the forms that give rise to experiences of beauty. In line with his theory of Ideas, Plato considered forms as the essential character of things. They constituted the metaphysical structure of reality, unchangeable and perfect. Most important of all, these forms of reality could be experienced through employing the intellectual and moral faculty of man rather than by dependence upon sensation. As a result of this Platonic emphasis some writers on aesthetics hold the position that forms of beauty must be capable of being grasped by intellectual and moral means rather than by means of sensation alone. They have repeatedly emphasized the importance of content and discipline in art. In their opinion an art object must be meaningful if it is to be beautiful. This theory of art was advocated by Ruskin in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century it became the rallying cry of critics who objected to the extravagances of modern art. Among these critics are men like Irving Babbitt and Paul Elmer More. The Neo-Thomist writer, Jacques Maritain, also advocates an intellectualistic theory of forms in his *Art and Scholasticism.*

A second group of theorists emphasizes forms as the source of beauty but considers that man perceives forms through the sensations rather than by intellectual or moral means. This group considers that the experience of beauty always involves perception of relations. The psychologist Herbart emphasized the importance of pure form as over against the Hegelian emphasis on content. Other representatives of this group in modern times have offered the theoretical basis for abstract art, for example, Clive Bell in his book called *Art* and in Foucillon's *The Life of Forms.*

A third view as to the means by which man perceives forms has been advocated by men who hold to a formal theory of beauty but who nevertheless have been influenced by the

Romantic emphasis on the emotions. These men, for example, Tolstoy in his *What is Art?* consider that forms are intuitively grasped not as a pattern of ideas or a pattern of geometrical relations but as a pattern of emotional meanings. Wordsworth affirmed that the origin of art was to be found in emotions recollected in tranquillity. His presentation of this point of view in his *Preface to Lyrical Ballads* emphasizes the emotional element in art and the intuitive method as a means for discovering the order in emotions.

The theories which consider that the source of beauty is to be found in forms have a number of advantages. They offer some hope that criteria will be established which will distinguish the beautiful from the ugly. All of these theories affirm that those forms which are appreciated over a period of time by many different people must possess intrinsic value in their formal structures. There seems to be little common agreement, however, as to the nature of forms, that is, as to what is appreciated or as to the means employed for arriving at appreciation.

Another strong point of the theory of forms is that it provides for the appreciation of the beauty of nature and of human experience in general apart from the experience of beauty in art. Nature can be appreciated in all its variety of formal structure, and memory can be regarded as a structure or form as Gestalt psychology has shown. Too frequently, theories of beauty which are not based on a theory of forms tend to delimit the sphere of beauty to the point where beauty is equated with art, in which case they ignore the fact that life itself is an art in which the rich qualities of experience may be beautiful.

B. Source of Beauty as a Subjective Psychological Drive

The rapid advancement that has been made in the study of psychology during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has

given rise to a large number of theories which consider the source of beauty as arising from one or another basic psychological drive. Konrad Lange and Karl Groos consider that the source of beauty rests in the need for play experiences among all men. The tendency of the child to make believe is also found in the life of the adult giving rise to art and the appreciation of the arts. Theodor Lipps and Vernon Lee have applied the psychological phenomenon of empathy to the study of aesthetics with interesting results. Psychologists have noticed that there is a common tendency for one to project one's subjective self into the posture of an external object thus giving rise to a characteristic emotional attitude. We tend to relax when we view a reclining figure. We tend to become tense and excited when we view a battle scene portrayed on canvas. The advocates of this theory consider that appreciation of beauty is dependent upon this psychological tendency. Benedetto Croce, on the other hand, recognizes an inner desire for expression in the lives of all men which results in some outward form of expression which gives rise to the production of art and the appreciation of art.

Another group of psychological theorists consider that the source of beauty rests in the need for emotional release rather than in the need for physical action. Sigmund Freud has emphasized the fact that this emotional release cannot be achieved in a direct way so that art arises as a psychological technique for wish-fulfillment. Hirn in his book *The Origins of Art* points out that all the arts have arisen as a means for relieving the emotions. F. W. Nietzsche emphasizes the importance of the arts as means for expressing an inner will to power. Others see in art a means by which the personality can remove itself from the environment in order to attain repose and equilibrium.

All of these theories have made noteworthy contributions to our understanding of the nature of beauty and art. For the most part they confine their attention to describing the condi-

tions that are necessary for the creation of works of beauty. They do not account as adequately for the fact that works of art are appreciated and enjoyed as beautiful by others once these works have been created. Moreover, most of these theories are inclined to oversimplify the complexity of the experience of beauty. The source of the experience of beauty cannot be found in any one psychological factor. Perhaps the greatest contribution of these theories to aesthetics is that they have shown the variety of psychological needs that find satisfaction in the appreciation of beauty. Consequently it is unreasonable to try to delimit the sphere of beauty and art to one particular field or to the fulfillment of one particular need. The needs of different individuals are different. The critic must be careful when he endeavors to set up standards for beauty lest he arbitrarily eliminate works of art as meaningless and ugly merely because they do not meet his own needs.

C. Theories Finding the Source of Beauty in Social Factors

There is a group of thinkers who would freely admit the value of many of the ideas contributed by those who find the source of beauty in psychological factors. Nevertheless they hasten to point out that the true source of beauty is to be found in the fact that man is a social being rather than in the fact that he possesses certain clearly defined psychological drives which lead to the creation of art works and the appreciation of beauty. Man would never have awareness of beauty if he were not associated with society. The social group is the agent which conditions man to have a pleasant emotional reaction under certain circumstances and to have a negative reaction under other circumstances. Three different variations of this theory have arisen to explain how we are led to appreciate beauty through our group associations.

Alfred North Whitehead presents the theory in *Science and the Modern World* that the source of beauty is to be found in

the type of education which society affords. Modern education has placed too much emphasis on the specialized knowledge of the scientist and scholar and on training for professional purposes. These need not be neglected, but if education can make man aware of values in these practical and intellectual fields, it is also capable of making man sensitive to values in the realm of beauty. Man can be trained to have habits of vivid appreciation of the arts just as he can be trained to the point where he has established habits of precision and accuracy in scientific research. Holding this point of view, Whitehead can afford to be optimistic about the prospects of developing appreciation for beauty in each new generation.

Other writers such as Spengler, Lewis Mumford, and Sorokin claim that every age determines its own art. The source of beauty is to be found in the fact that in each age a particular kind of beauty arises characteristic of that age and culture. There is no such thing as appreciation of beauty in general. Spengler claims that it is impossible for Western man to grasp the inner core of beauty in Chinese art, for Western man is the product of another age and culture. Mumford claims that it is futile to attempt to reproduce and to appreciate the art of an age based on the technology of water and wood in an age of coal and iron. We shall develop a new type of beauty and a new type of aesthetic awareness, he claims, as we move from an age of coal and iron to an age of electricity and alloys.

Men like William Morris of nineteenth-century England and John Dewey of twentieth-century America affirm that we come to appreciate beauty as a member of society because we learn to use those things in our daily lives which the group values as useful and admirable. This view refuses to regard art as a luxury and to consider appreciation of beauty as the by-product of a holiday mood. We cannot distinguish between the so-called useful arts and the fine arts. We learn to appreciate that which is beautiful in art in so far as we gain satisfaction

in adapting art objects to the needs of practical living.

The theories of beauty which find the source of beauty in society have not attempted to attack the problem of setting up criteria for judgment. However, they have made a contribution to the field of aesthetics that is badly needed today. They have reacted against the individualistic, art for art's sake type of aesthetics which has been dominant in so many circles. They have shown that the enhancement of beauty and its appreciation is not the responsibility of a select group of the artistically gifted or of the socially elite but that it is the responsibility of the community as a whole.

Our study of aesthetics as a highway for entering the land of philosophy has shown us that the desire for beauty is rooted in the life of all men. It is no less present in the life of the man on Main Street and in the slum than in the life of the man on Park Avenue or the Latin Quarter of Paris. Mankind must be shown ways by which it can partake of its heritage of beauty and by which it can contribute to that heritage. The philosopher must take his responsibilities in the field of aesthetics seriously. Too often he has given the impression that he is not in earnest in his quest for beauty. Improvement in entertainment and home surroundings as well as in architecture and city planning will never be made until men and women of all walks of life are taught how to judge the beautiful from the ugly. The philosopher cannot be satisfied until he is able to offer acceptable techniques for judging the good and the inferior in the various fields in which experiences of beauty are most common, that is, in the various fields of artistic endeavor.

CHAPTER X

Aristotle and the Landmarks in Cosmology

In our introductory section we pointed out that the philosopher who is interested primarily in thinking about nature is not easily distinguished from the scientist. The philosopher has a more comprehensive interest in nature than the scientist, we decided, and consequently refuses to limit his thinking to the use of only one method or the investigation of only one phase of nature. It will also be remembered that we called attention to the fact that the early Greek philosophers began the philosophic quest of Western man when they endeavored to use reason to account for the phenomena of nature. There are many examples of Greek philosophers who were interested in thinking about nature. No better example can be found for our purposes, however, than Aristotle.

ARISTOTLE: THE PHILOSOPHER AS OBSERVER OF NATURE

Aristotle is the culminating figure in a long line of Greek philosopher-scientists. It is doubtful if any other figure in the history of philosophy more clearly illustrates the comprehensiveness of the philosopher's interest in nature. Aristotle was not concerned with one limited field of natural phenomena but rather with nature as a whole. He wrote works on physics, astronomy, meteorology, biology, and psychology. His method of approach varies from that of precise, scientific observation and classification to that of almost carefree poetic speculation.

Aristotle had the philosopher's genius for coming to terms with nature, not by dissecting nature into the minutiae of unrelated entities, but rather by looking for a general ordering principle that would have explanatory value when applied to nature as a whole.

Aristotle is usually described as a biologist who rebelled against the speculative metaphysical thinking of his teacher, Plato. There is just as much evidence indicating that Aristotle was a true disciple of Plato rather than a belligerent opponent of his old teacher. Aristotle always writes in a manner showing great respect and veneration when he has occasion to mention Plato. Moreover, his own views of the world of nature are dependent upon Plato. As an Athenian, Plato was interested in thinking about man and thinking about God. His interest in nature was confined to an interest in mathematics and the related science of astronomy. Aristotle was a Macedonian in line with the traditions of the natural philosophers of Ionia, such as Democritus. Moreover, his father was a famous physician and Aristotle was influenced by the medical science of his day. With this background it was only natural that Aristotle should have been the one disciple of Plato who had the insight to see that no system of philosophy could be complete if it neglected to think about nature. Aristotle began his life work as a philosopher by attempting to contribute a philosophy of nature to the philosophical system of Plato. In order to accomplish this task it was necessary for him to modify the system of his master, as we shall indicate, but he never rejected the basic principles of that system.

Aristotle came to Athens to study in Plato's famous school, the Academy, when he was eighteen years of age. He worked under Plato's tutelage for almost two decades. During this period he became thoroughly grounded in philosophy. He taught rhetoric in the Academy, and his literary efforts during this period were in line with the traditions and teachings of

the Platonic school. At first he wrote philosophical dialogues after the manner of Plato. These dialogues became famous for their literary quality, however, rather than for their originality. When Plato died and the destinies of the Academy were turned over to Speusippus and Xenocrates, Aristotle became convinced that the mathematical emphasis of the Academy would make it impossible for him to develop his genius as a philosopher of nature. He left the Academy to devote his attention to biological research in a leisurely way on the island of Lesbos. Apparently this period of research was very influential in Aristotle's development as a thinker, for it is in the field of research of marine life that he shows the most exact knowledge.

In the meantime political events served to open new opportunities for the genius of Aristotle. His native district of Macedonia was clearly in line to take over the political leadership of the Greek world. When Philip, king of Macedonia, sought for a tutor for his twelve-year-old son Alexander, his choice fell upon Aristotle. For four years Aristotle held the most important teaching position of his day as tutor of the future conqueror of the civilized world. In later years Aristotle may have considered this step as very unfortunate. He certainly felt that his efforts were fruitless when Alexander betrayed his teacher by rejecting the Greek ideals taught by Aristotle in favor of Oriental ideas and practices. Moreover, the political involvements which arose through his association with Alexander carried serious consequents later on when Alexander suspected Aristotle of being anti-Alexander and the Athenians accused him of being pro-Alexander. From the point of view of science and philosophy, however, Aristotle's association with Alexander was a fortunate coincidence. Because of this association Aristotle had access to an ever-increasing fund of observations collected by men of learning and insight who accompanied Alexander's armies in their wanderings in strange lands. As a result it can be said that Aristotle was the first of the scien-

tists who had at his disposal a corps of observers and workers who aided in the collecting of facts. The genius of Aristotle was of such a nature that he could not rest until all of these facts were properly classified and interpreted.

Aristotle returned to Athens to set up his own school and to develop his own philosophy after his tutorial duties had been fulfilled in Macedonia. As in most Athenian schools emphasis was placed in Aristotle's school on the teaching of the popular subjects of rhetoric, oratory, and politics. It was not long, however, before it became clear that Aristotle's school, called the Lycaeum, was to be devoted to scientific work as well as to practical teaching and to philosophical speculation. A museum was established to house the growing collection of curiosities that came into Aristotle's possession. In his technical lectures given in the mornings, use was made of the data which Aristotle had collected from his own observations. Above all else it was clear that even though Aristotle remained on a friendly footing with his former friends of the Academy, he was venturing to reinterpret the philosophy of the Academy in such a way that it would hold true for a philosophy of nature as well as a philosophy of man and a philosophy of religion. By taking this task as his life work Aristotle was destined to bring Greek thought to fully rounded completion. The philosophy of nature that Aristotle contributed to Greek civilization was definitive for Greco-Roman civilization. Its influence was so great that it continued to dominate the thinking of man for a thousand years after the decline of that civilization.

Any man with even a very slight philosophical bent will find that some intriguing problems are brought to his attention if he spends a summer's vacation in the mountains or by the seashore observing nature. The artificial routine of man's life is dwarfed by the majestic routine of nature. The days that Aristotle spent by the sea on the isle of Lesbos, far removed from the routine of the university circles of the Academy

and of Athens, appear to have left an indelible impression of the wonder and grandeur of the course of nature. Here he could contemplate the ever-changing sea with its multitude of strange living forms. Here he was faced with the burning sun, the contrast of land and sea, the starry heavens. Aristotle must certainly have thought of the doctrine that he had been taught at the Academy.

Plato had claimed with great persuasive power that universal forms gave structure to the universe in both its spiritual and physical manifestations. These universal forms were self-existent, complete, perfect, accessible to the mind of man but not to the senses. The world of material things which could be observed through the senses was a real world only because it partook of certain eternal forms such as color, shape, sound. Aristotle had seen evidence in the inspired teaching of Plato that this doctrine of forms had contributed mightily in the realm of spirit. It had induced the followers of Plato to fashion the moral and aesthetic realms of man's experience into an orderly system of ideals and had inspired men to strive to attain these ideals. Could this doctrine of forms render a similar service in explaining the order of the natural universe that it had performed in ordering man's spiritual life? The answer Aristotle gave this question was both positive and negative.

On the positive side, Aristotle recognized that the Platonic forms could be seen in nature as general types, species and subspecies, laws of nature. They were consequently the basis for any classification of the multitude of things to be observed in nature, and without classification there could be no knowledge of nature. Moreover, Aristotle saw that Plato's doctrine that only the types are real and unchangeable and that all natural objects and individuals are in a constant state of change was of real value in so far as it called attention to two important facts of nature, namely, that nature was a system of order and that nature was in constant process of change. On the negative

side, Aristotle could not conceive how the orderly process of change which characterized the natural world could be accounted for if one accepted the Platonic doctrine that forms as real beings exist apart from things. Aristotle found that it was necessary to modify Plato's doctrine at this point.

Basing his conclusions on his own observations of nature, Aristotle arrived at the doctrine that matter and form are inseparable. Matter is the potential form which becomes an existing actuality or thing when it is united with form. Thus the egg is potentially a bird which is only actualized after due process of change in which matter is molded according to the pattern of the individual bird. When matter refuses to conform to the ideal pattern, deformities arise in nature and the ordering process of nature is disrupted. Aristotle received a kind of poetic enjoyment in contemplating all nature as an eternal process of change under the guidance of forms as ordering principles. Nature could be regarded in all its phases as a process by which matter as potentiality was actualized as form only to become potentiality for some higher form. This process, called "entelechy" by Aristotle, is regarded as the organizing principle at work throughout the universe.

Aristotle's speculations led him to postulate four factors at work in motion: something to be moved, something to move it, a final goal or form, and an orderly process of development. The universe was not a static, meaningless, unreal image of eternal forms as Plato had taught but a living organism that had within itself the elements of order. Moreover, the universe was not a mechanical arrangement of atoms as Democritus had taught. The universe is seeking to fulfill final goals in all the forms of the natural world. In the end we find Aristotle rising to the heights of the religious seer and affirming the existence of an Unmoved Mover who imparts energy to the universe and who is the goal of the eternal striving of the universe.

A. Aristotle and the Basic Problems of Cosmology

With one mighty effort Aristotle had offered Greek philosophy a satisfactory answer to the problem of how to account for the process of orderly change in the natural world. His answer can be seen from our perspective as a reconciliation of the Platonic and Atomistic schools of Greek thought. There are other problems which confront the philosopher who thinks about nature besides this central problem of how to account for the process of orderly change. Some of these problems come to mind immediately for they are with us today in an age of cosmological speculation. Among the abiding questions that interest the philosopher of nature are the following: What is the general nature of the physical universe? How can we account for the origin of the universe? What are time and space? What is unique about living organisms and how are we to account for life? Aristotle had suggestive answers for all these problems which confront the philosopher of nature. It must be noted, to be sure, that Aristotle was largely dependent upon the physical science of his day so that his answers appear somewhat naive to us. However, we cannot help but admire this encyclopedic thinker for his attempts to comprehend all realms of nature within his system.

Aristotle had arrived at a solution to the central problem in a philosophy of nature. He had accounted for the process of orderly change in the universe by affirming that the energy of the universe was directed by a tendency within things to fulfill an orderly pattern of forms. Aristotle's answers to other problems in a philosophy of nature can be seen as attempts to co-ordinate the physical science of his day with this basic principle of entelechy which he had formulated in such a brilliant way.

Aristotle affirmed that there was no way of accounting for the origin of the universe. The formal or orderly structure of the universe just is, and it must be recognized as uncreated

and eternal. Moreover, this formal structure never changes in its perfect order. The process of change must be accounted for, however, postulating an Unmoved Mover. We cannot imagine a time when the universe was not in existence, but we can visualize a static universe which did not show the tremendous energy evidenced by the universe as it is today. The Prime Mover must be postulated as pure actuality, unmoved by the process which it has initiated.

The physical science that was generally accepted in Aristotle's day considered earth, water, air, and fire as the elemental substances. Aristotle accepted this view of matter and affirmed that these four elements had the characteristic of being potentiality of a very general nature. When actualized they give rise to material things. However, he found it necessary to add a fifth element, the ether, in order to account for the heavenly bodies. The heavens seemed to Aristotle to be made of a finer type of matter than any earthly matter for their perfect order gave evidence that here matter was actualized in a unique way. The earthly elements move up and down while the ether is characterized by the most perfect of all motion, namely, motion in a circle. The universe is consequently a series of spheres with the earth as the central sphere. Space too must be spherical. The universe must be regarded as containing space rather than contained in space. There can be no such thing as formless void for in that case the process of entelechy could not be in operation in empty space and Aristotle could not conceive of a situation in which the process of entelechy would be inoperative. As a result he combatted very strenuously the teachings of Democritus who had affirmed the existence of a void. Time, according to Aristotle, is the measure of motion and, as a result, dependent upon space and motion.

The problem of the uniqueness of living things caused no particular difficulty for Aristotle in his attempt to understand all of nature as an interrelationship between form and matter.

Certain combinations of elements uniting with "pneuma" or breath, that is, uniting with a special kind of ether, give rise to the potentiality of life. When this potentiality is actualized the soul or principle of life takes form as an inseparable part of matter and we recognize an individual as plant, animal, or man. All living things consequently are possessed of souls. The vegetative soul characterized by the functions of growth, nutrition, and reproduction, as in plants, is the potentiality or matter which is actualized as sensitive soul. The sensitive soul characterized by the functions of sensation, desire, and locomotion, as in animals, is the potentiality which in turn makes possible the rational soul peculiar to man. The sensitive soul has the unique power of absorbing the qualities of things through the senses without absorbing the matter of the objects observed. The rational soul is even more unique since it possesses the power to absorb pure form by the intellect unhampered by matter. Thus man who possesses a rational soul has the potentiality of intellectually comprehending forms in all their variety and purity. Aristotle drew the necessary conclusion from this line of reasoning and affirmed that the rational element in man is actualized in immortality as intellectual appreciation of the eternal Active Reason which is God.

Aristotle's philosophy of nature is significant today because of the clarity with which Aristotle presented the basic problems that arise when one thinks about nature. The scientific discoveries that have been made in the past four hundred years have shown that Aristotle was wrong many times in the attempts which he made to answer these problems. He was certainly right, however, in recognizing that the central problem in a philosophy of nature was the problem of how to account for the process of orderly change in the natural world. Even today it is possible to reconcile Aristotle's philosophy of nature with the discoveries of modern science. Neo-Thomist philosophers in the Roman Catholic church have worked dili-

gently at this task with considerable success. The German biologist, Hans Driesch, can be said to be a modern Aristotelian philosopher of nature who has had wide influence among both philosophers and scientists.

LANDMARKS IN COSMOLOGY— THE UNIVERSE REVEALED BY SCIENCE

The great landmarks in the field of philosophy of nature that have appeared in modern times have arisen through the work of the scientist rather than the philosopher. These landmarks are described for us in detail in such works as Dampier's *History of Science.*[1] It is essential, however, that we have some knowledge as to how contemporary science endeavors to answer the basic problems which Aristotle brought to the attention of the philosopher.

A. How Explain the Process of Orderly Change?

Scientists differ among themselves today in their answers to the problem of how to account for the process of orderly change in the universe just as philosophers differed in Aristotle's day. This difference of opinion is to be expected since this problem is essentially a philosophical problem. The discoveries that have been made in all scientific fields indicate that the universe is an orderly universe and that it is a universe possessing tremendous energy. Wherever the scientist investigates nature, whether it be in the realm of microscopic organisms or in the realm of interstellar space, there he finds an orderly arrangement of things and events. Aristotle had no comprehension of the vast size of the universe or of its complexity. The universe of Aristotle is dwarfed by the universe that astronomy has revealed to modern man. Our galaxy of stars as seen in the Milky Way is estimated to contain 100 billion stars. Our sun, which is about 332,000 times as large

[1] William Cecil Dampier, *A History of Science and Its Relations with Philosophy and Religion,* 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Co., 1943).

as the earth, is a comparatively insignificant unit in this galaxy. Astronomers tell us that the spiral nebulae are other galactic systems just as vast as the one of which we are a part. Throughout this vast universe there is an orderly process of change which can be observed at work in both the realms of living and non-living things. How can we account for this orderly process?

Ever since the time when Isaac Newton propounded his classical system of mechanics in the seventeenth century, sufficient evidence has been available from the physical sciences to warrant scientists and philosophers in their claims that the process of orderly change can be explained in terms of the laws which govern matter and motion. Biologists such as Julian Huxley and C. Judson Herrick[2] have endeavored to interpret the phenomena of living organisms in terms of inorganic mechanisms. It is interesting to note that this theory ultimately points to a universe that would be pure form without process. The second law of thermodynamics affirms that all process in nature tends toward a common temperature and a common energy level. This means that in the long run the energy of the universe tends to pass from available to unavailable forms so that the time may come when the universe is in absolute equilibrium.[3]

In recent years discoveries made by physical scientists tend to discount the mechanistic explanation of the orderly process of the universe. Mechanism emphasized order in the operation of the laws of nature. Nature, on the other hand, appears to emphasize process even to the point of disrupting a fixed pattern of order. Research on the atom has indicated that the atom is a compound of energy rather than a static bit of matter

[2] See Charles Judson Herrick, *The Thinking Machine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932).

[3] See Arthur S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937), chap. IV.

operating by purely mechanical means. The quantum theory applied to research on light indicates that light does not follow one specific mechanical law. Sometimes it behaves like a projection of material particles, at other times like a series of waves. Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy affirms that electrons jump from one orbit to another in the atom in an unpredictable way. One cannot predict where these electrons will go or how long a time will be required for them to make a change in their orbits. In other words, all signs point to the fact that process is more important even in the material universe than mechanical order. As a result the tendency in modern science has been to explain the process of orderly change in the universe by emphasizing evolutionary processes rather than mechanical laws.

Theories of emergent evolution have been offered by a number of important philosophers including C. Lloyd Morgan, S. Alexander, and J. C. Smuts. These theories all aim to take into consideration the results of scientific research in the twentieth century. With one accord, thinkers of this type whether they be philosophers or scientists affirm that the universe is an ongoing process which constantly tends to give rise to new forms which must be considered as something more than a complex arrangement of previous forms. There are many levels of emergence moving from electrons and protons, atoms, chemical elements, molecules and crystals through plant and animal life in a great variety of forms up to the level of mind as seen in man. In order to account for this process some of these theories postulate a cosmic drive or *nisus* which is inherently a part of nature. Discoveries that have been made in the field of biology in the twentieth century tend to fit into this theory of emergent evolution. August Weismann (1834-1914) showed that each generation produces offspring of the same type from generation to generation because the germ cells are unaffected by the body cells of the parent and conse-

quently unaffected by the environment as Darwin had thought. Hugo de Vries discovered that there are unaccountable mutations in the germ cells which breed true from the beginning. The evidence indicates that evolution proceeds by abrupt changes rather than through gradual variations.

B. Origin of the Universe and the Uniqueness of Life

Modern science reveals to us a universe that is a living organism in some respects, a perfectly ordered mechanism in other respects. The theory of emergent evolution describes the process of orderly change in a way that is satisfactory for scientifically minded modern man. On the other hand, the problems of how to account for the origin of the universe and how to account for the uniqueness of living organisms are considered by most scientists as beyond the scope of the scientific method and therefore as insoluble. Astronomers have offered acceptable theories as to the origin of the planetary system of which the earth is a part. For example, the planetesimal theory of Moulton and Chamberlin is frequently accepted in one form or another. This theory claims that the planets were separated from the sun due to the gravitational pull of a passing star. The philosopher is not satisfied, however, by an explanation that accounts for our world by showing the relationship of mother earth to grandfather sun. The question arises as to how we are to account for the universe as a whole. In a similar way scientists like Lord Kelvin and Arrhenius maintained that life came to this planet from some other planet by way of microscopic living forms driven by light radiation or carried by meteorites. Today most scientists consider that living organisms emerged gradually from non-living material even though all indications are that life always arises from other life.

By and large, the thorny problems relevant to the origin of the universe and the relative importance of living things are placed in the lap of the philosopher where they have been

since the beginning of philosophy. The chief difference in the situation today is that the philosopher fears to approach these speculative problems knowing that the technical knowledge of the scientist is necessary before he can hope to gain a respectful hearing in the modern world. Perhaps the religious seer, the mystic, and the poet as well as the scientist may make contributions in these neglected fields of philosophy of nature in the years ahead.

C. The Nature of the Physical Universe

Modern science has not left us with a vacuum regarding the two other problems that Aristotle regarded as significant in a philosophy of nature, namely, the problem of the general nature of the physical universe and the nature of time and space. Aristotle had no knowledge of chemistry. The science of chemistry has contributed immeasurably to our understanding of the basic structure of the universe in recent years. Since John Dalton (1766-1844) revived the old atomic theory of Democritus and made it the basis for a science of chemistry based on measurement and experimentation, the mystery of the structure of matter has gradually been unfolded. Certainly Aristotle with his five elements would have been astonished to learn of the complexity of that structure. The material of the physical universe is now seen to be composed of ninety-two elements. Some of these elements such as gold, silver, and copper have been known since the earliest time. Some of the most important such as oxygen and hydrogen were discovered to be gases. All of the diversified material of the physical universe—trees, animals, liquids and gases, sun and moon—is now known to be composed of these elements, uniting and reuniting in an extremely complicated but orderly fashion.

In the nineteenth century the atoms of the various elements were regarded as indestructible building blocks of the universe. Twentieth-century research, however, has shown that the atom

is in reality a complicated world in its own right. The Curies discovered radioactive elements in 1898 indicating that the elements were not indivisible. Further research by men like Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, James Chadwick, and Carl Anderson has shown the atom to be a minute planetary system with the nucleus containing over 99.9 per cent of the mass of the atom and only one-millionth of one-billionth of the volume. The nucleus is a complicated structure emitting electrically charged particles of various types called neutrons, positrons, positive and negative mesotrons. The electrons which revolve around the nucleus are negatively charged particles comparable in number to the number of positive electrical charges in the nucleus. These electrons consequently vary in number for the various elements and appear to determine the properties of the element. Research on nuclear fission of the uranium atom which led ultimately to the production of the atomic bomb has corroborated the theoretical insights of the scientist. The matter of which the universe is constructed is recognized as a complicated arrangement of electrical energy. The universe is seen to be primarily process. The formal structure of that process can only be conceived as mathematical pattern. It is more reasonable according to many scientists and philosophers to believe that this formal structure is sustained by mental and spiritual forces than by mere chance. Certainly such a belief is more satisfying for the ordinary person, for without that possibility there is little hope that the universe can be regarded as meaningful or friendly.

D. Space and Time

Man's experience of time and space is as convincing as man's experience of his own self as a thinking, living being. We think of all things including ourselves as being extended in space and persisting through time. Scientists tell us that we are still free to think of space and time in this way since per-

ceptual space and time enable us to adjust quite satisfactorily to our immediate environment on our little planet. They have shown quite conclusively however that we can no longer allow our perception of space and time to be applied in an absolute way to all space and time. We are no longer free to say that space extends in all directions indefinitely and that it is of the same nature everywhere or that each instant of time is the same everywhere going on indefinitely and forever.

A new star suddenly appears in the heavens a hundred light years from the earth. In terms of our scheme of time the star which erupted last night would have appeared years ago for an observer thirty light years distant from the star. Moreover, the fact that the earth is moving toward or away from the star complicates the situation. The heavenly bodies as we see them might have gone out of existence a year ago without our knowledge. We see one star as it existed ten years ogo, a spiral nebulae as it existed in the time of Abraham. It is obvious that space cannot be considered apart from time and that the universe is a space-time continuum, forever relative as far as man is concerned to man's own point of view.

The space-time continuum as studied by the scientists takes on some very queer characteristics. Regarding space we find that it is not necessary to consider space as being either limitless or as coming to an end. Space is essentially curved so that a ray of light moving in a straight line from the sun might conceivably return to the sun after five hundred thousand million light years. Regarding time we may still consider that time goes on forever in a never-ceasing stream until we reach a maximum size of curved space at which point, Eddington claims, time as observed from the earth stands still. However, time as observed from our point of vantage on the outer edges of curved space would be found to be running on as usual.

These strange paradoxes which appear in the more advanced physics and astronomy need not worry the philosopher too

much. The chief significance of the new cosmology for the philosopher rests in the fact that the universe appears to be man's universe after all. It is man's co-operative endeavor in interpreting the universe which makes the universe what it is; and this means that man is a very important element in the universe, playing a much higher role than he was allowed in nineteenth-century materialistic science.

The contributions that have been made by science to a philosophy of nature were great in the past two centuries. Philosophy of science has to a great extent taken over that phase of traditional metaphysics known as cosmology. Whether this interest in theoretical ideas about nature will continue or whether science will be sidetracked to other interests than knowledge for knowledge's sake remains to be seen. An overemphasis on applied science to the neglect of pure science might easily mean a sharp decline in the scientists' interest in abstract problems. From the point of view of philosophy this would be disastrous. On the other hand the philosopher recognizes that the scientific approach is not the only approach for the construction of a philosophy of nature even though from the perspective of the twentieth century it appears to be the most acceptable one.

The philosopher is reminded that science can discover only as much of the mystery of nature as his empirical techniques will permit of discovery. Our knowledge of nature is as good as the techniques and measuring instruments that we use to attain that knowledge. If the only technique and instrument that we have for studying our friend is a pair of scales, we shall get knowledge of the weight of our friend but that is all. There will be many important items left out of our investigation under those circumstances. The methods and techniques of science, wonderful as they have proved to be, may be quite crude and inadequate as compared to the wonder and mystery of nature. It may be that other methods for investigating na-

ture must be used to supplement the scientific method. Certainly the Romantic poets, for example, had important insights as to the togetherness and the relatedness of nature long before the scientists attained similar insights through empirical investigations of a purely scientific nature.

CHAPTER XI

Soren Kierkegaard and the Landmarks In Philosophy of Religion

We have described the philosopher who is interested in epistemology as a critic and analyst, the philosopher who is interested in cosmology as an observer of nature, the philosopher who is interested in ethics as in quest of the good life, the philosopher who is interested in philosophy of history as observer of society, the philosopher who is interested in aesthetics as a man of culture. How are we to describe the philosopher who is interested in thinking about God? Can we characterize such a philosopher as God-intoxicated? Spinoza has been described in those terms. We think not, for the man who is God-intoxicated is essentially a lover of God rather than a lover of wisdom. In other words he is a saint rather than a philosopher. The philosopher may become a saint on rare occasions but we can hardly consider sainthood as one of his fundamental characteristics. Let us consider the philosopher who is primarily concerned with thinking about God and man's relationship to God as a man of decision.

Generally speaking, man does not wish to think about God. Man knows that he is treading on familiar ground so long as he thinks about man and nature. Many men come to the border line of knowledge about man and about nature only to withdraw in haste lest they be compelled to think about God. They retrace their steps in order to learn more and more about

man and nature. What is more likely is that they hasten to lose themselves in the intricate pathways that wind in and out in endless profusion in the dense forest of epistemology. Other men, however, coming to the border line of knowledge about man and about nature feel that they must go on to venture into the unknown. They are restless and uneasy if they are compelled to limit their quest to the three-dimensional intellectual realm of thinking, man, and nature. They must consider the possibility of a fourth dimension.

The philosophers who take this crucial step, and there are few who can avoid it, are men of decision. The history of philosophy has shown that once they have made this decision they must necessarily reorder their philosophical ideas and rethink all their experience in terms of this fourth dimension. This is true of all philosophers no matter what their conception of God may be and no matter how they may arrive at this conception. In this chapter we shall study the Danish philosopher, Sören Kierkegaard (1813-1855) as an example of the philosopher as man of decision. We trust that acquaintance with the life and work of Kierkegaard will give us some insight as to the general nature of the work of the philosopher of religion.

SOREN KIERKEGAARD: THE PHILOSOPHER AS MAN OF DECISION

The portraits of Kierkegaard that we possess almost invariably have a quality of pensiveness combined with a quality of intensity which remind us of some of the great English romantic poets such as Keats and Shelley. Kierkegaard as a youth shows a predominance of the quality of pensive expectancy. The bronze statue of Kierkegaard before the Royal Library in Copenhagen shows us a man in whom the quality of inner intensity has become so dominant that he has become old before his time. To some degree these portraits tell the story of Kierkegaard's life and work. Above all they tell the story

of a man whose entire life was devoted to a quest for God.

No one could ever dare to say of Kierkegaard, as Heine said of Kant, that he had neither life nor history. The biographies of Kierkegaard make fascinating reading. Outwardly, however, his life was almost as calm and uneventful as that of Kant. Kierkegaard was born and reared in Copenhagen. He was the son of a prosperous woolen merchant which meant that he had opportunities for education and later on the leisure to devote his efforts to a literary career which offered little by way of remuneration. As a youth Kierkegaard enjoyed his position as the gifted son of a rich man and took advantage of the cultural opportunities afforded by Copenhagen. As a student at the University, Kierkegaard studied philosophy under the Danish representatives of the dominant Hegelian philosophy. After the death of his pious father he fulfilled his father's desire by taking his degree in theology. However, his personality was such that he could not find satisfaction in following in his brother's steps and devoting his life to ordinary parish work as preacher and pastor.

There was a dark side to Kierkegaard's personality which makes it difficult to explain many of his attitudes and actions. At first this dark side of his personality took the form of a critical attitude toward society. Kierkegaard could find no reason for trusting in any of the great men or great movements of his time and nation. In one of his earliest works he attacked Hans Andersen, the literary idol of the Danish people. He began to react against the reverence with which philosophers regarded the Hegelian philosophy. When he presented his doctor's dissertation it bore the title: *On the Concept Irony, with Especial Reference to Socrates.*

It was clear that this sensitive young man with the penetrating intellect could not find rest in the ordinary amenities and values presented by his society as superb, marvelous, or colossal. He saw more and more clearly that he must be the

Socrates of his day, the man who was destined to puncture the pretty balloons of false security enjoyed by the fortunate and taken for granted by all. Throughout his life Kierkegaard maintained this dangerous and unpleasant role of critic. Wherever men placed faith and trust in false security Kierkegaard felt constrained to rise to the attack. In the end he was even driven to attack the institution which had nurtured him and of which he was an integral part, namely, the Christian church. The role of critic had been a difficult role for Socrates, the hardy, elastic sage of Athens. It was a much more difficult role for the sensitive, introverted sage of Copenhagen who had all of the religious seriousness and the gift of irony possessed by Socrates minus the balance wheels of good humor and earthly common sense.

If the dark side of Kierkegaard's personality had gone no further than to have driven him to be a critic of his age, the probabilities are that we would be studying him as a great literary genius rather than as a philosopher of religion. Kierkegaard did not stop at this point. The sharp sword of the spirit that had punctured the false hopes of security of his society was turned inwardly upon his own life. The outward symbol of this inner operation can be seen in the cruel experience by which Kierkegaard broke his engagement with Regina Olson. The echoes of this experience can be found in all the subsequent work of Kierkegaard. Biographers have puzzled over the motives for his action. He undoubtedly loved Regina who in turn protested that she could not live if the engagement were broken. Her proud father went so far as to beg Kierkegaard to reconsider only to be met by a brusque answer. This strange man insisted on destroying all connections that could bind him to the sustaining love of human fellowship. Henceforth he knew that he must be forever alone unless he could find the only fellowship that could meet the needs of his spirit, that is, fellowship with the living God. Henceforth the history

of his inner life is the history of a man dominated by a quest for God.

The best known works of Kierkegaard, such as *Either-Or, Fear and Trembling, Repetition, Philosophical Fragments, Stages on the Way of Life, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments* are primarily literary and philosophical rather than religious works. Here we find the Socratic Kierkegaard at work disturbing the complacency of the well-fed, well-educated man of the nineteenth century. Neither the aesthetic way of life with its goal of pleasure nor the ethical way of life with its goal of self-realization through performance of duty can bring security to the man who really understands what it means to exist. Here too we find the philosopher Kierkegaard using the tools of irony to undermine the prestige of the comfortable, contemplative philosophy of Hegel with its continuous series of compromises and syntheses. In exchange Kierkegaard offers an existential philosophy, that is, a philosophy which arises from the crucial experience of human existence. Hegelian philosophy is an evidence of the bankruptcy of the spirit, Kierkegaard claimed, because it fails to confront man with the decisive distinction between good and evil. The system of Hegelian idealism is useless because man cannot live within this beautiful palace built by speculative reason, for if a man is to live religiously he must accept the ethical alternatives of either-or and reject the false hopes held out to him by a comfortable both-and philosophy.

All of the writings listed in the above paragraph were published by Kierkegaard under assumed names. While he was publishing these works, however, he was also writing a series of *Edifying Addresses* with his real name on the title page. These works were very definitely the works of a man whose primary interest was religious. They indicated the progress that Kierkegaard was making in his personal religious quest. The last decade of his life was dedicated to the production of

works which offered a new and stimulating approach to philosophy of religion. Among those works were *Christian Addresses, The Works of Love, The Lilies of the Field and the Birds of the Air, The Sickness unto Death, Training in Christianity, The Gospel of Suffering, For Self-examination.* Let us consider some of the chief emphases of this philosophy of religion.

It must be recognized from the beginning that Kierkegaard's philosophy of religion is the product of a Christian thinker. Kierkegaard was reared in the Christian faith, and his religious quest grew out of the fact that he was driven to discover what it meant to become a Christian in reality as well as in name. Kierkegaard begins his task by examining the inner life of man in order to see why it is that man is driven to find God. He finds that man is essentially alone in the universe. In his attempts to overcome this loneliness he makes decisions that drive him to despair and an awareness of sin. He must ultimately recognize that only from the depths of this despair can he appreciate the true nature of his manhood and the possibility of redeeming that manhood. All men, no matter what their attainments or how fortunate they may be, are ultimately forced to come to terms with despair as the common human level of existence. The tragedy is that men allow themselves to be blinded by superficial hopes for so much of their lives.

Once a man has reached the point where he understands the true nature of his inner life, the question of the existence of God can be viewed from an entirely different angle. One no longer seeks to find God as one seeks to identify a star in space or to describe a tree in the park. He knows that God must be known inwardly, not objectively. He knows that his own inner need points to "Something Other" which is in answer to that need. The extent to which one passionately and utterly gives oneself up to this inner longing determines the extent to which one is made aware that that longing is not in vain. The fact

that our personalities are so definitely driven to affirm this longing and to make it central in our earthly lives is an indication that the soul must be immortal. For in immortality the personality will know its true nature as complete longing for God and fulfillment in God once the superficial values that now sustain us are recognized as inadequate.

Man must consequently risk all for God, realizing that by his own power he can do nothing to bring light into the dark night of despair. In the end, God is recognized by each personality as a necessity for the life of that personality. With this recognition comes faith and with faith a transformation of man's life. Henceforth all earthly values take their rightful place as relative stages on life's way and the Christian can freely resign these values when called upon to do so in order to live the life of faith in fellowship with God.

The true church, according to Kierkegaard, is constituted of individuals who have come to know God inwardly and who live outwardly a life of renunciation and suffering. The true church is not found as an institution, for all institutions tend to encourage complacency. It is an invisible spiritual order. Man cannot look to the church for salvation, for one is not automatically saved because of membership in a church. Rather it can be affirmed that the church exists because men whose lives have been inwardly changed constitute a fellowship which is completely God-centered. The life of the Christian is consequently one of continuous uncertainty and tension. The suffering which is inevitable for all can become religious through the sufferer's relationship with God.

Christianity is distinct from all other religions, including the common institutional religions of Christendom, because it intensifies the sense of guilt found in all men to the point where it becomes a sense of despair. At that point man knows that there is nothing in his nature that can save him from destruction but the passion of faith. It is only from this point

of view that the seemingly absurd doctrines of sin, forgiveness, and the incarnation are seen to be true and of utmost significance for man.

A. Road Signs for the Philosopher of Religion from the Life of Kierkegaard

What can we learn from this brief account of the life and work of Kierkegaard that will help us to understand the nature of philosophy of religion as a highway for philosophy? We learn first of all that the highway of philosophy of religion is not a highway that can be taken in the company of others. On this highway every man travels alone in his quest for God. In the second place, we learn that the highway of philosophy of religion is closely related to the highway of ethics. It is the individual's personal decisions which lead him to see the necessity of going beyond ethics in quest of a power who is "Wholly Other," by virtue of whose existence all decisions are judged in a way that is qualitatively different from man's judgment. In the third place, we learn that the philosopher as a man of decision in quest of God need not be limited by any philosophical or scientific methods of approach. Furthermore, he is under no compulsion to accept the authority of any institution in his quest, whether that institution be a popular philosophy, a political group, or an established religion. In the fourth place, Kierkegaard's life and work teach us that, even though the philosopher of religion need not accept the authority of a religious group, he must nevertheless come to terms with theology. He must somehow come to terms with the religious experience of his group formulated as a system of theology.

Kierkegaard is unique among philosophers of religion because of his awareness of the need for fulfilling the final requirement listed above. In many respects Kierkegaard's work can be considered as an elaborate set of footnotes to a Chris-

tian theology rather than as a fully rounded philosophy of religion. Here we find the deepest truths of the Christian religion presented in a literary and philosophical way independent of the authority of any church council or of any ecclesiastical organization.

It is impossible, however, to conceive of the philosophy of religion developed by Kierkegaard as arising apart from the Christian tradition. Kierkegaard spent the latter years of his life studying the ancient writings of the church fathers. It would be strange indeed if this free-lance thinker were to be recognized by future generations as one of the modern church fathers. This possibility is not unlikely. Kierkegaard has influenced philosophers such as Heidegger, Jaspers, Unamuno, Sartre. The main stream of his thought has gone into theology, however, to influence men like Barth, Brunner, Tillich, and Niebuhr in Protestant circles, men like the Jesuit Przywara in Roman Catholic circles, and men like Berdyaev of the Eastern Orthodox church.

There are two types of philosophers who become men of decision by going in quest of God, the afflicted souls and the wistful souls. Both of these types are made up of men who are adventurous. Men of the first group adventure with desperate courage. They push into unknown country like frontiersmen, knowing that no maps are available for the country that they must explore. Men of the second group are more hesitant. They are like colonists who move into new country with many a backward glance. They map the new country that they explore step by step with the firm conviction that the continuity between explored and unexplored territory may be greater than at first appears to be the case. Kierkegaard represents the philosopher of religion as an afflicted soul in quest of salvation. Other men whom we shall study have an entirely different outlook.

Philosophers like Kierkegaard who are dominated by a reli-

gious quest are the exception rather than the rule. For this reason modern professional philosophers are sometimes inclined to disregard the results of the explorations of the afflicted souls. They claim that after all the bold speculations of the afflicted soul are characteristic of the mystic and the theologian rather than the philosopher. It is the afflicted soul as philosopher, however, who has made the daring explorations and who has been most influential in remaking religion. The more cautious philosophers forget that, as Jaspers has said, even the philosopher who is not an exceptional case religiously can profit by philosophizing with his eye on the exceptional. This is certainly true in the field of philosophy of religion, for where we are dealing with the unknown we are more likely to find that it is the exceptionally bold and gifted religious genius who penetrates deepest.

B. *Cultural Role of Philosophy of Religion as Compared with Theology*

Before we give an account of some of the important contributions which have been made in the field of philosophy of religion let us indicate how philosophy of religion can be distinguished from theology. As we have seen, there is a tendency for these two fields to overlap. It will serve our purposes best, however, if we somewhat arbitrarily distinguish philosophy of religion from theology. Then we can confine our attention to landmarks in philosophy of religion, leaving the numerous landmarks in theology for treatment by the theologian.

The chief distinction that can be made between philosophy of religion and theology rests in the fact that philosophy of religion is based on the religious quest of a single individual while theology is dependent upon the religious experience of the group. Among the peoples of every culture there arises a more or less fixed and recognized mass of presupposed principles, convictions, and ideals. These principles unify and sta-

bilize the activities carried on by individuals within the culture. They also direct the activities of the culture as a whole toward a common end. These presupposed principles, the product of the experiences of the communal life of man, tend to become fixed in the form of religious belief and principles of conduct in their popular phases, theology and ethics in their intellectual phases, and as social institutions in their practical phases. When these group ideals are related to a concept of God which serves as the central point of integration for the culture, theological construction is possible and imperative.

Theology is the intellectual task of co-ordinating and systematizing the presupposed principles which embody the group ideals that are considered as worthy of the highest devotion into a unified whole in terms of a conception of God. When the group ideals that call forth the greatest devotion cease to be associated with a belief in God, social ideologies arise to take the place of theologies, and political and social myths endeavor to perform the functions of religion.

On the other hand, philosophy of religion is essentially a critical and speculative endeavor carried forward by individuals who attempt to investigate religious phenomena without yielding absolute allegiance to any historic faith or social group. Philosophy of religion serves the community in an indirect way compared to theology. It suggests new insights and investigates alternatives neglected by the prevailing theology. It opens new hypothetical possibilities which can be tested in the life of the culture in a comparative way.

At least two functions of philosophy of religion can be recognized, namely, the critical function of the analytical examination of religious phenomena and concepts and the speculative function of the synthetic construction of a world view centering in a theory as to the nature of God. The essential task of the critical phase of philosophy of religion is to discover the roots of religious ideas, to examine basic presuppositions in

religious thinking, to strive for the attainment of clarity in religious ideas, to point out weaknesses and limitations in prevailing attempts at synthesis. The essential task of speculative philosophy of religion is to formulate possible alternatives as to the nature of God, to set up hypotheses that may lead to new insights, to offer material for the construction and reconstruction of theologies, and to prevent stagnation in theology by emphasizing relevant material that has been neglected in the prevailing synthesis. The descriptive sciences of religion, namely, comparative religions, the history of religions, the psychology of religion, and the sociology of religion offer material that is indispensable for the critical phase of philosophy of religion and useful aids in its speculative phase. In this chapter we are concerned with the speculative phase of philosophy of religion.

Cultural confusion and intercultural penetration are largely responsible for bringing philosophy of religion into its present position of importance. The crosscurrents of intellectual and cultural life are so complex today that they have come to bewilder rather than invigorate. Faced with conflicting religions and conflicting theologies the bewildered individual very often finds it necessary to strike out on his own. When he does this, he will find that philosophers of religion offer a variety of answers to the problems which concern man most acutely in his religious life. These problems are two in number, namely, the problem of the nature of God and the problem of how man can establish relationship with God. We shall keep these problems in mind as we consider the various landmarks that attract our attention along the highway of philosophy of religion.

LANDMARKS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION— UPON WHAT CAN MAN DEPEND?

The term "God" has been used in so many different ways by philosophers and theologians that it is a difficult task to

offer a definition which will be sufficiently comprehensive to include all the important meanings of the term. What do men wish to designate when they use the term "God"? Is it not the case that they are using this term to express a belief in something which is supremely worthful upon which they can depend with complete confidence and to which they can yield supreme devotion and allegiance? No matter what a man's view of God may be, he must regard his God as supremely worthful. What is even more crucial is that he must become a man of decision and dare to depend upon this supremely worthful God with complete confidence and self-abandonment. Now what can man discover in the universe that elicits this supreme act of confidence? Upon what can he depend? The answer that is given to this question determines what is distinctive in any philosophy of religion.

A. God Regarded as Redeemer—Radical Theism

The suffering, afflicted souls as philosophers of religion have given the most daring answer to this question. They have said that they see their way clear to depend upon a God who is a redeemer, that is, a God who is able and who desires to make of man something different from what he is by nature. They say that they can depend upon God to accomplish what is to all appearances contrary to nature and to experience, namely, to save all that is good in the universe so that suffering is not in vain, to offer to corrupt flesh the gift of eternal life, to destroy the effects of evil in man and in nature so that there will be a new heaven and a new earth in which the redeemed sinner will find fellowship with a God who is described as a personal Father. In a word they claim that they can depend upon a God who will make an indifferent universe friendly and who will redeem and bless the members of that strange and somewhat despicable species, *Homo sapiens.* Put in such bold terms as these, is it any wonder that those philosophers

who tend to be cautious souls withdraw in haste from this venturesome faith?

It is clear from the point of view of this radical theism that any relationship established between God and man cannot arise from any godlike characteristic that man possesses by nature. The relationship must be established by an act of God, a revelation of God's own inner being. To be sure, man's nature must be in some degree analogous to the nature of God to the extent of making man sensitive to the significance of God's revelation and capable of responding to that revelation. Nevertheless, it is only when man is confronted with God's revelation of himself in his Son that man can hope for redemption from despair. We recognize immediately that once philosophy of religion has reached this point it has ceased to be philosophy and has become Christian theology.

Not all theistic philosophies of religion are of this radical type. Some theistic religions such as Judaism and Mohammedanism, it must also be remembered, claim that God establishes a relationship with man through other means of revelation than through Christ. However, the strength of radical theism rests in the fact that this type of theism appears to be the most satisfying of all religious points of view for those who are most vitally aware of religious needs, namely, the afflicted souls. Moreover, in pointing to Christ as the revelation of God and as the means for establishing relationship with God, Christianity possesses a unique strength which rests solidly upon the uniqueness of Christ as a historical figure. Every man who is brought face to face with a realization of the mystery of the universe and of human life must sooner or later come face to face with that strangely alluring and commanding personality, Jesus of Nazareth.

We shall leave it to the theologian to pursue the task of discovering the means that God as Redeemer employs for the redemption of the world—whether it be through the instru-

mentality of his sovereign power or through the winsome appeal of holy love or by means of the delegated authority of a sacred institution. The classical theologians in the Calvinistic branches of the church have tended to champion the first view. Lutheran theologians, together with mystics in all groups, have emphasized the second view. Roman Catholic theologians have consistently maintained the third view. Some church groups have combined two of these views. For example, Eastern Orthodox theologians[1] have combined the second and third views while Anglican theologians have combined the first and third views.

Many philosophers who have gone in quest of God have not found it necessary to adopt any of these theological positions. They have been too cautious to take the decisive step of depending upon a God who is a redeemer. Let us therefore continue our study of the landmarks in philosophy of religion by briefly examining some of the alternatives to radical theism.

B. God as Ethical Order—Ethical Theism

The most venturesome among the philosophers whom we have designated as belonging to the class of cautious souls have come to the conclusion that they can depend with complete confidence upon an ethical order in the universe which makes for the increase of righteousness. We have already pointed out in our study of Socrates and Kant that these two great figures in the history of philosophy concluded by a process of logical reasoning combined with an inner intuition that they could depend upon an ethical order in the universe which would sustain the righteous man so that his good deeds would not be in vain or fruitless in a world in which evil was all too apparent. Socrates said that no evil could come to the righteous man in life or in death. Kant developed a doctrine of the "cate-

[1] See S. Bulgakov, *The Orthodox Church* (London: Centenary, 1935) and *The Wisdom of God* (Paisley Press, 1937).

gorical imperative" based on the importance of duty as a call to righteous living.

We shall consider men such as Socrates and Kant as ethical theists. They can be called theists because they recognize that if there is an ethical order in the universe there must be a God who is righteousness sustaining that order in his own person. It is only the self-conscious personality who can recognize an act as good or bad, and the ultimate sustainer of the ethical order in the universe must consequently be such a personality. According to this view man establishes relationship with this ethical order through a realization of the importance of his inner sense of freedom. It is man's conscience which gives him a sense of right and wrong. He and he alone is responsible for directing his life so that it will be in line with this ethical system of order which is intuitively recognized as supremely worthful.

There have been many philosophers who have regarded God as ethical order rather than as redeemer. J. G. Fichte (1762-1814), the follower of Kant, presented this point of view in his essay entitled *On the Ground of Our Belief in a Divine World Order* and in his *Doctrine of Religion.* Albrecht Ritschl presented this position in theological dress and he has had many followers, for example, the American theologians A. C. McGiffert and W. A. Brown. In Great Britain such works as John Baillie's *The Interpretation of Religion* and A. E. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist* show the strength of this tradition among philosophers. Similar views have been presented in America by D. C. Macintosh in his *Theology as an Empirical Science* and in Eugene W. Lyman's *The Meaning and Truth of Religion.*

C. God as Rational Order—Deism and Absolute Idealism

Philosophers who affirm that God is ethical order and who dare to offer utmost devotion to this moral order are bold men.

There is much in the universe which would indicate that the universe is indifferent to man's moral aspirations. There is no absolutely certain evidence that there is any ethical force in the universe beyond man which sustains those aspirations or fosters them. In the long run the universe may or may not be concerned about righteousness or good deeds.

Some philosophers of a more cautious temperament than the ethical theists have emphasized this uncertainty. They have been unable to yield themselves to complete dependence upon the moral order of the universe. However, after they have examined the universe, they have come to the conclusion that they can depend upon a rational order in the universe. God is not a redeemer or a force making for righteousness. God is an eternal mind. The fact that man is gifted with reason enables him to establish the proper relationship with this eternal mind. By understanding the rational order of the universe man establishes contact with God. As we have seen in our study of Aristotle, it is possible to carry this point to its logical conclusion and affirm that reason, and reason alone, is the immortal element in man.

Philosophers who have held this view of God have been called deists when they maintained that the rational order seen in the universe had its source in a mind beyond nature. The eighteenth century was the great age of deism. This position is affirmed in John Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* and by other thinkers such as Clarke, Hartley, Priestley in England and by Voltaire and Lessing on the continent. In this view a God who is rational order is responsible for the creation of the universe more or less as the mind of a master mechanic is responsible for the ordered system seen in a perfect mechanism. However, God has no immediate relation to the world so we can know his rationality only through his work and not through direct contact of mind with mind.

Very few philosophers today are deists. However, there are

many philosophers who claim that God is mind at work in all parts of the universe. Some of them have views similar to those of Leibnitz and are called panpsychists. They affirm that the whole of the universe consists of mind at work in the various parts of the universe. Others are called panentheists because they affirm that God is in all things. Philosophers who are absolute idealists frequently have this view of God. There is considerable variety in the religious philosophies of these men. They agree, however, in affirming that the connecting link that establishes a relationship between God and man is reason. God is Absolute Idea and the way we discover God is through the development of ideas in thinking. This is the position maintained in modern philosophy by men like William E. Hocking. In his *Meaning of God in Human Experience,* Hocking points out that the reason we consider feeling as so important in our religious life is because feeling is the primitive root of all religious ideas. Consequently religion must begin with feeling but it never comes to a true appreciation of the nature of God until God is known as Idea.

D. The Universe as God—Pantheism

Philosophers who regard God as an ethical order or an intelligible order are among the more daring philosophers whom we have classed as cautious souls. They dare to depend on an ordering principle apart from nature and apart from man which gives purpose to the universe even though it may be evidenced primarily in man and nature. Less daring thinkers can see no evidence of purpose in the universe. Three philosophies of religion have been developed by the cautious souls who have not been able to put their trust in a purposeful universe. We shall consider these philosophies very briefly as pantheistic, naturalistic, and humanistic.

Pantheism is one of the oldest philosophies of religion. The pantheist regards the universe as a whole as the most depend-

able of all realities. Man and nature are part of a unified whole. Man receives the energy and substance of his life from this whole. The energy and substance of his life are in turn absorbed into this ever-present unity when man's individual being is no more. God as conceived by the pantheist is sublime and mysterious even as the universe is sublime and mysterious.

In so far as man adjusts himself to the totality of reality, he has assurance of having established relationship with God. He is overwhelmed by warm feelings of kinship with all that exists. His hymn in praise of the unity and oneness of the universe is a hymn in praise of God as that which is supremely worthful. His worship involves a yielding of himself to the unity of eternal being which is the universe. This means that his highest act of worship involves the negation of his own personality in recognition of the fact that individuality is an illusion. This act of worship is carried to an extreme in the cruder forms of pantheistic religions so that existence is itself regarded as evil since it entices us to believe in the existence of an individuality which is in reality an illusion. The desire to be an individual is the root of evil. Elevation above individuality, achieved through contemplation or through religious practices, yields the only salvation that is genuine, namely, the peace that comes to one whose being is recognized as part and parcel of the universe in which he is at home. The loneliness of individuality is overcome. But the loneliness and meaninglessness of the universe remain forever unchanged and unchangeable. To accept this loneliness is to learn wisdom.

Spinoza is usually regarded as the philosopher who presented the pantheistic position in its complete form in Western thought. Poets who have been inclined to glorify nature have frequently written as pantheists. For example, pantheistic views are presented in Emerson's *Brahma* and Swinburne's *Hertha.* The naturalist John Burroughs offers a pantheistic

philosophy in his book *Accepting the Universe.* Modern man finds it difficult to accept the pantheistic position. He cannot yield supreme allegiance to a universe that modern science has shown to be ruthlessly indifferent to man's highest interests and values. H. G. Wells in his book *God the Invisible King* presents this difficulty very clearly. God-as-Nature is neither spiritual nor moral and stands opposed to the God who is experienced as Holy Spirit in our hearts.

E. God as Cosmic Process— Naturalism

Naturalistic philosophers who are not sufficiently daring to depend upon the universe as God have developed a philosophy of religion based on dependence upon certain creative forces at work in the cosmic process. Most philosophers of religion who are in close touch with scientific developments are inclined to find God in some creative energy at work in the universe. S. Alexander in his *Space, Time, and Deity* considers that God as the highest level of existence is still in the process of being created. H. N. Wieman in *The Growth of the Idea of God* considers that God is that element in the cosmic process which makes for the support and the increase of values.

In all cases the naturalistic philosophers of religion affirm that the connecting link between God and man depends upon man. Man must learn to understand the nature of this creative process by using the scientific method of research. Having attained this understanding he must learn how to adjust his life to this creative process so that he too can be a creative and appreciative agent in the increase of values. After all, the process of creativity is in operation in our lives. As we respond to those impulses within us which are creative, we are making contact with God who is creativity. We love God when we learn to appreciate and love those elements in the universe which bring forth more abundant life and an increase in values.

Prayer and worship consequently do not involve ceremonious petitions offered to a God who is in the heavens but an emotional awareness of the possibilities for growth in man and nature. Religious conversion involves a yielding of devotion and allegiance to this process of growth.

F. God as Man's Ideals—Humanism

The philosophers of religion whom we shall classify as scientific humanists cannot see their way clear to trust in any process of creativity in the universe apart from man. They cannot go beyond a dependence upon man in their venture of faith. They consider that God is the idealized symbol for man's own ideals, hopes, and possibilities. In the end, man must learn to accept the fact that he must depend upon his fellow men for the fulfillment of those hopes and possibilities. The only God is man. To place one's trust in any power beyond man is to indulge in wishful thinking that serves only to distract man's energies from his task of conquering the universe as far as possible so that all things may contribute toward the establishment of the good life.

If man is God, it follows that the way of establishing fellowship with God is through the appreciation of man and his possibilities. The highest form of worship comes to the man who has an overwhelming sense of fellowship with the community of men. The religious man is the man who endeavors to sustain that fellowship and to fulfill its possibilities in all fields of human endeavor.

Men who can find no other basis for religious living in an age of scientific skepticism have been sustained by the humanistic faith to live good and useful lives. Auguste Comte offered the classical presentation of this position in the nineteenth century. The twentieth century, however, has seen the full development of the humanist movement especially in America. Many contemporary American thinkers such as M. C. Otto,

R. W. Sellars, A. E. Haydon and Edward S. Ames have offered eloquent presentations of this position in their books and lectures. Famous European thinkers such as Bertrand Russell and Sigmund Freud have accepted this point of view. It is of interest to note that some of these men present humanism as a joyous faith taking it for granted that man can remake the future. The universe is indifferent to man's values, it is claimed, but nevertheless the universe can be made to respond to man's wishes and hopes. They tend to regard both man and nature in an optimistic light. Others such as Bertrand Russell adopt humanism as a kind of religion of despair, a position presented with great literary ability in his essay, *A Free Man's Worship.*

One group of scientific humanists finds that only one element in man can elicit their confidence, namely, man's ability to develop and use the scientific method as a technique for discovery. John Dewey in his *A Common Faith* finds that man must learn to put his trust in the power of human intelligence to remake the future. For these men God is a technique for controlling and manipulating the forces of nature and of society, for the scientific method is the only thing in the world upon which man can depend with complete confidence. To be sure, one cannot worship a technique or a method, but the man who is wholeheartedly engaged in applying this technique for human betterment will be rewarded with an emotional satisfaction and enthusiasm that is comparable to the satisfaction which comes to others in the worship of God.

It is of interest to note that when modern man places his trust in a technique for controlling and manipulating nature, he is once more on the level of the religious experience of primitive man. Primitive man, contrary to common opinion, was not very adventurous in his religious beliefs and speculations. He wanted a religion that he could depend upon to meet immediate needs. When magic arose as a technique for controlling the forces of nature, primitive man responded by yield-

ing implicitly to a trust in magic. It is only natural that modern man, who is greatly concerned about the immediate and the practical as the only worth-while achievement, should yield implicit devotion to the scientific method as a technique for meeting his needs. All that the historian of religions can say is that if the scientific humanists are right then the religious explorations of the thousands of years in which mankind dared to affirm more adventurous religious faiths have been fruitless and in vain.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful if man will ever be content to give up the eternal search for God. He is motivated to look beyond himself and beyond his society for help and aid. In the dreadful loneliness of the cosmos his heart goes out in search of cosmic fellowship. In the midst of the eternal mystery of existence his mind reaches out with overweening intellectual curiosity in search of ultimate truth. The awareness of his own frustration that comes to him as he gets a glimpse of the realm of higher values which forever elude his grasp moves him to search the cosmos for an all-powerful, all-good creator and sustainer of values. And in the guilt of his own soul as he feels the pull of evil on his life, man's cry goes up again and again imploring forgiveness and seeking salvation. It is not very likely that man will ever give up his eternal quest. It is not very likely that he will ever cease to ask the question: Is there a God and how can he be known? It is possible to visualize a time when all other branches of philosophy except philosophy of religion may be absorbed into philosophy of science. The time will never come, however, when there will cease to be philosophers like Kierkegaard who dare to go in quest of God.

CHAPTER XII

Hegel and the Landmarks in Metaphysics

In the previous chapters we have covered most of the important divisions of philosophy. We have taken examples from the history of philosophy which give concrete evidence as to how the great leaders in philosophical thinking carry out their missions. This approach may have misled the student if it has given the impression that philosophers were interested merely in one specialized field of philosophy. The task of philosophy is a task which calls for the unification of all knowledge and of all experience, and most philosophers resent the implication that they are departmental specialists. This means in effect that philosophers are generally aware that they must sooner or later become metaphysicians, that is, that they must unify the knowledge and wisdom that they have attained into a comprehensive theory of the universe.

Sometimes the philosopher does not have the ability required for this task. Very frequently the life span of the philosopher is too short for the fulfillment of this creative work. Sometimes the era in which a philosopher lives determines to a large degree his success as a metaphysician. In some periods of the history of a civilization the time is ripe for the formulation of great creative systems of thought. In other periods men do not appear to be ready for such formulations. In the latter case the philosopher must confine his attention to his specialty. If he is a metaphysical thinker in such a period, his work is

likely to be ignored until a generation which is more appreciative of metaphysical speculation arrives on the scene.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), whom we have selected for special attention in this chapter, is one of the best examples of a philosopher whose life was devoted to creative metaphysical speculation. We shall attempt a brief survey of the life and work of Hegel in order that we may have some insight as to what goes into the making of a metaphysician.

HEGEL: THE PHILOSOPHER AS EXECUTIVE

Hegel was the philosophical heir to the important intellectual movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which led to the development of the modern mind. These intellectual movements had become crystallized in the philosophy of Leibnitz, Spinoza, and Kant. Leibnitz had come to the conclusion that the primary characteristic of the universe as seen in the discoveries of modern man was the fact of force or energy. The scientific discoveries that had been made since the time of the Renaissance all pointed in this direction. Spinoza had come to the conclusion that the universe is a unified whole, a single substance possessing various modes of existence which we consider as matter and mind or bodies and ideas. Kant with his analysis of the possible ways of gaining knowledge had at first deflated metaphysics and had then made it clear to all philosophers that new possibilities for metaphysical formulation were at hand. Moreover, Kant had demonstrated the efficacy of a new type of dialectical method in his doctrine of antinomies. He had shown how human thought tends to produce its contradictory and how each set of propositions, thesis and antithesis, can be proved to be true if their presuppositions be accepted as true.

Hegel possessed the speculative insight that enabled him to see all of these revealing ideas as elements in a unified world

view. He came to the conclusion that the universe is a dynamic process which operates continuously in all phases of existence as the dialectical process of an all-inclusive Mind or Absolute. The categories of thinking which Kant had analyzed so carefully are seen to be modes of being objectified in nature, in history, and in the spiritual life of man. The dynamic nature of the universe that Leibnitz had emphasized is seen to be an orderly evolutionary process by which everything tends to give rise to its opposite. However, the universe does not remain in a constant state of tension with every thesis producing its antithesis. The process is a rational one in which contradictions are overcome on a higher level of existence. In the realm of nature the process is unconscious. In the realm of history, art, and religion, evolution becomes self-conscious as an interaction of ideas in the cultural life of man. In the end the universe is seen to be a unified whole, an Absolute Mind, a thinking process striving for a clearer fulfillment of itself as a rational system.

Hegel presented these revolutionary insights to the world in his *Phenomenology of Mind* (1807). This book, published when he was 37, would no doubt have sufficed to have given him recognition as a thinker of profound insight and originality. However, it is doubtful whether Hegel would have been recognized as a great metaphysician if his productive work had ceased at this point. During the remaining twenty-four years of his life he gave ample evidence of possessing encyclopedic command of knowledge in a wide variety of fields and the ability to organize this knowledge in a comprehensive way.

Hegel's development as a philosopher was slow compared to that of such contemporaries as Fichte and Schelling. He was not recognized as an unusually brilliant student in his undergraduate days or as a theological student at Tübingen. Throughout his student days, however, the characteristic that distinguished him from the average was his unwearied dili-

gence in collecting notes from all available sources on an immense variety of subjects. This habit of taking notes remained with him as a tutor and private student when he left the university. Later on it proved to be one of his finest assets as a university professor at Jena and Berlin. Hegel's lectures were poorly delivered but it could never be said that they lacked content. His writings suffered from a tortuous style but one did not have to read Hegel very extensively before becoming aware that here was a philosopher who thought in the grand style. This man had a comprehensive grasp of knowledge in a wide variety of fields. He had somehow managed to incorporate this knowledge into an imposing system of philosophy in which all problems of modern man were considered and all points of view reconciled.

Hegel spent his productive years in the uneventful routine of academic life. His intellectual life, however, was by no means uneventful. The inspiration of the poet was combined with the disciplined constructive thinking of the metaphysician. Hegel published works on the *Science of Logic, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Philosophy of Law.* His carefully prepared lectures covered the subjects of philosophy of history, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, history of philosophy. Men of the nineteenth century who were weary of narrow perspectives and who thought in terms of wide horizons had at last found a philosopher. Students came from all over the civilized world to attend the lectures of the sage of Germany. The learned Hegel went on as usual, droning over each sentence of his manuscript, shuffling his notes, seeking recourse from time to time in the ever-present snuff box. In this atmosphere the Hegelian system of idealistic metaphysics was born and won its adherents. It was a system which was destined to dominate the thinking of many of the finest minds of the nineteenth century. It is still with us today.

With the increase of fame there also came the increase of

criticism, for no philosophical system can escape criticism. Hegel had his enemies but he could never be moved to engage in philosophical quarrels such as have poisoned the life and work of some of the great philosophers. One either accepted the Hegelian system as a whole or rejected it and little more could be said. The same holds for all the great conclusive systems of metaphysics. They are characterized by a kind of completeness and finality which distinguishes them from philosophical work in any other field. Hegel presented the modern world with a system of thought which provides one of the possible answers to the mystery of the universe. Some may not be able to accept it as the true answer. Certainly it is not the only possible answer as we shall endeavor to point out. But for those who come under the spell of Hegelian dialectic it is certainly a comprehensive and satisfactory answer.

The nineteenth century was a period of great intellectual fermentation. It was a period in which almost any philosopher could build up a following in the intellectual centers of Europe and America. Men like Schelling and Schleiermacher had their circle of followers in Germany. The French positivist, Comte, had a loyal group of disciples in France. The utilitarian movement under the leadership of Jeremy Bentham had a strong following in Great Britain. In no case, however, were these rival philosophical movements able to compete with Hegelianism on a world-wide front. Influential centers of Hegelian philosophy were established in Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries during the nineteenth century. Strange to say the movement even took root in the frontier town of St. Louis in distant America, so that the first philosophical journal to appear in America, the *Journal of Speculative Philosophy,* was published in that city under the leadership of an American Hegelian, William Torrey Harris. How is one to account for the immense popularity of the Hegelian philosophy?

The answer to the above question rests in the fact that the Hegelian philosophy met the needs of many intelligent people in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in a remarkably adequate way. It was both intellectually and emotionally satisfying to the men of that period. First of all, the Hegelian philosophy met the spiritual and religious needs of the age. The nineteenth century was an age which was sensitive to the fact of process and change as a fundamental factor in the universe. The doctrine of evolution was in the air on every side. On the other hand, the age was characterized by strong religious motivations. The Hegelian philosophy offered a world view that reconciled these conflicting principles. It provided the intelligent churchman with a philosophy that emphasized the fact of evolution but at the same time showed in great detail and with profound insight how this evolutionary process was spiritually directed. As far as Hegelianism was concerned there was no such thing as a conflict between reason and religion. Moreover, the Hegelian philosophy inspired in men a longing for an ideal that called for an ever-expanding growth of the personality and of society as a whole. Nineteenth-century religious life was characterized by Romantic individualism. Here was a philosophy that called for the ever-expanding development of the personality as a part of the process of evolutionary development toward the ideal.

Hegelianism was able to come to terms with Christianity in many advanced circles and it still holds its place among some theologians. Twentieth-century developments in Christianity have made it clear that it is impossible to equate Christianity with philosophical idealism. It is also clear, however, that a philosophical idealist can be a Christian with complete intellectual integrity, providing, some would add, that he is a Christian before he becomes a philosophical idealist. Although the Christian as idealist can maintain his intellectual integrity, it is still an open question as to whether he can main-

tain the dynamic of Christian living solely on idealist grounds.

In the second place, Hegelianism met the philosophical needs of nineteenth-century man by providing him with a political philosophy. The nineteenth century was an age of progress, an age of nationalism, an age in which the constitutional monarchy was regarded as the normal system of government. Hegelianism furnished a philosophical basis for all these preconceived political ideas that dominated the age. It provided for inevitable and endless progress in the social development of man. It set up the nation as the instrument by which the Absolute is embodied in history. It was essentially conservative politically, for change was expected to be brought about by a gradual process of transformation by evolution rather than by revolution. The Hegelian statesman was just as much at home in the nineteenth century as the Hegelian theologian.

Finally, Hegelianism served to meet certain scientific needs which gave it added strength as a popular philosophy. Many philosophically inclined scientists were troubled by the tendency of science to develop along the lines of airtight compartments. The Hegelian philosophy provided a program for the unification of all the sciences into a comprehensive whole. What was even more important it provided for the inclusion of the social sciences in its program of unification. As a matter of fact the social science of history was lifted from oblivion as a science to a place of central importance in Hegel's approach. Hegel's emphasis on history helped considerably to make the nineteenth century a period in which historical research received unprecedented encouragement and registered remarkable achievements. Moreover, it must be remembered that the new emphasis on the study of economics and the other social sciences which arose from the stimulating work of Karl Marx had its origins in Hegelian philosophy.

A. The Cultural Role of the Metaphysician

The genius required for the highest type of metaphysical speculation is found only rarely. Our brief study of the work of Hegel indicates why this is the case. The metaphysician must be a combination of poet, encyclopedist, and prophet. He must be a poet in order to gain a kind of intuitive insight into the nature of things which will serve as a clue to the understanding of the nature of the universe as seen from his particular point of view. He must find a key to the puzzle of the universe which will serve as a guide for ordering the universe into a logically consistent and meaningful pattern. This requires the genius of the poet. Moreover, the metaphysician must be a kind of encyclopedist. He must command knowledge in all fields of thought and investigation and at the same time possess the organizing genius to co-ordinate this knowledge into a comprehensive world view.

Finally, the metaphysician must be a kind of prophet in so far as he must be in vital touch with the inarticulate, half-hidden longings, ideals, and convictions of a certain social group in a certain era of history if his work is to gain acceptance. It is important for the philosopher that his work receive this recognition for only then can it become the basis for the cultural life of a people. If it does not become the basis for the world view of a cultural group, there is no practical way open for testing its effect in the life experiences of man as man attempts to come to terms with the grim reality of the universe.

The qualities that make a man a great metaphysician are not unlike the qualities that make for executive ability in administrative work. Like the executive the metaphysician must be able to see things as wholes. He must be intimately acquainted with the details of a system of connections and meanings without being overwhelmed by these details. Like the executive the metaphysician must be gifted in utilizing contributions of his predecessors in a constructive way. He must be

able to recognize what is significant in previous contributions. He must be able to select elements from these contributions that will be helpful in his constructive task and at the same time maintain complete independence.

It is quite evident, of course, that the metaphysician is a different kind of executive than the business executive or government administrator. The metaphysician is concerned with the manipulation of ideas, the administrator with the manipulation of facts and persons. The philosopher may be a good executive as a metaphysician without being a man of action. This does not mean that his philosophy is entirely removed from the realm of action. A system of metaphysics becomes embedded in the life of a culture. It may determine the acts and decisions of millions of individuals who are a part of that culture and who live hundreds of years after the metaphysician has done his work. Systems of ideas, like any series of activities involving choices, are tested in the tough and relentless school of historical experience. It may take a thousand years to test the validity and the effectiveness of a system of metaphysics.

LANDMARKS IN METAPHYSICS— THE FORTRESSES OF THE SPIRIT

So far in this chapter we have concentrated attention on the personality of the metaphysician. When we come to consider the landmarks in metaphysics, we find that we cannot follow the program of previous chapters and consider the landmarks in that field as the constructive intellectual work of individual personalities. The landmarks in metaphysics must be regarded as massive communal structures, built up over a long period of years through the combined effort of many different thinkers. The great metaphysicians such as Hegel are the executives, the architects who leave the imprint of their own genius upon the final product, but they would be the last to claim that these great fortresses of the human spirit have been created by them

alone for their own exclusive use. They are to be used by all.

In this section of the chapter we shall give brief consideration to four of the great systems of metaphysics which have served as fortresses of the human spirit. These systems of metaphysics are idealism, materialism, naturalism, and supernaturalism. These systems of metaphysics have been fortresses of the human spirit in many different cultures. They stand in magnificent splendor on the highest mountain peaks in the land of philosophy. In any period of history one or the other of the fortresses often commands greater following than the others. It is crowded with tenants while the other fortresses are more or less deserted. In no era of history, however, do we find any of these fortresses completely deserted.

Men are constantly at work adding improvements to their particular fortress so that the fortress may be all the more comfortable and impregnable. Different philosophers of different civilizations find it necessary to change the intellectual furnishings of these structures from time to time in order to make them more livable and acceptable for the men of their age. As a matter of fact it is the ordinary humdrum task of the average philosopher to serve in this capacity. He makes his living by acting as a kind of interior decorator who provides an appropriate intellectual setting for the spiritual life of the men of his generation. If he is a man of genius, he may go so far as to add a wing to one of the fortresses of the human spirit. He may even attempt to construct a new fortress on one of the hitherto unoccupied mountain peaks. By and large, however, he is likely to confine his attention to improving one or the other of the ancient fortresses in which he feels most secure. It is a difficult task to perfect a system of metaphysics which can compete for the allegiance of men with the four systems of supernaturalism, naturalism, materialism, and idealism.

We have already mentioned at one point in our previous

discussion that systems of metaphysics are characterized by their completeness and self-sufficiency. We recognize a system of metaphysics as complete because of the logical coherence of its ideas. If one accepts the premises of the system, one will be carried forward step by step in a logical way until all realms of experience are included in the system and all problems solved. We recognize a system of metaphysics as sufficient because it is emotionally satisfying; or it may be emotionally distasteful for us. The intelligent man can gain intellectual satisfaction from the fascinating game of tracing out the logically coherent pattern of ideas in any of the great systems of metaphysics. He cannot remain aloof in this grand manner, however, as far as his emotions are concerned. One system of metaphysics, one world view, one way of life is emotionally satisfying; another repels. In the end he will accept as his life view only that system which is emotionally satisfying. Let us consider some of the possible choices as represented in the four great conclusive systems of metaphysics. Since we have already had some insights as to the nature of idealism from our study of Hegel we shall begin with a summary of the idealistic metaphysics.

A. Idealism—The Universe Regarded as Mind

The fundamental question which must be answered by metaphysics is the question as to the ultimate nature of the universe. Idealism, as we have seen, claims that the ultimate nature of the universe is mind or consciousness. Mind is primary and everything exists in relation to mind. The real is the intelligible and consequently the world has a meaning that cannot be judged by regarding the surface appearances of things. There is an inner harmony between man's intellectual life and the universe as a whole. The lower forms of existence must be interpreted in terms of the higher levels for only on the

higher levels can mind be seen in operation as self-conscious process.

Every system of metaphysics has its own universe of discourse, that is, its own point of view, depending upon the source of the poetic insight which gave rise to a unifying concept by which all things are ordered. Greek idealism with Plato as its great exponent had its point of departure in mathematics. In Platonic idealism, mind is consequently regarded as analogous to mathematical patterns. The source of the poetic insight which gave rise to idealism in the modern world is to be found in introspective psychology. Idealism of the modern type had its beginning in the introspection of a Descartes who said, "I think, therefore I am," and reached its completion in Hegel who affirmed that the categories of the human mind were also categories of the universe. As we have already seen, Hegelianism regarded Mind not as analogous to mathematical patterns but rather as analogous to a process by which new ideas emerge from the interaction of conflicting ideas. In both cases, however, there is agreement on the central point at issue, namely, that the ultimate nature of the universe is Mind.

During the course of man's long philosophical quest, idealism has proved that it has the capacity to develop a rationally coherent world view. Its critics are inclined to regard it as lacking in comprehensiveness in so far as it is manifestly more concerned with the world of man than the world of nature. They claim that it is lacking in a genuinely impersonal scientific point of view. In recent years, however, the results of scientific research have tended to strengthen the idealistic position rather than the reverse. We have pointed out this fact in our earlier chapter on cosmology.

The strength of idealism as a system of metaphysics rests primarily in its emotional appeal. Idealism gives us assurance that man's life, his moral and intellectual aspirations, his

values are in tune with the ultimate nature and ends of the universe. It gives us assurance that in the end the universe is a friendly universe. Many men find in idealism an emotionally satisfying philosophy for this reason. On the other hand, some men find that idealism is emotionally distasteful because the idealist tends to sidestep the problem of evil. These men want to know why there should be evil and imperfection in the universe if the universe is to be regarded as friendly and the rational unfoldment of an all-encompassing Mind.

B. Materialism—The Universe Regarded as Matter

In direct opposition to idealistic metaphysics which affirms that the universe is essentially Mind stands materialism which denies that there is a controlling intelligence at work in the universe. For the materialist the universe is regarded as a machine and all elements in the universe, whether they be organic or inorganic, function as parts of a machine. The materialist is interested in the stuff of the universe. However, he is even more concerned about the laws which regulate the universe. He contends that the laws operate uniformly throughout the universe as a matter of necessity, and that acquaintance with the system of laws which enables us to understand the physical universe can be applied to an understanding of man as an intellectual and spiritual being. Mind and consciousness can be adequately explained in terms of physical processes, and there is no need to move beyond physical principles for an explanation of things.

The classical materialists of the eighteenth century thought of the universe as analogous to a perfectly adjusted timepiece in which billiard-ball atoms as physical elements operated according to the laws of Newtonian physics. The modern materialist regards the universe as analogous to a magnificent dynamo in which the physical elements are fields of energy. In both cases the universe is governed by blind forces which

move according to predetermined laws which are self-contained and undirected by any spiritual end or superimposed Mind.

The point of departure for materialism as a system of metaphysics has always been the physical sciences. The strength of materialism rests in the fact that these sciences have made great progress in the modern world so that their results and methods have come to be regarded as normative for all realms of exploration. In so far as the physical sciences have been able to include more and more realms of experience in a coherent system of relations based on the fundamental postulate that the more complex relations can be explained in terms of the less complex physical relations, materialism has prospered. Opponents of materialism point out that the effectiveness of physical science in offering explanatory principles decreases as it attempts to deal with living organisms. Idealism is most effective in offering suggestive explanations for the interpretation of man's moral and cultural achievements and aspirations in the making of history. It is exactly at this point that materialism is notoriously weak.

The most recent form of materialism, the so-called dialectical materialism, is aware of this weakness. It attempts to make materialism into a more comprehensive system of metaphysics by seeking to find the source of man's life and culture in economic forces. Man's choices are not determined by moral principles or rational discernment but by underlying economic forces at work in his society. Dialectical materialism has become the official philosophy of Soviet Russia. For this reason it has a position of strength and influence comparable to the position held by idealism in the nineteenth century. Under these circumstances the strength and weakness of materialism are likely to be demonstrated with considerable clarity. A theoretical system of metaphysics must be applied in the life of a people before its implications can be fully understood. Today materialism has its great opportunity to mold the life,

thought, and future of almost a fifth of the population of the earth.

William James said that as far as their attitudes toward philosophy were concerned, men could be divided into two groups, the tender-minded and the tough-minded. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) might be considered as a good example of a tough-minded philosopher. He accepted the materialist philosophy without hesitation and lived successfully and creatively as a materialist. He attained the ripe age of ninety-one enjoying the life of a hard-riding, uncontrollable, red-headed English squire to the very end. It does not appear that he was troubled for a single moment by religious problems. He was never harassed by idealistic sentiments. Materialism has great emotional appeal for tough-minded men like Hobbes. It is a system of philosophy that is crystal clear and logically coherent. Most men, however, regard materialism as lacking in comprehensiveness. It fails to make room in its system for the creative will of man, and that creative will is as much a part of the universe as the law of conservation of matter or the principle of thermodynamics. The philosopher may criticize materialism for its lack of comprehensiveness. The ordinary man is likely to reject materialism for emotional reasons. The crystal clarity of materialism is the crystal clarity observed by the shipwrecked mariner, a lonely universe of sky and sea. There are not many who are sufficiently tough-minded to feel at home in such a universe.

It is important to call attention to the fact that the debates which have characterized the struggle between idealistic and materialistic metaphysicians continue to attract considerable attention, even though they may take on different forms today. For example, the problem of the relationship between body and mind has always been a crucial problem for metaphysicians of these schools of thought. The classical materialists such as La Mettrie claimed that mind is derived from body.

The classical idealists such as Berkeley claimed that body is derived from mind. In modern times this is continued as a debate involving two schools of psychology. The behaviorists argue in favor of the materialist position and emphasize the role of environment and the conditioned reflex. The Gestalt psychologists, on the other hand, emphasize the uniqueness of the mental processes in ordering the data afforded by the environment.

The problem of the relationship between body and mind is not as important for the metaphysical systems of naturalism and supernaturalism as it is for materialism and idealism. Both naturalism and supernaturalism can accept a theory of parallelism, recognizing mind and body as independent entities. Naturalism frequently affirms that both mind and body are dependent on the evolutionary processes. Mind, like man's physical organism, develops as an instrument for survival. Supernaturalism is especially concerned with the problem as to how man can know the nature and will of God. Does God act on man through the reason or feeling, through the moral will, or through the personality as a whole? Naturalism can make an adjustment with behavioristic psychology, whereas supernaturalism cannot compromise with any theory of human personality which ignores the uniqueness of man as created in the image of God.

C. Naturalism—The Universe Regarded as Organism

Time and again philosophers arise who make statements regarding the nature of the universe which have a strangely familiar ring in that they remind us of the materialists on some occasions and of the idealists on other occasions. However, they refuse to identify themselves with either group. Men like Aristotle, Bruno, Spencer, and Dewey are philosophers who can be said to regard the universe in a figurative manner of speaking as essentially an organism. The universe is not a

mechanical process for these men. It must be considered as a process of growth, an organism. We have chosen to call the type of metaphysics which regards the universe as an organism as naturalism.

Naturalism as a system of metaphysics rejects any idea of causal factors existing in the universe above or apart from nature. In this respect it resembles materialism. However, it rejects the implications of materialism which tend to interpret mind in terms of matter. Naturalism considers that the living organism cannot be explained merely in terms of matter and motion. Intelligence as evidenced in the life of man and cultural achievements as a product of the social nature of man are the results of a long process of growth which is above and beyond mechanically determined factors. On the other hand, the naturalist can see no reason for accepting the idealistic position which goes to the opposite extreme and interprets nature as a product of an Absolute Mind.

The biological sciences have usually been the point of departure for a naturalistic metaphysics. Since these sciences have risen to new heights in the past century under the stimulus of the theory of organic evolution, it is natural to expect that this system of metaphysics would be closely allied with the doctrine of evolution. Naturalistic philosophers have applied the doctrine of evolution as an explanatory principle in many different fields. They have constructed a coherent system of metaphysics which interprets all things from solar systems to political ideologies as a process of growth. The modern naturalist has an open mind regarding the ends toward which this process of growth is moving. He insists that the universe is an open universe, rather than a universe that is predetermined by either an Absolute Mind or by matter and motion operating according to fixed law. This does not mean that he is less devoted to the scientific method than the materialist. He places his faith not in the results of the scientific method but in the

method itself, for he recognizes that science is also changing and growing since it too is part of this process of growth.

If the universe can be likened to a growing organism, the question arises as to how we are to consider this organism. Is it to be regarded as analogous to a plant, an animal, or a human organism? The naturalist who regards the universe as analogous to an undifferentiated bit of organic protoplasm similar to the amoeba can hardly be distinguished from the materialist in his philosophical outlook. Those who regard the universe as analogous to a thinking, willing, purposeful organism may go so far as to think of the material universe as the body of God. Members of the latter group may have much in common with certain types of idealistic philosophy.

As far as its emotional appeal is concerned, naturalism resembles materialism in that it appeals to the tough-minded. Its universe is not a mechanically determined universe, however, so that naturalism can offer a more hopeful and optimistic future than materialism. For that reason it has appealed to men who consider themselves as realists, in so far as they avow a readiness to accept the universe. At the same time it has appealed to men who regard themselves as liberals in so far as they are motivated to bring about progressive change in man's social and cultural life.

D. Supernaturalism—The Universe Regarded as Drama

A moment's thought will suffice to convince us that the three great systems of metaphysics mentioned above have one factor in common, namely, they all regard the universe as a unified whole. They are monistic systems of metaphysics. Supernaturalism is usually considered as a dualistic system in so far as it regards the cosmos as divided into two systems of order, the realm of nature and a realm beyond nature and distinct from nature dominated by the being of God. Not all supernaturalistic systems of metaphysics are dualistic in this

sense. They all affirm that God cannot be identified with the realm of nature. They do not necessarily maintain, however, that God has no relations to the realm of nature. The term "supernaturalism" must consequently be used in its most comprehensive sense to affirm that God is above nature but not necessarily beyond nature or history.

The characteristic of supernatural world views which inclines the philosopher to classify them as dualistic is the fact that they must necessarily affirm an ethical dualism even when they differ as to the extent that the realm of nature is to be regarded as related to or a part of God's being. Unlike the other great systems of metaphysics which we have studied, supernaturalism does not have its point of departure in a scientific realm of discourse. It has its point of departure in ethics, that is, in an awareness of the dualism between right and wrong, good and evil. It interprets the entire universe from this point of view rather than from the point of view of the physical, the biological, or the psychological sciences.

From the point of view of supernaturalism the universe is analogous to a drama. The world of nature is the setting in which is unfolded the mighty drama of the struggle of moral forces in the life of individuals and in the course of history. Supernaturalists differ as to the role played by God in this drama. All would agree, however, that he is the unseen power which makes the drama possible and gives it significance. God speaks to man and man responds to God's Word. The way man responds determines his thoughts, his actions, the course of his life.

Supernaturalism as a world view is usually associated with a cultural religion. It takes on many different forms depending upon the ethical level attained by the culture in which it finds acceptance. In many cases we find that it is formulated by the theologian as a world view that supports the religious aspirations of a people. It has furnished the metaphysical basis

for many of the great historic religions such as Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Mohammedanism, and Christianity. In all these religions the theologians have elaborated a coherent world view based on supernaturalism. They differ considerably as to their views of the nature of God. They may endow God or the gods with attributes which characterize man as is usually the case in polytheistic religions. God may be regarded as an aloof sovereign or as a busy world administrator or as a loving father. In each case a characteristic system of doctrines arises as an elaboration of this basic apprehension of the nature of God. In addition theologians may differ in their views as to how God reveals himself to men even though they agree on the question of the nature of God. As a result they are constrained to develop their ideas into a coherent system on the basis of a doctrine of revelation as well as on the basis of a doctrine of God.

Supernaturalism has had greater emotional appeal in the course of history than any other system of metaphysics. Its strength rests in the fact that it serves to sustain man in a universe that appears to be indifferent to man's hopes and his aspirations. It destroys the sense of cosmic loneliness which continually haunts men in all ages and among all peoples. It encourages man to devote the energies of his life for the increase of values no matter what discouragements may be at hand in his environment. As a result he is better equipped to resist the temptations to live frivolously or to yield to the domination of anxiety and despair in his life. Finally, supernaturalism promises victory over the domination of time and of death. Eternity is in the hands of God and man's efforts in a transitory life are not in vain.

The chief inadequacies of supernaturalism as a system of metaphysics are two in number. Its concentration on the study of God and man tends to make it indifferent to the reality of nature. When faced with the problem of reconciling its views

of God and man with the hard facts of nature, its advocates are inclined to desert their posts as metaphysicians by refusing to exert themselves in the difficult task of bringing these hard facts of nature into a more comprehensive supernatural world view than they have been accustomed to advocating. They seek refuge in the embattled stronghold of revelation. What is even worse from the philosopher's point of view is that they have on occasions yielded to the temptation to use propaganda rather than reason, and persecution rather than persuasion to win their ends.

Supernaturalism is frequently associated with a society as a conserver of the values of that society. Thus it performs one of the important tasks of religion in that it helps to integrate the cultural life of a people. At the same time, however, it may degenerate as an institution to the point where its chief function is to instill reverence for tradition. Under those circumstances it develops an attitude of authoritarianism. The quest for wisdom consequently ceases to be a quest from the philosopher's point of view. No encouragement is given for each generation to struggle with ever-renewed energy to delve into the mystery of the universe.

Some philosophers would be pleased if they could discount supernaturalism as a system of metaphysics, claiming that it cannot possibly be considered as one of the great comprehensive, coherent world views. It is not likely that their objections will be heeded, however. If one were to eliminate philosophers who contributed to the development of a supernaturalistic metaphysics and who made their own philosophical choice in favor of supernaturalism, one would have to eliminate a very large percentage of those commonly studied in the history of philosophy. To be sure, supernaturalism has not been popular among philosophers in the twentieth century. It has always had its advocates, however, and most of these advocates must be respected for the breadth of their interests, the logical con-

sistency with which they have presented their positions, and the rich fund of wisdom that they have contributed for the guidance and sustenance of men.

The four conclusive systems of metaphysics considered above are the most noteworthy of the fortresses of the human spirit. Sometimes philosophers endeavor to build other fortresses to suit their own particular needs by borrowing from these massive systems and occupying an intermediate position between them. For example, Schleiermacher, the liberal churchman, stands at an intermediate point between supernaturalism and idealism. John Locke occupies a position between materialism and supernaturalism. Spinoza can be placed between materialism and naturalism. The most imposing of modern metaphysical structures, namely, that of Alfred North Whitehead can be placed between idealism and naturalism.

In an age of confusion and transition like the present, in which many conflicting systems of metaphysics stand side by side, it is natural to expect that an eclectic tendency should arise in which philosophers recommend that elements be borrowed from all the great systems and reworked into a new philosophy. This rarely proves successful since one is inclined to make his selection on the basis of an emotional predilection that favors one or another of the established systems. It is possible, however, to regard the basic systems of metaphysics as dependent upon a particular point of view operating within a limited realm of discourse. The philosopher can then strive to bring about a synthesis of these realms of discourse into a universe of discourse on a higher level of metaphysical apperception. At present there is no indication that this can be done, but the possibility is a fascinating one that the modern metaphysician must continue to entertain. If that goal could be attained, the philosopher might rest content.

On the other hand, one is free to affirm with some degree of probability that one or another of the four great systems

of metaphysics is the truth, that is, that it offers us a blueprint which corresponds to the real structure of the universe. There is not sufficient evidence available at present to require the philosopher to accept one position with dogmatic finality. The individual continues to choose one of these world views as his life view according to the extent that his emotional and intellectual needs are satisfied. All that this means is that the result of the quest of philosophy is still darkness and mystery. The mystery has been clarified and interpreted but never explained. The darkness may be artificially lighted for an individual or for an era but it is still there. The history of man's philosophical quest suffices to make man humble before this mystery and yet proud of the limited light that his experience and intellect have been able to shed upon it. The philosopher is constantly tempted to limit his explorations to one set of consistent data only to find in the end that the universe as a whole can neither be reduced to a limited set of data nor its mystery completely clarified by the limited intellect of man.

PART FOUR

Problems of Philosophical Living

CHAPTER XIII

Values and the Philosopher As Man of Decision

No doubt the course of our investigation has by this time brought many of our readers to the point where they feel a strong urge to give up the study of philosophy in despair. No problems have been solved once and for all time in any field of philosophy. No one philosophy of life has emerged from our investigations as final. This confused situation must be attributed to the complexity of philosophy rather than to the perversity of the writer on philosophy. The many alternatives that have been considered are not arbitrary. They are alternatives that have arisen from the strenuous, intensive, heart-breaking thought, meditation, and debate of courageous men covering a period of twenty-five centuries. One of the values of philosophy for society during its long history has been that it serves to keep open all alternatives so that each generation can take up the eternal quest for truth with renewed energy. Our efforts have not been in vain if we have encouraged the reader to become a participant in this quest.

The previous section of the book has presented the alternatives investigated by the great philosophers on the important highways of philosophy. An introduction to philosophy can go no further along these highways without ceasing to be an introduction. Those who are interested may find helpful guides in any well-stocked library or among the professors of any

university faculty. We suspect, however, that most of us will have to follow the highways of philosophy without benefit of expert guidance. It is just as well. The highways lie open before us, and in the end life itself ordains that every man travel alone.

We have endeavored to present the philosopher as a man of flesh and blood in the previous sections of the book. In our introductory chapter and in the chapters on ethics, philosophy of history, and philosophy of religion, we were especially concerned that the reader become aware of the fact that the philosopher must be regarded as a man of decision as well as a man of reason and of meditation. When a man makes decisions regarding right and wrong, decisions regarding the role of his community or nation at a critical point in history, decisions about his God, he is no longer an analytical philosopher or a speculative philosopher but a practicing philosopher. Since every man must make such decisions it behooves us to consider philosophy as a practical subject in this last section. We have not emphasized the practical applications of philosophy heretofore for the simple reason that we did not wish to make unjustified claims for philosophy. Philosophy always has been and always will be a theoretical subject. It is a pure science rather than a technical, applied science. However, in so far as ability to use the tools of straight thinking in a daring adventurous way and in so far as an intimate acquaintance with the stored-up wisdom of the past enable us to make decisions regarding problems of utmost importance for today, philosophy is a very practical discipline.

In this section of the text we shall endeavor to introduce the student to some of the problems about which decisions of a very practical nature must be made by men of this generation. Men of our generation must make crucial decisions regarding the nature of man. They must decide what kind of community life they desire to create for the future. They must

make decisions regarding the type of education that they wish to foster for the oncoming generation. They must make decisions regarding the religious life of their time. These are some of the crucial fields in which wisdom is most definitely needed today if our civilization is to survive and prosper. These are the problems for philosophical living that we shall consider in the following chapters.

We trust that it is clear that the problems in these fields are problems for all men rather than for the philosopher alone. No single philosopher or group of philosophers can hope to offer an arbitrary solution on these basic issues. It would be presumptuous if we made such a claim for an introductory book in philosophy. However, it is also clear that we are not without hope of attaining helpful and significant results from a consideration of these problems. We place our trust as philosophers in the method of philosophy, that is, in the quest for wisdom itself. The application of the philosophical method of directed investigation, free discussion, sympathetic understanding, creative decision has not and will not prove to be in vain or sterile of significant results.

The process of adult education in which men and women educate themselves by participating in serious discussion of contemporary problems is one which can be fostered by the philosopher whether he be a professional or an amateur. In the subsequent chapters it will be our aim to foster such discussion, hoping that by this means the soil will be cultivated for the growth of ideas and principles which will contribute to the making of wise decisions for the future progress of our civilization. The philosopher can cultivate the soil of his generation as an educator. He cannot be depended upon to sow the seed that will result in new growth. On some occasions a great philosophical genius may arise who is a sower of seed as well as cultivator of the soil. On many occasions the great fertile ideas come from other sources. However, unless the

philosopher has done his work as educator of his generation, there is little likelihood that these ideas will germinate and bring forth fruit.[1]

THE IMPORTANCE OF AXIOLOGY FOR MODERN PHILOSOPHY

There are certain periods in the history of a culture when the crucial problems of philosophical living involve the making of decisions about nature, as was the case for the scientifically inclined philosophers of the Renaissance. There are other periods when the crucial problems involve the making of decisions about God, as was the case for the theologically inclined philosophers of the Greco-Roman world during the first four centuries of the Christian era. Today the crucial problems of philosophical living involve the making of decisions in the realm of human values. Before we consider the nature of these decisions, it may be helpful if we summarize some of the results of the philosopher's thinking about value and offer a few introductory paragraphs regarding the nature of values.

Axiological questions have come to the forefront of philosophical discussion in the past few generations in a surprising degree. As in ancient days philosophical interest centered around the questions of the one and the many and of being and not being, so in our modern world the word "value" has come to indicate the crux of some of the most important philosophical questions which concern modern man. This interest in axiology has led to the creation of a variety of theories of value.

[1] See suggestions for setting up an Open Forum Laboratory of Philosophy in the Appendix. Open forum discussions were recommended as a project for the previous section of the text. They are an essential discipline in this final section. The lonely reader is at a disadvantage. We recommend that he leave his study from time to time and carry on his investigations at the corner drugstore, the hotel lobby, the home of a friend, or any other place where men can be found who are willing to talk. Reading and thinking are not enough for the true philosopher. He must also talk. To be sure, talking is difficult and occasionally dangerous. But if the neophyte in philosophy makes a nuisance of himself by talking too much, he has the consolation of knowing that he has at least one thing in common with the great philosophers.

We might classify these theories under six heads. First, there is the naive, materialistic theory which identifies value with things such as apple pie, or a new car, or an old friend. This theory has difficulty explaining the more illusive moral and social qualities of man's experience which we usually consider as the higher values. The second theory is the subjective theory which identifies value with the state of feeling of the individual. The third theory is the idealistic theory which affirms that in the end value lies in the mind of the cosmic Absolute. Akin to this theory is the objective or Platonic theory which affirms that value is an essence, a thing in itself, having its eternal being in the realm of essences, and not in the mind of man. The fourth theory is the relational theory in which value is the relation between man and the thing experienced. This theory, which is the theory presented in the great work of Ralph Barton Perry, *General Theory of Value*, comes very close to the subjective theory in that it affirms that value is the object of any interest. The same is true of the organic theory which completes our list. This theory looks into the future as well as the present and the past, for in the organic theory value is the whole complex of factors in the situation related in such a way as to yield satisfaction or dissatisfaction.

Leaving the naive theory out of our discussion, we find the theories are divided into two sharply defined groups. The first group includes the idealistic and Platonic theories and places the emphasis, generally speaking, on the static, external aspect of value as being. The second group includes the subjective, relational, and organic theories. Here the emphasis is placed on the relative nature of values. Religion has usually felt more at home with the first group of theories; science has generally supported the second group.

The controversies over the nature of values have indicated that it is difficult to maintain either the objective or the sub-

jective positions. The relational theories hold forth the greater promise for the future. Henceforth discussion is likely to center on the nature of the relation between object and subject which gives rise to value. We shall endeavor to retain the truths of both positions in the following pages in which we try to analyze the nature of this relationship.

THE UNIQUENESS OF MAN AS A CARRIER OF VALUES

At one time in the history of philosophy it was taken for granted that that which distinguished man from all other creatures was the fact that he alone possessed rational faculties. Man possessed an intellect by which he could think in terms of abstractions, reason by means of the syllogism, and make judgments on the basis of his reason. More recent investigations in psychology indicate, however, that to a surprisingly large degree man is dependent upon subconscious, irrational emotional forces in his life rather than upon reason. As a matter of fact man uses his reason as a tool to satisfy desires and drives which can be recognized as emotions before they are formulated as ideas. He may even distort his rational faculties in very peculiar ways in order to satisfy his emotional needs. We are compelled to recognize in man something that is more fundamental than his reason.

On the other hand, it is evident that man possesses abilities as a rational creature which other animals do not possess. What is of special interest to us at this point is that man does not always use his reason as a tool to serve desires and drives that are rooted in his emotional needs. He uses his reason on many occasions to aid him in making choices that are actually distasteful. It is man's reason which enables him to choose the unpleasant experience of an operation in order that he may improve his health. It is man's reason which tells him that he must adjust emotionally to an unpleasant situation in an office where a cantankerous boss makes life miserable for the

department. His reason tells him that only through adjusting to the situation can he hope to retain the other more important advantages which accrue to him as an employee of the company. This tendency of man to use his reason as an aid in controlling and directing his emotions compels us to recognize that man is characterized by something more fundamental than his emotions.

Man is dominated by neither reason nor emotion. The fundamental trait which characterizes man is that he is a creature who is sensitive to values. The human personality acts as a whole as a thinking, feeling, doing creature who can appreciate values and who is dominated by a quest for values. Man is characterized by the fact that he is remarkably sensitive to values, on the one hand, and by the additional fact that he has a remarkable capacity for expanding his range of appreciation of values. Whether he is aware of it or not, man is a value-obsessed creature. This is the reason why the life of man can be so gloriously creative and rich. This is likewise the reason why man can be such a dangerously sinful and destructive creature.

Man is made aware of his sensitivity toward values in so far as he has feelings of appreciation which find expression in preferences. Man is constantly making choices on the basis of his likes and dislikes. All living creatures can appreciate values to some degree and respond to values by making choices. The plant prefers the rays of the sun to the darkness and strives to move into a position where it can enjoy and utilize these rays. The dog carefully inspects the bones offered for its choice and then makes a deliberate selection. It is only man, however, who is so sensitive to values that his entire life is dominated by a quest for values. No other creature is faced with the endless sequence of choices which confronts man. No other creature is capable of reacting in such a deliberately purposeful way when faced with a choice of values. The speed and vio-

lence of man's reactions to choices of values are evidenced in the intensity with which man lives. A man becomes angry, sad, elated every day of his life. Very casual incidents involving a choice of values may arouse a man to a pitch of excitement that other creatures experience only on very crucial occasions, for example, when they are fighting for their lives.

Men differ as to the degree of their sensitive awareness to values. In all cases, however, man's sensitivity is superior to that of any other creature. One is impressed with this fact when one visits a hospital for the mentally ill or a school for mental defectives. The pathetic smile that carries with it a longing for friendship, the response to kind words, the light of gladness in the eyes of the patients as they respond to color or tone set these ailing creatures apart from those of the animal kingdom. They too are human beings in quest of values.

In addition to his sensitivity to values, man is characterized by the fact that the range of values which he appreciates is so extensive. A man may not be more sensitive to the value of his food than an animal. When this is the case, we recognize it as an indication that man is interested in other values than food. The eating of food is merely a means for sustaining the physical organism in order that other values may be pursued. The child is satisfied to eat alone for a time but once it learns to appreciate the values of companionship that go with eating at the family table it turns its back upon the private meal. The man who learns to appreciate Keats is no longer satisfied with the rhymster whom he formerly read with pleasure. The joys of true friendship once appreciated are never mistaken for the casual fellowship experienced at a convention. True love once experienced and fulfilled is never mistaken for casual flirtation.

Once a man is made aware of something as good, he experiences emotional dissatisfaction unless he can live in such a way that that good thing is a part of his life. Man's capacity to experience values leads him to grasp other values on new levels

of experience. Because of his sensitivity to values he is driven to make decisions with past experiences of value in mind. Because of his capacity to experience values he is also constrained to make decisions with a yearning for the increase and fulfillment of values in an ever-widening range of appreciation.

THE NATURE OF VALUES

A. Value Defined

As one might expect, there is no definition of value that is generally accepted among philosophers. In order that we may consider some of the important points regarding values in the discussion which follows, we shall define value in a rather abstract and arbitrary way. Value is the forming of connections of quality and meaning within the individual and between individuals which: (1) yield an emotional experience of satisfaction and fulfillment, (2) generate maximization of interactions that expands the range of appreciation. With this definition as a point of departure let us take a bird's-eye view of the realm of values.

B. How Values Arise as Structures of Experience

We spend our lives seeking for values. If called upon to do so, we may even sacrifice our lives for the sake of values such as friendship, liberty, loyalty. The one who experiences these values knows how real and important they actually are. If we try to analyze these experiences in a psychological way, we can go no further than to recognize that sensations and ideas are organized in the experience of the individual into a structure of relationships which is interpreted as being unusually important and meaningful for that individual.

One of the elements which goes into the making of this structure of relationships is sensation. We recognize sensations as qualities, for example, pleasantness or unpleasantness. The meal that we enjoy after taking a long hike in the mountains

is identified as a value because a host of sensations are organized into a structure of relationships which is bound up primarily with the physical organism, its comfort and well-being.

Another of the elements which goes into the making of this structure involves ideas. We recognize ideas as interesting, as meaningful, as important, as true or false. After we have enjoyed our evening meal, the value that we derive from reading our favorite author arises from a structure of relationships dependent primarily upon ideas. When our best friend drops in for a chat, the situation becomes more complicated. The values that emerge from the conversation arise through a complex structure of relationships dependent upon immediate sensations, past memories and associations, interesting and suggestive ideas. We end the day with an awareness of having enjoyed a pleasant and profitable experience. We say to ourselves that we shall store up memories of this day, knowing that not all days yield so many satisfactory experiences.

Now exactly what is this structure of relationships, this mysterious connection of qualities and meanings described as in operation in the previous paragraph? This is the crucial question which the philosopher faces when he thinks about values. Quite clearly the structure is dependent upon nature, that is, connections yielding value could never arise without an organism sensitive to qualities and without an environment that provided qualities which could be sensed. On the other hand, the structure is also dependent upon the mysterious psychological process by which sensations and ideas are interpreted and connected in such a way that they became meaningful and precious as experiences of value.

Are these two factors the only factors involved in the experiences of value? It may be that they are. In that case is it not a futile gesture for man to be continually in quest of values when they are in reality chance, evanescent structures which continually form and disintegrate like bubbles on a mountain

stream? Some philosophers have faced this crucial dilemma, which involves the whole spiritual quest of man, by reverting to Plato and affirming that these value-structures are the most permanent realities in the universe.[2] The religious man need not go very far beyond this position to affirm that value is related to God. God is the creator and sustainer of value-structures even as he is the creator and sustainer of the natural world which is necessary for the growth of values and of man who is the carrier of values.[3]

C. How Values Are Grasped and Recognized

Whether values are apperceived as physical satisfaction or as emotional fulfillment, it is characteristic of values that they are grasped personally. Man is a lonely creature. He can never adequately share an experience of value with his fellows. There is always danger, consequently, that a man may come to regard himself as supremely important as a carrier of values. He finds it difficult to regard other men as gifted with sensitivity to values and as obsessed with the lure of the infinite range of values. This is the reason that man is essentially selfish. This is also the reason that it is such an easy matter for all of us to rationalize our selfishness.

The individual's perception of value-structures as physical satisfaction and emotional fulfillment is comparable to the individual's observation by perception and insight described in chapter IV. Every value is imbedded in an elaborate context of relationships. One becomes vitally aware of this value by abstracting it from its elaborate setting. The value is intuitively grasped as something that is of unquestionable worth. Our intuitions of value-structures make us immediately aware of the good and constitute the only way for us to know the good.

[2] Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, "Moral Phenomena," *Ethics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932), Vol. I.

[3] Cf. N. O. Losski and J. S. Marshall, *Value and Existence*, tr. S. S. Vinokooroff, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935).

However, these intuitions can deceive us just as our senses deceive us. That which is good in itself can be grasped only through this peculiarly personal psychological response to quality and meaning connected into structures or *gestalten*, as the psychologist would say. This does not mean, however, that the individual possesses an infallible guide for the choice of values or for the making of decisions. The lesser value is grasped as a value in the same way that the higher value is grasped. They are both unique, simple "atomic" experiences and each is of unique worth to the individual. The realm of values apparently offers an infinite number and variety of values. As far as we can judge from man's choice of values, his desires, his likings, these values are amoral, chaotic, without order. Consequently, it is not self-evident as to what values are permanent or impermanent, ennobling or stultifying, high or low. It is not self-evident as to exactly what constitutes the good life. Here again we have insight as to the reason why man as a carrier of values is a dangerous creature. There is nothing in the nature of values themselves which compels an individual to devote his life to the quest of higher values if he prefers to devote his time and energy to the quest of lower values.

D. How Values Grow

It would be a mistake if we considered that we understood the nature of values by virtue of a psychological analysis as to how they are grasped and recognized. It will be recalled that we included in our definition of value a statement to the effect that values are characterized by the fact that they generate maximization of interactions that expands the range of appreciation. The forming of connections of quality and meaning to yield an experience of value is a continuous process which calls for a maximization of the experience of value and lures the individual on and on in quest of that maximum experience.

The music lover who has experienced the value of a Beethoven symphony will return again and again to concerts where he seeks not only to repeat that experience but also to heighten it to the utmost point of fulfillment possible within the range of values latent in Beethoven's music. Moreover, this experience of value in Beethoven's music is capable of generating further interactions that may lead to an appreciation of an ever-widening range of musical values which includes many other composers and many other experiences of value. This experience of the maximization of values in the range of musical values may in turn open insights into the values of other arts, for example, poetry, until the whole range of aesthetic values is appreciated.

Values of all types tend to generate maximization of interactions. This means that appreciation of values involves a never-ceasing process of growth. However, not all values generate maximization of interactions to the same degree. That is the reason why one level of values must be considered as superior to another level of values. A man is recognized as wise if he forgoes eating lunch if necessary in order to visit an art gallery. He is not considered wise if he drives past an injured pedestrian in order to hasten on to the art gallery. If the injured pedestrian is recognized as a friend whom he has ignored in time of need, he is not only considered as unwise or thoughtless but as inhuman and cruel. There are greater opportunities for the maximization of interactions that expand the range of appreciation in a trip to the art gallery than in the eating of lunch. But the opportunities for meaningful interactions are infinitely greater in aiding an injured person than in visiting an art gallery. The extent to which the growth of interactions is possible determines the extent to which one level of values must be regarded as better or worse, higher or lower than another level of values.

The question arises as to what determines the growth of

interactions. There is a growth of interactions on the physical level when a meal is digested. There is a growth of interactions on a higher level when the child learns to walk. There is a growth of interactions on a still higher level when the boy learns to participate in games with his gang. To a certain extent the higher animals can participate in all these forms of interaction. However, the pattern of interactions involved in the play behavior of the gang is definitely different from that of the romping of puppies. A host of meanings enhanced by social participation arise in the former case to form a complex pattern of interactions that is totally foreign to the experience of the animal. On the higher levels of value experience the interactions are determined less and less by the presence of quality and more and more by the predominance of meanings.

Meanings are encased in signs by which ideas or feelings are communicated from one individual to another. Language is the most important of all sign vehicles. However, it is not the only means for communication. Art of all kinds functions as a sign vehicle. The same is true for symbols such as the cross or the flag. The past experience of the race is encased in these signs. As a result the interactions involving meanings that can become a part of the value-structure of an individual are not limited to his own narrow range of experience. Moreover, the past experience of the individual can be retained in the form of memories. Past memories can be recalled and identified by means of language. Consequently they too enter into the complex of interactions which enhance man's experiences of value on the higher levels.

The fact that man can use signs or language to transmit meanings gives him an additional advantage as a carrier of values. Meanings are enhanced by social contact. The growth of meanings is stimulated by social contact. The growth of meanings is stimulated by social participation. The boy who participates in the activities of the gang not only finds that

things which he enjoys are enhanced by sharing with the gang. He also finds that he is stimulated to enjoy values which were formerly unknown to him. He learns to appreciate the values of comradeship whereas these values could never have been attained in the more protected atmosphere of the home. Social participation stimulates in him an interest in new sports, new hobbies, new prospects for adventuring. He is also stimulated to develop native aptitudes which he had formerly ignored in order that he may impress the group or compete within the group for prestige and leadership. Wherever men work together or carry on discussion or exchange ideas, the possibilities for the increase of interactions on a meaningful level are enhanced. That is why international and intercultural contacts are so important for the increase of values among men.

E. How Values Become Organized into Systems

Another characteristic of values that is extremely important is that values tend to become organized in the life of the individual and for a social group in the form of a value-system. A value-system is nothing more or less than the sum total of the hopes, interests, and desires of an individual or a group of individuals at any given moment. We are the kind of persons that we are because we have yielded allegiance to a particular value-system to such an extent and over such a long period of time that our personalities are given direction and continuity by this value-system. We are motivated as individuals to maximize the interactions which are possible within the range of that value-system. All the energies of our life are devoted toward that end. It is easy to see how devotion to a system of values gives purpose to our lives. Using the term devotion with its broadest possible implications, we can say that every person is capable of devotion inasmuch as every person yields allegiance to some system of values and affirms a conscious or unconscious loyalty to the creative powers and structures of the universe

which are believed to sustain and fulfill those values which are regarded as of ultimate importance.

When value-systems are formulated in such a way that they elicit the loyalty of an entire social group, they tend to conserve and stabilize the values of that group. There is danger, however, that these socially accepted value-systems become fixed and unresponsive. There is further danger that a fixed value-system which is loyally supported may come into competition with another value-system supported by another social group. When that happens the stage is set for conflict within the community or between groups of communities. The source of international conflict and war is to be found in this tendency for value-systems to become inflexible when adopted by social groups.

We trust that by now the reader has been sufficiently aroused and instructed so that he can share the philosopher's enthusiasm for the study of values. The subject is abstruse and difficult. It is no more abstruse or difficult, however, than the problems which face modern man. Nearly all of these are problems which involve decisions about values. Natural science has enabled man to conquer and control the world of brute facts to a remarkable degree. A new approach is needed which will enable us to understand the world of values and to direct man and his society toward the conquest and fulfillment of values. In the chapters that follow we shall consider some of the problems which confront modern man in his decisions about man as a carrier of values, the community as the conserver of values, education as the transmitter of values, and religion as the fulfillment of values.

CHAPTER XIV

Decisions on the Nature of Man

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Many years ago an Old Testament psalmist wrote a poem about man. The poem is still quoted with approval.

> What is man, that thou are mindful of him? and the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet. (Psalm 8:4-6)

We read these words with a sense of great pride and gladness. The question arises as to whether we really believe them. We recall the human derelicts that we have observed on the streets of city slums. We recall the dejection on the faces of entire families in rural America who have come into town on a Saturday night as an escape from the drudgery of eroded farms. We remember the grotesque heaps of half-burned, emaciated bodies at the concentration camps of Dachau and Buchenwald. This contrast between man's glorification of man and his complacency when faced with man's failure to fulfill his possibilities makes us aware that modern man is called upon to make decisions regarding man. He must make decisions as to the nature of man, his place in the universe, his limitations and possibilities. These decisions will determine the extent to which we are justified in being hopeful regarding man or indifferent or subject to the hatred and suspicion which drive us to demonic destruction of our fellows.

Not all problems regarding the nature of man are philosophical problems. We have a great deal of information about man which ought to be taken for granted in any discussion. We have already pointed out that man is characterized by the fact that he uses language. In the chapter on philosophy of history we emphasized the fact that man is a social creature. No one is likely to argue about these general characteristics of man. In like manner there should be no argument regarding the fact that mankind is a unit from the point of view of both psychology and anthropology.

There is truth in the proverb which states that human nature is everywhere the same. The basic traits which make up human personality are universal traits. To be sure, individuals differ as to the preponderance of one trait or another. Individuals are variously endowed with possibilities for excelling in one way or another. Individuals are also influenced by their environments, especially their social environments, to develop certain traits; but in no respects can it be said that men are essentially different psychologically. The mental illnesses that afflict men in America have their parallels in the neuroses and psychoses of men of Africa and Soviet Russia. From the point of view of anthropology there is likewise no such thing as different species of men. All races are capable of admixture for the simple reason that they are of one species biologically. Any attempt to consider race as a metaphysical category, such as we have seen in the Nazi ideology, must be made in direct defiance of the findings of anthropology.

It can also be affirmed that philosophers are no longer at liberty to argue the point as to whether man is part and parcel of the world of nature. It is practically impossible for any person who has surveyed the gamut of scientific research to escape the conclusion that man is inextricably bound to the processes of natural law. The bodies of men are subject to the same laws as are the bodies of lower animals. *Homo sapiens*

has his own particular place in the scheme of evolution. This being the case, man existing in nature finds himself in the precarious state of all life on the planet. The winds blow and the rains efface, the forces of nature move on with slow, unhesitating step and man must make the best of his precarious position within nature.

However, man must also be recognized as more than, and above, nature. Since the beginning of human history man has used his ingenuity to establish a better place for himself within nature. He became the conscious discoverer of natural processes. As time went on he became the intelligent molder and regulator of nature. In our own day this task still occupies his attention, as it no doubt will continue to do as long as man inhabits the planet.

Not only does man show his superiority over nature by his ability to control nature. As we have indicated in the previous chapter, the uniqueness of man is shown even more clearly in man's peculiar position as a carrier of values. Human personality alone is capable of the discovery and appreciation of the higher values. The dog may appreciate the value of a fresh ham bone, but he can never appreciate the value of a Bach chorale or of an act of unselfish love. The history of man's ethical and spiritual growth shows a strange, incomprehensible striving for the creation of higher values. It also shows an irrational willingness on the part of man to make sacrifices and to undergo suffering of all kinds in order that values may be preserved. Man's peculiar tendency to recognize and cherish higher values, and above all, his sense of responsibility for the maintenance of higher values in his own life and in his society give him a place in the universe that is unique.

We have made statements in the previous paragraph that are subject to criticism and debate. In doing so we have hit upon problems regarding the nature of man that are definitely philosophical in nature. What is there in man which enables

him to be a carrier of values? Is his position in the universe as unique in this respect as we have claimed? To what extent is man capable of being a conscious creator of values as well as a carrier of values? These two problems are of fundamental importance. Throughout the history of philosophy they have been debated as the problem of the nature of the human soul and the problem of freedom of the will.

DECISIONS ABOUT THE SOUL— WHAT IN MAN MAKES HIM A CARRIER OF VALUES?

Some of the possible alternatives that are before us today relevant to the questions of the nature of the soul are the following: (1) We can deny the existence of the soul and affirm that man is of no more significance than other organisms. (2) We can affirm that the soul is not personal but a disembodied emanation of a world soul which is absorbed into that world soul at death. (3) We can affirm that the soul of man is intellect and that man is immortal in so far as his intellect conquers the non-rational elements in his personality. (4) We can affirm that the soul of man is moral will and that man is immortal if he is a good man. (5) We can affirm that the soul of man is the totality of his personality as it responds to God.

A. Soul as Biological Organism

The first of these positions is the one that is generally accepted today among naturalistic philosophers. According to this view man is a carrier of values because his biological organism is more finely constructed enabling him to think, to choose between values, to appreciate complex situations as agreeable and worthful. As a carrier of values man differs from all others because of the number of values he can appreciate in a quantitative way rather than because of any unique qualitative sensitivity. There is nothing mysterious about his ability to appreciate values or to strive to attain them. He is that kind

of animal and that is all that need be said about the matter. There is certainly no need to postulate an immortal soul in this position. All man's values are earthbound and any inclination to look into a future life for the fulfillment of those values must be regarded as wishful thinking.

Some very dangerous consequences follow if one wholeheartedly adopts this position. There is always the temptation to regard values as of less significance in the life of man than actually is the case. Man is more than his biological organism. In fact he is on some occasions willing to sacrifice that organism in the name of higher values. The heroism evidenced in time of war gives ample evidence of this fact. All tendencies which find the source of man's appreciation of values in the biological organism tend to encourage man to delimit his appreciation to those values which are most alluring to the biological organism. This means that ultimately material things are regarded as alone possessing value. Moreover, if material values are the most persuasive, there is no reason why one should not run roughshod over the rights of others in attaining those values. The individual is free to unite himself with other likeminded members of the community into a wolf pack that has only one end in view, namely, the subjection of the weak and the defenseless for one's own material gain.

B. Soul as Emanation of a World Soul

The second alternative is the opposite of the first position. Many great religions have been based on the view of the soul as part of a world soul. Mystics in all religions are inclined to accept this position. The individual soul is regarded as an emanation from God and as returning to God. Life is primarily a school of purification by which one frees oneself from the delusions of matter and the flesh and prepares oneself for reabsorption into God. It is clear that this point of view tends to deny the importance of the values associated with active par-

ticipation in the world. Values that arise from meditation and inwardness are alone recognized and those that arise through social fellowship are neglected or ignored. Man's quest for values ultimately becomes a self-centered quest and a world-denying quest. This means that the scope of values is sharply delimited.

Moreover, this theory tends to foster the idea that the soul is a disembodied spirit and that matter is essentially evil. Thus the individual is encouraged to renounce the idea that values can be associated with the material world. One is encouraged to neglect one's health and to belittle the importance of material prosperity for all members of the community. In reality there is no such strict division between body and soul. As a carrier of values man is dependent upon the body to sustain his efforts at grasping higher values. In many respects the higher values arise only when there is a broad general basis of material values in the community. The interaction between body and soul is so complete in man as he strives to attain values that any attempt to consider the soul as a source of values and the body as the root of disvalue leads to dangerous confusion. Spiritualists have endeavored to prove the existence of disembodied souls. Until their evidence is more conclusive, it must be taken for granted that nothing can be gained by regarding the soul as distinct from the body.

C. Soul as Reason and Will

The classical tradition in Western philosophy places the emphasis on the rationality of man and upon the will of man as the distinctive characteristics of the soul. The soul enables man to consider choices in a rational way and then to act upon choices once a course of action has been determined. The central philosophical debate regarding man has revolved around the extent to which the reason or the will is to be regarded as paramount. Great philosophers such as Aquinas, Descartes,

Spinoza, Hegel have emphasized the predominance of the reason. Other great philosophers such as Duns Scotus, Kant, Fichte, Schopenhauer have considered the will as more important. If the soul of man is equated with his reason, the natural conclusion is that it is the rational element in man which is immortal. As we have already learned, Aristotle carried this view to its logical conclusion and affirmed that creative reason was imperishable but that all other elements of the personality suffered dissolution with the body. If man's will is regarded as the vital element of the soul, one is likely to conclude that the way one uses his will determines the status of his soul on earth and throughout eternity. The logical conclusion of this position leads to an affirmation of conditional immortality, that is, immortality of the soul is regarded as depending upon the extent to which one has made choices during life which increase one's store of good deeds.

There is considerable truth in these philosophical analyses of human personality. It must be recognized, however, that both approaches tend to be exclusive. Not all men are gifted with great reasoning ability. Many of us are so unfortunate as far as educational opportunities are concerned that we can never hope to develop the native abilities that we may possess along this line. In the great age of Brahman thought in India a way of life was elaborated for the rational thinker which could not possibly be followed by the members of the lower classes. A similar tendency can be traced in the development of Greek thought. Wherever the intellect is regarded as the dominant factor in the soul a tendency toward intellectual snobbishness almost inevitably arises.

On the other hand, another type of snobbishness arises in cases where the will is regarded as dominant. The Pharisee prides himself on the strictness of his observance of the rules of the game of life. His moral and religious snobbishness is no more conducive to the creation and the increase of values

than the snobbishness of the intellectual who retires to his ivory tower to enjoy the fruits of his lofty flights of reason.

D. Soul as Capacity for Eternal Life with God

The final position mentioned above is essentially the position which has been affirmed by Christianity. It involves the recognition that the soul of man cannot be distinguished from the totality of his personality. The naturalistic, biological position is strangely similar to the Christian position at this point. However, a second affirmation is presupposed in the Christian position, namely, the recognition of the fact that man as a personality is a carrier of values because of his unique ability to respond to another personality who is the creative source of values. This creative source of values is the living God. The naturalists are right in claiming that man is capable of being a carrier of values because he is a complex organism reacting in a conscious way in a stimulating environment. But man does not become a carrier of values because he views the world from the point of view of his own ego and its drive for fulfillment as the naturalists claim. Man becomes a carrier of values because he views the world from the point of view of his relationship to God who is the creator and sustainer of values.

In his difficult struggle to attain values man has ordinarily been sustained by the faith that he was not limited to his own powers in his quest. The spiritual history of man, as for instance among the Hebrews, indicates that man has always considered that he was being helped and strengthened in his struggle by contact with "Something Other" that drew him in the direction of the highest values. It was this mysterious power that man worshiped.

Among primitive religions we find that their most characteristic quality is their practicality. The primitive man in all climates and ages demanded one thing from his religion and that was help of a physical nature. In other words, he desired

help for the creation of the highest values that he knew. We cannot positively affirm that such help was not granted to primitive man. We know that his personality was integrated and his life made more worth while by his religion. Furthermore, we know that religion serves to uphold a form of crude morality among primitive peoples; and that when primitive man's religion is taken from him without substituting something in its place, his life loses meaning, his personality disintegrates, and his society decays.

In the historic cultures we find this same process in operation. As values are recognized in that culture, men of that culture feel the need for a power beyond themselves to help create and sustain these values. Spiritual inquiry is consequently made into the darkness of surrounding mystery. And again man feels that there is an answer to his appeal. As a result of this conviction that God answers man's appeal we have the emergence of the ethical religions. These religions stand in contrast to the primitive nature religions. Man becomes aware of the fact that his quest for values is not determined by his own selfish desires but that it is motivated by God's revelation of the nature of higher values as contrasted with lower values. Ethical religions such as Judaism and Christianity set up obedience to the will of God as their standard of values. In most cases this will of God finds expression in the written word of a holy scripture, a Bible, a Torah, or a Koran.

According to the Christian view, man is part of nature, more than and above nature, and in contact with a supernatural power which is other than himself or nature. As a carrier of values man is dependent upon nature. As a creator of values he is motivated by something other than himself or nature. For the fulfillment of values he is in the end dependent upon God's gift of eternal life. In this view the soul is not some disembodied substance that can be separate from the personality as a whole. It is not something that is "real" in the usual

sense of that term. It is not something that we possess but an activity of God by which our personalities respond to God's creative power in such a way that he possesses us. We can perceive the soul only when we notice that man is capable of responding to this creative power. The capacity for responding to this creative power is found potentially among all men, for the gift of the soul which comes from God is never withdrawn by God.

This does not mean that men respond to the creative power of God for the fulfillment of their personalities to the full extent of their capacity. There is the fact of sin in man's experience. Man tends, in his natural state of inertia and indifference, to prefer lower values, and what is even more discouraging, he shows within his nature a demonic, irrational tendency toward the creation of disvalue. This perverse, ingrained tendency of man to choose the lower value and to be satisfied with it despite the infinite possibility of higher values, together with man's inclination toward the creation of disvalue constitutes what Christian theology has called original sin.

Moreover, some men cannot respond to the creative power of God for the fulfillment of their personalities because of the chance limitations that a cruel, inert, and indifferent natural order has placed upon them. It is a disconcerting experience to find oneself in the midst of a room inhabited by the deformed creatures in a ward of idiots in a state institution. If man is nothing more than physical form plus reason plus will, then there is no reason for considering these poor creatures as personalities. If in addition man is an immortal soul as Christianity affirms, then we must regard them as men even though we cannot consider them as personalities.

According to the Christian doctrine of man, the immortal soul is that which relates man to God; usually considered as something that is instilled into man at the moment of conception, that is, something that comes from God and returns to

God. This something is an unknown quantity which cannot be isolated from the personality as a whole or indeed separated from the body. For this reason the Christian view of the resurrection has always emphasized a physical resurrection.

It is evident that there is no content to this term "soul" apart from the Christian doctrine of eternal life. Perhaps all that can be reasonably affirmed is that among Christian thinkers the term "soul" designates a capacity for immortality. Since the potentiality for the fulfillment of values in eternal life cannot be proved, it must be accepted by faith. If it is accepted on faith, the status of the idiot is not hopeless. The opportunity for becoming a personality is potentially his as much as the potentiality for becoming a new personality, a redeemed soul, rests with the normal man.

The Christian view of man has some very practical implications which would revolutionize society if put into operation. If man is an immortal soul created in the image of God as a psychophysical organism, all human beings must be regarded as of infinite and like importance before God. To evidence irreverence for the life of man as either a physical organism or a spiritual being is to evidence irreverence for the life of God. No individual can be ignored as of little consequence. No man is at liberty to use other individuals for the increase of his own selfish system of values as if men were objects rather than subjects who are in turn sensitive to values. No pride of intellect or birth or race or social status can be justified.

If all men are carriers of values and potentially creators of values, every man is responsible before God and his fellow men to use the years of his life as a sacred trust for the increase of values. In other words, man is obligated to live an active creative life. He must discipline his life so that habit patterns will be established which will enable him to fulfill his possibilities rather than distort or frustrate his unique potentialities for the creation of values. Moreover, if man is stimulated to

appreciate and create values through his social environment, society is obligated before God to furnish a social environment which affords opportunity for the creation of values for all who are a part of that society. This means that the community is obligated to struggle against the powerful demonic forces which are destructive of values, namely, the inertia of nature and the sinfulness of man. God has provided the instruments for this struggle in his gift of reason, which can conquer and control nature, and in his redeeming gift of his Son which can, through the mind of Christ, warm the cold heart of man who is cruel and selfish by nature and heal his sick spirit so that it is renewed and daily awakened to the possibilities of the growth of values.

Finally, if God supports values throughout eternity in the gift of eternal life, there is no reason for despair or dejection when faced with the ever-present negation of values as evidenced in death, chance evil, frustration, and defeat. Man is not frustrated by the limits of time or defeated by the inevitability of death. No amount of pleasure or wealth or achievement will continue to motivate a man in his quest for values if he loses hope. And in the long run no man can continue a sustained hope for the future unless there is some assurance of winning the victory over his great enemies, time and death.

On some occasions it would appear that Christians are anxious to avoid emphasizing the revolutionary nature of the Christian doctrine of man. They have been satisfied to promise a miraculous redemption in the life after death. They forget that the central doctrine of Christianity, namely, the doctrine of the Incarnation, gives evidence that God's kingdom begins here and now in the growth of values in man's heart, in his life, in his community. Eternal life, as the Gospel of John affirms, is an immediate possession of the follower of Christ. Too often Christians have allowed their consciousness of the sinfulness of man to blind their eyes to the power and love of

God as the creator and sustainer of values. The importance of the sinful nature of man must not be ignored. It is more important, however, to emphasize the fact that Christianity is a God-centered religion. Modern man no longer has a medieval sense of sin and judgment. But as always, man cries out from the depths of his loneliness for fellowship with God who is the fulfillment of values. He knows his life to be meaningless in a world of hatred and indifference if he is bereft of the abiding and creative power of love.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the previous paragraphs is that modern civilization must make decisions regarding the nature of the soul which will renew our faith in human beings as supreme carriers of values. Faith in mankind as a carrier of values will arouse within us an attitude of reverence for the life of man which will make it impossible for us to ignore our fellow men or to exploit them or to remain indifferent when subversive forces call for the liquidation of certain races or social groups which are arbitrarily regarded as objectionable. However, if we are to become creators of values as well as carriers of values, we must also come to a decision regarding another important question—to what extent man is a free agent. At this point we are confronted with the thorny problem of the freedom of the will.

DECISIONS ABOUT FREEDOM OF THE WILL—IS MAN FREE TO CREATE VALUES?

In the course of the history of human thought powerful tendencies to negate the freedom of the will have arisen from two main sources—religious fatalism and scientific determinism. The deeply religious man who is dominated by convictions of the power of God may come to regard God as not only the source and sustainer of values but as the sole creator of values. The human personality must be regarded as nothing more than a carrier of values. Every man is an empty recep-

tacle into which God may or may not pour the values that come through redemption, as he sees fit.

Practically every great religious leader who has reflected on the power and majesty of God has had to struggle against this tendency. Thomas Aquinas, the most important philosopher of the medieval church, was tempted by the lure of predestination and escaped from the implications of this position by emphasizing the importance of man's unique faculty of reflection or reason which enables him within certain limits to choose between paths. Martin Luther, the greatest of the Reformers, experienced the same temptation and narrowly escaped predestination by emphasizing that grace is open to all men. John Calvin gave up the struggle and accepted a radical religious determinism. Orthodox Mohammedans carried this religious determinism to its logical extreme and affirmed a fatalism not only in religious matters but in any and all circumstances. It is common knowledge that the results were disastrous for Islamic culture in every respect except one, namely, the nurture of fanatical men of war.

There is no great likelihood that modern man will deny freedom of the will for religious reasons. He is more likely to deny freedom of the will on scientific grounds. The physical sciences have been able to make great progress because they have accepted the postulate that all events in the physical universe have been determined by the inexorable laws of nature. The biological, psychological, and sociological sciences have found it helpful to accept similar postulates for their work. As a result man's choices are regarded as determined by his heredity or by his environment or by economic forces or by subconscious urges. In other words abstract science, like abstract theology, conspires to discount freedom of the will.

If freedom of the will is to be maintained against the contentions of religious determinists, it is of utmost importance that the ethical tradition of the Bible be emphasized. As the

great prophets affirmed, every man must develop a sense of moral responsibility for righteous living. Even though the relationship between God and man may rest in God's hand, nevertheless the relationship between man and man is to a large degree the responsibility of the individual. The way man acts toward his fellows in any social situation contributes toward the creation or the disruption of values. The fact that the religious man is personally dominated by a consciousness of God's power and majesty need not prevent him from working for the best moral and social order possible at a given time and place. His efforts directed in this way hold within them the possibility of the creation of values.

The fact that the religious man is acutely conscious that these efforts must be judged by God's standards rather than man's standards is sometimes used as an excuse by the religious man for refusing to bear any responsibility in the world of practical affairs. Even though this attitude might be considered logically justifiable, it is ethically indefensible. It is just as logical for the religious man to regard every system of social and ethical values that arises from the creative relationship of man with man as the lowest common denominator of moral life, that is, as a system which is to be transcended and improved. Since he is always acutely conscious that this system is the lowest common denominator as judged by his personal relationship with God, he need never be satisfied to accept the standards of that system as fixed or final. As a result the religious man can and should play a unique role in society as a creator of values. His personal relationship with God fixes upon him the responsibility of being the central factor making for change and improvement in the ethical life of the community. Under the guiding hand of God he may become the crucial factor in the dynamics of social change.

Scientific, mechanistic determinism cannot be proved false for those who affirm it any more than providential determinism

can be proved false for the theologian. However, it is possible to weaken the hold of scientific determinism by a negative proof. The opponent of determinism has an initial advantage because men naturally have a high degree of conviction regarding their ability to make choices. They are more strongly convinced of freedom of choice than of the abstract affirmations of an impersonal science. Most men have a higher degree of conviction regarding their ability to move either a right arm or a left arm through an act of will than they have of the earth moving on its axis. It is no easy task to disabuse man of this conviction.

Moreover, no matter how hard the determinist tries he cannot deny the fact of individuation. Each person is unique and is aware of that uniqueness. Even if some form of transubstantiation of souls should be discovered so that the doctrine of reincarnation would have to be accepted, it would still be necessary to recognize some element of uniqueness in the individual in his present state of incarnation. Even identical twins reared in the same environment must be recognized as unique individuals.

A particular choice can be traced back to certain influences which go into the making of the personality that makes the choice. They can be traced as a series of previous crucial choices of that person which contributed to the process of conditioning, or they can be traced as a concatenation of environmental influences which lead up to the person who made the choices. However, the influences and the choices cannot be connected except through a personality. The point is that they cannot possibly be traced *through* the personality. There is an unknown factor in the personality that cannot be accounted for by any known laws of physics, psychology, or sociology. Man remains the most unpredictable of all creatures. One has as much right to attribute this unpredictability to freedom of the will as to predetermined laws of action. The

psychologist or the sociologist has no higher degree of authority for regarding his descriptions of these laws of action as final than the moralist has for affirming his conviction of freedom of the will.

The burden of proof rests with the determinist if for no other reason than the very practical one that if there is no freedom of the will, the difficulties of establishing a system of moral order as the basis for society are insurmountable. Freedom of the will must be postulated as axiomatic by ethics just as science postulates an orderly universe. The alternative is the ethical determinism of the Marxist or the ethical anarchy of a Nietzsche or the ethical nihilism of a Schopenhauer. No progressive civilization can be based on an ethical nihilism which affirms that the highest morality is the denial of the will. The history of Hinayana Buddhism vouches for this fact. No orderly civilization which conserves the values of the past can be based on ethical anarchy which affirms that all moral codes and laws can be broken at random and according to the whim of individuals. No civilization which preserves the values of the individual has ever been based on the ethical determinism of Marxism.

In the previous paragraph we have accepted some assumptions regarding the nature of civilization which may or may not be justified. We have assumed that civilizations can be regarded as satisfactory or unsatisfactory, good or bad, in so far as they provide opportunities for progress, in so far as they are orderly in the preservation of the values of the past and in so far as they preserve the values of the individual. These assumptions cannot be taken for granted. We are confronted with the problem of the good life as it involves the communal life of man. In the following chapter we shall consider some of the problems of modern man as he makes decisions regarding the type of community, state, or governmental system that is worthy of his devotion as a wise citizen.

CHAPTER XV

Decisions on the Community

WHY THE PHILOSOPHER IS CONCERNED ABOUT COMMUNITY PROBLEMS

We have repeatedly affirmed that only the individual can be a carrier and creator of values. If this is the case, why should the philosopher who is concerned with values be concerned about such problems as the control of business by the government; the relative advantages of communism, socialism, or democracy as systems of government; the value of home rule as compared with centralization of governmental functions; the relative importance of international as over against national loyalties? These problems which concern the welfare of the community as a whole are recognized as important for man as a carrier of values for a number of reasons.

First of all, some form of stable community life is a prerequisite for the individual in order that meaningful interactions which make for value may be increased. As we have already pointed out, the increase of meaningful interactions occurs most readily through the stimulation of social participation. The institutions of every community arise naturally and inevitably to provide opportunity for the increase of meaningful interactions in the various fields of man's interests. Some institutions, such as the economic institutions and those which provide for health, sustain the interactions of the members of a community on a physical level. Others, such as the institutions which provide for the use of leisure, enhance interactions

on a recreational or aesthetic level. The great basic institutions of the family, education, and religion enhance interactions at an even more complex and meaningful level.

Since the values of the individual as a social creature are so closely bound up with the institutional life of the community to which he belongs, it is only natural that he should be concerned about the effectiveness of those institutions for enhancing meaningful connections. If those institutions have been effective in his experience, it is also natural for him to be vitally concerned when a program is suggested for their change or modification. On the other hand, the individual who has not found the institutions of the community effective means for increasing values in his own experience will be vitally interested in changing them. It is no exaggeration to affirm that the community through its institutions is a necessary agent for the growth of values.

The alert man is not only concerned about problems of the community because the community, through its institutions, is an agency for the growth of values. He is also concerned because the community has within its control the means for the preservation or the destruction of values, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. In many respects government is the most important of all institutions for the philosopher who is concerned with values. Government is unique in so far as it is an institution that has the power either to enhance, preserve, and encourage or to discourage the growth of values in a particular field. The political institution can make and unmake other institutions.

Sometimes the political institutions run into opposition when they endeavor to make changes as, for example, when the Russian government endeavored to change the institution of the family, or when the German government endeavored to change the institution of the church, or when the United States government endeavored to eliminate the institution of slavery.

In no case, however, can one fail to recognize the unique role played by the political institution wherever it asserts its power to decide what fields of value and what value systems are to be emphasized for preservation and possible development. Furthermore, the most powerful of the political institutions, namely, the government, also has the power to decide to a large degree what groups or classes are to share in the values afforded by the community and the degree to which they are to be given opportunity for participation.

The philosopher is concerned with community problems because the institutions of the community are agencies for the growth of values and because one of the institutions of the community is granted unusual power to encourage or discourage the growth of values. An even more important reason for vital concern with the community rests in the fact that conflicts over values are not merely experienced within the individual. Tensions between value-systems arise within communities and between communities. These tensions must be resolved in a positive way on the community level if progress is to occur. The values, attitudes, and meanings incorporated in the life of a labor union inevitably come into conflict with the value-system of the capitalist, for example. Under the stress of tension, value-systems are formulated as public opinion. The value-systems become more sharply defined in their opposition and contrasts. If no means is provided for easing the tension of the situation, overt conflict may be the only recourse.

When the community becomes identified with an entire nation and when the value-systems of one nation conflict with those of another nation, a clash of interests is involved which may ultimately lead to open warfare. Each value-system elicits supreme devotion, feelings of loyalty, attitudes of conviction on the part of the citizens of the respective nations. The warfare which results is all the more ruthless and uncompromising because of this devotion and loyalty.

The resolution of tensions between value-systems may take the form of adjustment making for progress of the community, or disruption making for the decline of civilization. Tension between two value-systems each of which has positive values to offer the community may be resolved by discussion which permits the absorption of new ideas and values from both systems and makes possible their reorganization on a new level of interaction in the life of the community. On the other hand, if no common basis for discussion can be found, the value-systems stand over against one another as centers of reference demanding complete allegiance. Overt conflict results which tends to be disruptive rather than constructive. The tragedy of the modern world rests in the fact that tensions between value-systems tend to become more and more sharply drawn both on the community level and on an international level. If no common basis can be discovered for developing a technique for reconciling these tensions in a positive way, the results are likely to prove even more disastrous in the future than in the past.

Since the philosopher as citizen is interested in the increase of values, he must make decisions regarding the institutions of his community—decisions as to the form of government which enhances the growth of values, decisions regarding the value-system which is worthy of his loyalty and support, decisions regarding the development and use of techniques for reconciling tensions.

In former ages it was possible for the philosopher to argue about these matters undisturbed by the necessity of making radical decisions. The community in which he lived changed so slowly that the structure of that community, its mores, its institutions, its religion, its government could be taken for granted. As a result the philosopher from Plato and Aristotle to Rousseau usually confined his attention to theoretical consideration of what form of government could be regarded as

best. He could go so far as to visualize the possibility of a radical change in the structure of government. As a political theorist, however, he could presuppose a common set of values as recognized as worth while by the community as a whole and he could regard the institutions of that community as the means by which those values were conserved. The political institutions were regarded as more or less effective, depending on the extent to which they contributed to certain ends regarded as universally valid.

The situation is radically different today. There is no general agreement as to what type of community is to be desired. The structures of the old, established institutions are badly shattered. This can be noted especially in the breakdown of family life and the decreased influence of religion. We are living in an age in which the mores are so flexible that no type of community life can be taken for granted. As a result the most important theoretical problem that faces the philosopher as a political thinker is the problem as to what is the good community. He must consider this problem as of paramount importance because he is living in an age when the community is being reshaped with unbelievable rapidity throughout the world.

Before a man can be a carrier and a creator of values, it is necessary for him to experience the fellowship of community, that is, he must have a sense of at-homeness. He must be able to share traditions of the past that have made for the increase of value in his society. In addition, means must be provided for the sharing of present experiences that make for the growth of meaningful interactions. In an ideal situation a man would be born into a community which provides both of these opportunities. Since communities are primarily conservers of values, there is always the tendency for them to become closed communities. Conservative communities recognize the values in the tradition to such an extent that they do not provide means

for the growth of new values. The result is that individuals tend to rebel against the traditional community. These individuals may form small groups within the community as a whole. These groups afford opportunity for the growth of values in a limited field, but they can never be a substitute for the richness of group values conserved by the traditions of the community. On the other hand, none of the traditional closed communities that has elicited the loyalties of mankind in the past is effective in the modern world for establishing a world-wide community.

As a result, modern man must make crucial decisions that will result in the development of a type of community in which the individual can retain a sense of at-homeness by sharing in the traditional values of the community and at the same time be stimulated and encouraged to explore new possibilities of value independent of his loyalty to the traditional community. The philosopher is obligated to attack this basic problem of the nature of the good community with unrelenting energy. The future progress of civilization may depend more upon his success than upon the success of atomic scientists working with desperate haste in the laboratories of a dozen competing nations. In the subsequent pages of this chapter we shall endeavor to induce the reader to participate in the philosophical discussion which is a necessary preliminary step to the reconstruction of the community in the modern world. We shall proceed by reviewing in a critical way some of the philosophies of the community advocated today.

At the same time it will be necessary to consider the various types of political systems compatible with these philosophies. The problems of political philosophy would be relatively simple if it were possible to consider the problem of the ideal society apart from the problem of the means for attaining that society. It is a very dangerous procedure, however, to draw a sharp line of distinction between ends and means in politics.

If the ideals of a political program are fostered by political techniques that are indifferent to those ideals, it will not be long before the ideals are forgotten or distorted in line with the means employed. On the other hand, dependence cannot be placed upon political techniques apart from the recognition of ends or goals compatible with these techniques. The techniques of free elections, for example, were used to establish dictatorship in Germany in 1933 at a time when that nation possessed no abiding ideal of a democratic community. It is not likely that our program of study and discussion outlined above will offer a solution to the political problems that face modern man. It is hoped, however, that we shall be able to offer some evidence that the philosopher's interest in the study of values is not a purely theoretical interest as applied to the crucial political problems that face mankind in an atomic age.

KINDS OF COMMUNITY ADVOCATED TODAY

A. The Traditional Community—Religious, National, Racial

Three types of community advocated today emphasize the values of group loyalty and stability and the sense of at-homeness that comes to one who is a member of the traditional community. Men who consider that the highest form of the community is of the traditional type are inclined to have as their ideal a religious community, a national community, or a racial community. The ideal of the national community has dominated the modern world in the same way that the ideal of the religious community dominated the Middle Ages. In recent years, under the impact of the Nazi movement in Germany, we have seen the rise of the ideal of the racial community. Each of these types of community fosters certain distinctive values. Each type is in turn subject to perversions that endanger the growth of values.

There has never been a people without a religion of some type or other. Wherever the center of devotion is focusd on

a supernatural world and the control of supernatural agencies, we find a tendency for priestly functionaries to arise. The institution of religion may become dominant under these circumstances to the point of controlling and directing the entire life of the community in a situation where church and state are one. Many religious groups have visualized the ideal community as a religious community. Both Judaism and Mohammedanism have been dominated by this ideal. The great thinkers of the Middle Ages with their ideal of a united Christendom, directed from Rome through the spiritual medium of the church, founded a civilization on this principle in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The founders of Puritan New England had a similar ideal in mind. We need go no further back into history than the nineteenth century to find a religious sect, the Mormons, which has been successful in building a stable community life with this ideal as a basis.

Thomas Aquinas had this ideal of a religious community in mind when he affirmed that the church was superior to the state and that the state received its power from God through the church. Aquinas was opposed to oppression and tyranny but he regarded rebellion against the church-approved government as equivalent to rebellion against the church. The position of Aquinas remains the official position of the Roman Catholic church today. It is a position that has received philosophical support in the writings of Neo-Thomist philosophers. The semiclerical dictatorships of Portugal and of prewar Austria were modeled after this ideal.

The distinctive values fostered by the religious community are the values that emerge from the unifying experience of a common worship. Men are not only sustained by the sense of strength that they achieve as a group but also by the sense of being at home in the universe. The purpose of man's life is clearly defined by the program of the church so that man has a sense of certainty as to how he should live. Moreover,

man's place in the community is assured because of the stabilizing influence exerted by the church over the institutions of society. Most important of all, the church fosters in man through many channels of instruction a sense that he is being sustained in his quest for values by a power greater than man or his society. This sustaining power is at hand to aid him even when all is darkness. The result is that a man whose life is nurtured by a traditional religious community is not likely to despair.

We can find no better symbol of the values fostered by the religious community than the medieval cathedral. With its spires pointing heavenward the cathedral symbolized man's dependence upon God and the nurturing care of God as exerted through the church. With its crypts encasing the bones of the saints sunk deep into the soil the cathedral symbolized the church's continuity with the past and its identity with the land and people to whom it belonged and who in turn belonged to it. The ideal of the religious community has always appealed and will always appeal to people who are sincerely religious.

Much of the strength of Roman Catholicism in the modern world rests in the fact that as a political force it continues to affirm the importance of the religious community. It continues to work strenuously to establish this community wherever possible. Other Christian groups, for example, the Protestant denominations, can endeavor to foster the values that emerge from worship. However, they can go no further than to foster these values for the individual who is part of a wider community than the congregation. They have neither the power nor the program that would justify identification of the religious community with the political community.

The type of government which is most compatible with the ideal of the religious community is clericalism. In this political system the governing authority is in the hands of the functionaries of the religious institution. History has indicated

that this identification of the religious and the political institutions has serious results for endangering the growth of values. In the first place, man is sustained in his quest for values in this community only in so far as that quest is regarded as lawful by the church. Consequently, there is constant danger that one will be delimited in his quest for values rather than directed toward the fulfillment of an ever-expanding range of values. Then again there is no guarantee that selfish men who are indifferent to the values fostered by the religious community will not be able to gain political control of the church and its priesthood so that they will abuse the great power entrusted to the religious institutions. It is possible that such religious parasites may fasten themselves upon the church of the future as they have in the past. When this situation arises, the faithful members of the religious community are helpless to rebel because of the fear that through such rebellion they may destroy the basic source of the values which have sustained and nurtured them.

Clericalism is unsatisfactory, in the third place, from the point of view of our theory of value, because it almost inevitably leads to intolerance. The institution of religion makes the mistake, when it becomes a political institution, of judging all values in terms of a *fixed* system of religious values. Men who differ even in the slightest degree from this fixed religious system are regarded as heretics and rebels. They are consequently cast out of the community either by law or by the social pressure of public opinion. They are never permitted to make their contributions to the increase of values of the community. Unless they have unusual inner resources to sustain them, their lives become unfruitful and warped. They are not only cast out of the community of men but they are also bereft of the hope of the sustaining power of God.

If the cathedral is the symbol of the values fostered by the religious community, the inquisition and the stake can be con-

sidered as the symbol of the weakness of the religious community. The ideal of the religious community advocated by Roman Catholics is not acceptable on philosophical grounds. It is certainly not acceptable on political grounds in an age when peoples of very diverse religious beliefs must learn to live together politically.

We have already pointed out that the ideal of the community which has dominated the modern world is the ideal of the national community. This ideal emphasizes the distinctive wealth of values preserved in the continuous history of a people in a limited geographical area. All who share in this localized cultural history are recognized as members of the national community. The national community engenders loyalty to the past traditions of a people. As a result there is always a tendency to foster this past tradition by means of folklore, art, public education, and national festivals. At the same time there is a tendency to arouse a sense of national destiny which aims to bring the values of the past tradition into fruition in the future. A common language, religion, and racial stock are frequently associated with the rise of a national community. None of these factors is essential, however, for history gives evidence of the rise of strong national communities that lack one or all of them.

National communities offer the individual a sense of at-homeness. He recognizes that he is an heir of a great tradition. Moreover, they offer an opportunity for the outsider to share in the values of the community in so far as he is able to appreciate the values of this tradition and willing to accept the responsibilities of citizenship. The individual member of the national community is also given a sense of mission. He is obligated to maintain and foster the values of his national tradition even at the expense of his own comfort and selfish desires. He has a sense of participation in a destiny that is richer and more meaningful than his own personal destiny. At the same

time his membership in a national community makes him conscious of his own individuality. He is made aware of the fact that he is different from others who are not members of his national community.

The ideal of the national community is most clearly evidenced in Europe. The history of the development of nationalism in Europe inclines one to believe that monarchy is the type of government most congenial to the nationalistic spirit. This is because the sense of continuity of national history is most adequately fostered by the principle of inherited leadership of the nation. The ruler is expected to represent the virtues and traditional values of the nation in his own person. Monarchies differ as to the amount of power intrusted in the hands of the ruler. In all cases, however, the monarch is the guardian of the traditional virtues of the nation.

In some types of national communities the guardianship of the traditional values of the nation may be in other hands than that of the king. For example, the church may perform that function as in the nationalistic movements in Ireland and the Balkans. In the United States the guardianship of the traditional values of the nation is to a large extent in the hands of the justices of the Supreme Court. In this latter case the Constitution has become a semisacred document since it signifies the past traditions of the American people more adequately than would be possible for any individual or group of individuals.

A flag is unfurled in the breeze or a national anthem rises from the lips of a gathering at a national holiday. The response to these symbols is automatic in scores of nations throughout the world. There is a quickening of the pulse, a reverent elevation of the spirit. The flag and the national anthem are symbols of the values treasured by our national community. They are symbols, too, of our hope for the future. There is another symbol, however, that must be associated with nationalism; and in this case the symbol is indicative of the weakness

of nationalism. We cannot think of nationalism today without visualizing a thousand battlefields on the soil of Europe and the rows of crosses as an aftermath of those battles. The weakness of the national community is that it is by nature an exclusive and jealous community. This means that it is inevitably a competing community when one national community faces another.

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries competition between national communities resulted in an expansion of values despite the constant and inevitable wars. One nation competed with another in the arts and sciences, in exploration and business expansion. The time is now at hand where competition between nations promises disaster. The ideal of the national community no longer supports the growth of values. It must be replaced by a more inclusive ideal in the future. This does not mean necessarily that the nation must disappear. It does mean that the view that the nation has the exclusive right to set itself up as the *only* community capable of supporting *all* values for *all* men must be uprooted or radically transformed.

The ideal of the national community has dominated the mind and heart of modern man to such an extent that it is difficult for us to visualize the possibility of the decline of this ideal. Nevertheless the fact remains that much of the political unrest of modern times can be traced to the failure of the national ideal to provide a sense of community for large masses of the population. The social developments that have gone hand in hand with ever-increasing industrialization tend to uproot all elements of the population. Those classes which are most insecure, for example, the industrial workers, tend to seek security in the class community rather than in the national community. They feel that they have been betrayed by the national community in some cases. In other cases they have lost contact with the great traditions of the national community

because of inadequate education, indifference, and poverty. Where the class lines are broken down by equality of opportunity and by an adequate program of education in the home, in the school, and in the local community, nationalism is still strong. Where these stabilizing influences are inadequate there is much political unrest. The source for this political unrest is spiritual rather than economic, as some claim. Men are searching for a more satisfying type of community than that provided by the national community.

The breakdown of the national community in certain nations such as Italy and Germany resulted in the emergence of the ideal of the racial community. In the racial community a select group claiming to represent racial purity of the national stock sets itself up as the savior of the nation. The ideal of the racial community is the last resort of decadent nationalism. Appeal is made to the racial pride of the group. Attempts are made to reawaken the sense of national destiny by fostering a mystical trust in the superiority of the elect racial or cultural group. The ultimate fulfillment of that destiny is presented as inevitable.

No one can doubt the power of the racial ideal to unite a people and to elicit fanatical loyalty. The history of National Socialism in Germany has amply demonstrated that power in a tragic and disastrous manner evident to all. The racial community fosters the value of cohesive unity that is stronger than the somewhat artificial unity of the national community. Moreover, if one cannot unite dissident groups in a nation for the quest of positive values, it is always possible to unite them by common hatreds and fears. The demagogue has no difficulty in using racial differences for the purpose of fostering pride in oneself and hatred of others. No matter how unsatisfactory one's life may be, one can always feel superior because one is by birth a member of a superior race. No matter how much disagreement there may be between individuals or groups,

these disagreements can be forgotten in the common hatred of peoples of a different race. Wherever men are taught to believe that good and evil traits are the inherent characteristics of races, opportunity is afforded for the stimulation of the primitive hatreds and fanatical loyalties which constitute the strength and the weakness of the racial community.

The values of group unity elicited by the racial community can be considered as symbolized in the Nuremberg rallies of Nazi Germany. Those who witnessed these rallies testify to the irrational sense of group unity that they inspired. For the Nazi this sense of group unity could be interperted as religious elevation. Hitler, as the central figure upon whom this sense of elevation depended, was an appropriate leader for the racial community. He did not represent the traditional values of the nation as in the case of the monarch. He personified the pride of race and above all the hatred engendered by such pride.

The entire civilized world is keenly aware today of the symbol of the weakness of the racial community. The concentration camps of Buchenwald and of Dachau and the many other points of mass torture and extermination scattered throughout conquered Europe are the horrible symbols of the failure of the racial community. Mass extermination and enslavement are not incidental elements in the program of the racial community. They are logical, systematic attempts to put that program into practice. The values of one racial group are alone recognized as worthy of support. All who are not members of this racial group are doomed to enslavement or death.

B. The Economic Community—Capitalistic, Communistic

Two types of community advocated with considerable vigor in the present era emphasize the economic values as the primary source of all values. The ideal of the capitalist economic community is dominant in the United States. The ideal of the communist economic community is dominant in the Union of

Socialistic Soviet Republics of Russia. The ideal of the capitalist economic community in America arose at the same time as the ideal of the national community so that it is difficult to distinguish between these two ideals. In Russia the ideal of the communist economic community was superimposed upon the ideal of the national community through the instrumentality of revolution. Although these two ideals of capitalism and communism are constantly presented as opposites, they have in common the fundamental faith that all values rest on and are dependent upon economic values. They differ primarily as to the attitudes that they foster regarding economic values. The capitalist economic community considers progress in terms of the act of creating economic values. The communist economic community has as its criterion of progress the extent to which economic values are equitably distributed.

The capitalist economic community places great stress upon free enterprise and the initiative of the individual in the creation of economic values. It has had remarkable success in instilling in men a sense of adventure that comes with the development and exploitation of the natural resources of new territory. The great symbols of the dynamism of free enterprise are to be found on every hand in America. They include the skyscrapers of Manhattan, the streamliner spanning a continent, the blast furnaces of Gary, and the New York Stock Exchange. The community in which the creation of wealth is emphasized is a community that elicits the competitive energies of men. Status in the community depends upon one's ability to make money rather than upon race, creed, or birth. The lure of wealth is sufficiently powerful to bring into play the creative energies of many different kinds of people and to enable them to work together in a co-operative way.

The ideal of the capitalist economic community would not have been so successful in winning adherents if it limited its quest for values to the attainment of wealth for the sake of

wealth. This ideal of the free-enterprise community holds forth the possibility of the attainment of values in many other fields. It favors a free society in which opportunity is afforded for individuals to organize themselves into instrumental groups for the attainment of the values afforded by art, religion, education, community uplift, personal improvement, recreation, and entertainment. In the free-enterprise community the world is filled with such a variety of organizations that it is taken for granted that every man can find a social group which will contribute to the goal of individual self-realization.

The type of government best suited to meet the needs of the capitalist economic community is a protective democracy. We have used the term "protective democracy" to indicate that in such a community the government's primary task is to protect the rights of the individual in his quest for wealth and self-realization. This means that the government maintains order by acting as an arbiter of competition. It protects the rights of individuals to organize themselves into groups of all kinds. Moreover, the government has the task of preventing external forces from disrupting the quest for economic values. The economic provisions in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights make it clear that one of the purposes of the makers of the Constitution was to provide a protective democracy for the United States. As we shall indicate later on, however, this was not all that they had in mind when they offered a democratic constitution for the new nation.

The ideal of the capitalist economic community has been challenged in recent years by communism from without and by the New Deal from within. It could be challenged by these political forces because it has demonstrated that it has undeniable weaknesses. The shutdown, whether due to strikes or depressions, is a symbol of one of the great weaknesses of this type of community. On the basis of its own criterion for judging success the shutdown represents failure for the capitalist

community. It is an indication that crucial forces tend to arise within that community which disrupt its productive capacities. It is immaterial whether these forces be attributed to the dissatisfaction of workers who somehow feel that they do not share in equality of opportunity for gaining wealth or whether they be attributed to the mismanagement of money power. The end result is the same for all concerned, namely, the defeat that comes to farm and factory when the creative energy of the community is frustrated.

Another symbol of the weakness of the capitalist economic community is the American movie, if we are permitted to select an example from the institutional life that provides entertainment and recreation. As we have pointed out, the ideal of the capitalist community does not limit its quest of values to the attainment of wealth for wealth's sake. Other values are expected to arise through the development of other group interests. It is these group enterprises which really make life worth living. They provide fellowship, the development of one's personality, the opportunity for creative effort. In the industrial community, especially in the large city, these instrumental groups do not function effectively. There is no creative fellowship for millions of starved souls. The symbol of this aesthetic and spiritual starvation is the American movie. In desperation millions of us flock to the movies, not because we enjoy the vapid display of nonsense presented there, but because, as we say, there is nothing else for us to do to fill in the time. There we sit entranced, enjoying vicariously the make-believe life of art, love, adventure, and travel. It is not an adequate substitute for the drabness and unresponsiveness of our daily lives.

The ideal of the communist economic community has a world-wide appeal for men whose economic position is so precarious that they must devote all effort toward the improvement of that position. For these men the values that arise from competition in the creation of wealth are unattainable. Moreover,

the instability of their economic position makes it difficult for them to enjoy the values that are associated with membership in instrumental groups. They are compelled by necessity to unite in a protective fellowship of their own creation, the worker's union, the soviet, the revolutionary party. These fellowships have succeeded in being remarkably creative in building up a sense of loyalty. They have given a sense of personal worth and mission to men whose lives have been without hope.

Under the impetus of the intellectual leadership of such men as Marx and Engels and the political leadership of such men as Lenin, the ideal of the communist economic community has made a strong bid for leadership throughout the world. It is equipped with means of ideological infiltration which enable it to disrupt the traditional religious, national, and racial communities. The communist community transcends the bounds of religion, nation, and race. Moreover, it holds forth the hope of immediate economic improvement to dissatisfied groups. At the same time it promises ultimate fulfillment for all values in a future age when all economic needs are met for all men, and leisure and security are provided for the increase and enjoyment of other values.

The modern age of scientific machine production offers an opportunity for the increase of wealth to the point where all poverty may be eliminated. Wherever this productive capacity has been successful in eliminating poverty, as has been the case in a large measure in the United States, the ideal of the communist economic community has little appeal. In countries where political disruption or industrial mismanagement and conservatism have failed to take advantage of the opportunities for economic betterment that the present age affords, communism asserts its claim to offer new hope of a new community in which the values of economic plenty will be accorded to all. It is a claim which will not go unheeded under those circumstances.

The symbols of the values fostered in the communist economic community are the worker's soviet or meeting, the communal farm, and the giant public works such as the great Dneiper River dam. The worker's soviet with its fellowship, its fervid discussion, its educational program gives evidence that the values of loyalty and unity of purpose can be stimulated among all groups in the community regardless of race or lack of opportunity. The communal farm and the great public works which were achieved under communism in Soviet Russia are symbols of the ideal of plenty in a machine age. The basic wealth of the community is owned by all and developed by all in line with the advanced contributions of science and scientific management.

The symbols of the weakness of the communist economic community are the empty, decaying churches and the bureaucratic Soviet Party. The empty churches indicate the attempts that communism has made to sever itself completely from the values contributed by the past to the enrichment of man. To a greater extent than in most modern nations traditional, non-economic values of Russian civilization were interwoven into the rich experience of worship afforded by the Orthodox church. The values of family life, the fine arts, literature were all enhanced by the religious sentiment of the Russian people. In this sense Russia has been the heir of Greek-Byzantine civilization. In refusing to recognize the necessity of treasuring the values of the past through the acceptance of a great religious tradition, communism has made it impossible for the people to enjoy this treasure of values or to contribute to its increase.

Economic values are not adequate substitutes for the rich, satisfying values of family life, worship, enjoyment of the arts. It is interesting to note that the recent trends in Russia indicate that the Soviet leaders are aware of this fact. For the rich traditions of the past they offer substitutes that are crassly inadequate. Lenin's tomb is set up as a kind of religious shrine

that reminds one of the deification of the emperor in ancient Rome. Great athletic, military, and political displays are organized which appear to be based on the principle that the superficiality of Nazi standards can be offered to the Russian people as a substitute for genuine community life.

The second symbol of the weakness of the communist economic community is the presence of the Soviet Party as a special class in the body politic. A select group has been set apart to enjoy special privileges and opportunities. Membership in this select group is carefully guarded. Moreover, this special group operates through a bureaucracy which not only encourages arrogance but which also gives indications of tolerating inefficiency and discouraging progressive innovations. The freedom of the individual scientist, inventor, engineer, or plant manager is hampered on all sides by the necessity of taking into consideration political questions. Under such circumstances it is difficult to see how the most capable men can be placed in the crucial positions or how their capacities can be fully developed and utilized. This situation cannot be corrected until some means is adopted that will assure the gradual dissolution of the Soviet Party itself. The tendencies appear to be in the opposite direction, toward the stabilization of the one-party system as a basic dogma of the new religion of communism. Once the party is regarded as sacrosanct along with the deified leaders of that party, the crucial step will have been taken which will subject the communist economic community to the same evils and weaknesses found in the ecclesiastical community. It too will be dominated by a fanatical priesthood, the bureaucrats of the party.

C. The Enlightened World Community—United Nations Program

We have noted that dangerous weaknesses can be found in the types of community generally advocated today. In all

nations there are men who are keenly aware of the need for correcting these weaknesses. The program for United Nations organization has been provided as a means by which peace between nations may be maintained until a new sense of community arises between men of good will throughout the world. The ideal advocated by the United Nations program is that of a world community based on enlightened self-interest. This ideal takes for granted the fact that the unit of genuine community of feeling is the nation. It also assumes that an organization based on the rational principles of law can provide a means by which nations can be federated into a world-wide community. Such a federation based on a rational program of organization may be artificial at first, possessing no community of feeling. Nevertheless, the opportunity may be provided for the growth of a genuine world-wide community.

It is a grave mistake to consider that the success or failure of the United Nations depends upon the capabilities of the political leadership afforded by the participating nations. Political leadership may furnish the world with a program of world government. Another type of leadership is required if that world government is to develop into a world community. As a matter of fact it is always a dangerous situation for any community from the point of view of the growth of values when the leadership of that community is entrusted to governing functionaries who have the power or means for using coercion. The values that give rise to a deep sense of understanding and fellowship in the true community can never be fostered by coercion.

The history of the American federation of states has much to teach the United Nations in this respect. The genuinely responsible leadership in America that provided for the growth of communal spirit in the past has been largely in the hands of the American businessman and the American educator. The former provided for the establishment of the ideal of the capi-

talist economic community, the latter for the establishment of the American national ideal. Community life in America is to this day a combination of these two types of community. These two ideals were able to operate side by side in America in the development of a great nation because political leadership with its weapon of coercion was never recognized as a serious competitor of the businessman or the educator. The Constitution itself made it clear that the political functionary was given a place of leadership only under the duress of emergency. Even then it was presupposed that it was the function of the government to appoint leaders only for the duration of the emergency. For example, in time of economic crisis or military stress the government is expected to grant special powers of leadership to the specialists in these fields.

There is little hope for the success of a world-federated state if the experience of the American peoples is ignored in this matter. One group of political leaders, for example, those of Soviet Russia, will endeavor to establish its limited and inadequate ideal of a world community upon the United Nations. This attempt will meet with the opposition of another group of political leaders, those of America and Great Britain, for example, who will endeavor to foster their equally outmoded ideals of a capitalist economic community or a traditional national community. In the meantime no opportunity will be afforded, no machinery provided, no leadership trained which will hold forth the promise of the growth of values in a genuinely creative world community. The symbols of that world community will never become established in the lives and hearts of men. They will never become realities that elicit the loyalty of all men of good will to a world-wide ideal which will transcend the limited ideals of community hitherto dominant in the lives of men.

One may look far and wide without success in an attempt to identify appropriate symbols that express the values inherent

in the United Nations ideal of the community. Those symbols have not arisen as yet for the simple reason that the United Nations as a community is still in the process of formation. What forces in our civilization today are capable of forming a new world community on the foundation established by the formation of the United Nations Organization? What type of leadership is required for developing a living, pulsating, interacting world *community,* when all that we have at present is a rational structure, an *artificial organization,* incapable of eliciting the loyalty of anyone except the expert in international law? No one can answer these very urgent questions today. If and when they are answered, however, they will be answered in terms of a new apperception of community values on the part of modern man.

CHAPTER XVI

Decisions on Education

THE DILEMMA OF MODERN EDUCATION

We have reached the point in our discussion where the next logical step in our procedure is to consider the decisions that modern man must make in the field of education. Theories of education are dependent upon theories as to the nature of man as a carrier of values and theories of the community as a conserver of values. Techniques of education, on the one hand, are based on some theory as to the nature of man. Programs of education, on the other hand, are based on some theory as to the nature of the community. A satisfactory philosophy of education must provide techniques which can be applied in such a way that a generation subjected to those techniques will be modified by them. It must also provide a program, that is, a system of ideals which can be tested in terms of the past history of a community.

Every person who is at all concerned with education today must be aware of the great amount of energy that is being expended by educators in discussions as to the future program of education in America. It is interesting to note that within comparatively recent times the emphasis has shifted from a discussion of the techniques of education to discussions regarding a future program of education. This shift of emphasis is a tacit recognition among educators that they can no longer assume that a system of community values can be taken for

granted. Education does not ordinarily make the culture. Rather it adapts its institutional machinery to meet the recognized needs that are already present in that culture.

The dilemma that faces education today is this: The *recognized* needs of our culture upon which education as an institution must build its program are not the *real* needs of the modern world-wide community that is in process of emerging. The educator is in the embarrassing position of marking time as far as his program for education is concerned. He must sit back patiently and wait until the new ideal of the community arises in some relatively remote future. He can continue his interest in techniques of education, transmitting the values associated with the recognized needs of his culture only as long as he is convinced that these recognized needs are the real needs of the community. When he loses faith in these recognized needs, he becomes disillusioned and discouraged. Many educators find themselves in this position today. Their situation is not a comfortable one.

It is the suggestion of this chapter that the educator of today can find his way out of this dilemma in only one way, namely, by deserting his traditional role as transmitter of the recognized values of a culture. He must become the critic of the values of his culture, sifting the adequate from the inadequate elements of his cultural heritage. In so far as he is capable of doing so, he must become the prophetic instigator of an open-minded, open-hearted attitude toward the creation of a new system of values as those values arise hand in hand with the emergence of a new world community. Only through a positive choice along these lines can the educator hope to be a creative agent in remaking the future. We are suggesting, of course, that the educator is in a position today where he must become a philosopher before he can fulfill his task as educator. Moreover, it is his good fortune, or his misfortune, perhaps, to be living in an age where the educator as philosopher must

follow in the footsteps of Socrates, the critic and prophet, rather than in the footsteps of Thomas Aquinas, the scholarly arbiter of order in church and state.

CURRENT PROGRAMS OF EDUCATION

Most of the philosophies of education which are dominant in the thinking of professional educators today are based on the principle that a certain recognized need of the community must be made central for a general program of education. Those communities which have as their ideal the traditional religious, national, or racial community agree in considering that the basic need for education is the need for integrating the succeeding generations into the life of a certain religious, national, or racial community. The program of education is consequently one which fosters a transmission of the traditional system of values, together with an attitude of loyalty to those values and an attitude of obedience to the traditional authorities which support and foster those values. Education as centered in the home and the church has served to meet this need for the transmission of a cultural heritage in past generations. In the modern world, however, pubic education has taken over the function of the home and the church with the result that nearly all education is of the nationalistic type today. The ceremony of high school commencement, for example, serves as a kind of initiation into the society of a modern state more or less as the public ceremonies of primitive societies initiated the youth into the society of family and clan and as confirmation initiated the adolescent into the membership of the group in the religious community.

The kinds of schools that arise in the national community depend upon the extent to which certain values are recognized as worthy of transmission. Some national communities, for example, Great Britain, emphasize the need for the transmission of the values of a system of social status together with the

traditions of an aristocracy. The aristocratic system evidenced at Eton and Oxford arises to meet this need. Emphasis is placed upon a classical education which serves to transmit traditional values and virtues, on the one hand, and to enhance social status on the other. Even in the national community of democratic, plebian America, education means social status to many people; and the exclusive country club type of school has a place in our educational system to meet the needs of the social climber, the established wealthy classes, and the aristocratically inclined scholar.

Those national communities, on the other hand, which emphasize the need for the transmission of an attitude of loyalty to race or nation and of obedience to the leadership of a certain race or nation tend to develop school systems modeled after the military pattern. In ancient times, the educational system of Sparta was directed along these lines. In modern times, Nazi Germany attempted a similar program with disastrous results for the peace of the world. Democratic countries tend to develop a less dangerous but nevertheless similar type of educational program when they overemphasize the importance of sports for the development of youth and subordinate the intellectual, religious, and professional phases of education to physical education.

The program of education which is most congenial to the capitalist economic community is that of vocational training. The motivation of obtaining a good job is uppermost in the minds of many who endeavor to get an education. They prefer a program of education that will enable them to gain jobs of a lucrative nature and that will equip them for a successful career in the vocation of their choice. The emphasis on vocational training that is found in American education in general and in the vocational schools in particular is an attempt to meet this recognized need of the community. Some philosophers of education tend to make vocational training the central

item in any program of education. Try as hard as they may to interpret their slogan of "education for life" in as broad a sense as possible, the fact remains that education for life in a capitalist economic community means education for a vocation.

The program of education for the communist economic community is similar to that of the capitalist economic community except for two important modifications. The former must necessarily emphasize the need of indoctrination into the Marxist ideology which means that the system of education must take on some of the characteristics of regimentation in order to transmit the values of that ideology and to elicit obedience to it. As a result the characteristic emphasis on regimented military training and regimented sports appears in Marxist countries. A second difference rests in the fact that there is little need for vocational training after the American plan since there is little competition for jobs in the ideal communist state. The emphasis is rather upon the technical training of selected groups who are automatically recognized as experts and fitted into the complex machinery of the established bureaucracy.

THE DEBATE ON QUESTIONS OF TECHNIQUE

Since educators have not been able to agree as to what system of values should be transmitted or as to what recognized needs of the community should be emphasized, it is only natural that the professional should approach education from the less controversial point of view of techniques of education rather than from the point of view of a program for education. Even though a technique for education constitutes only one phase of a philosophy of education, it is nevertheless a very important phase. Among the problems which have concerned the educator in this field of techniques are those of the role of discipline in educational procedures and of the nature and extent of transfer of training. Translated into the terminology

of the philosopher who regards man as primarily a carrier of values, the first problem considers the extent to which discipline contributes to the growth of values in the experience of the learner. The second considers the ways by which education can aid the learner to expand his range of values.

A. Decisions on the Value of Discipline

Modern education has been frequently criticized by the older members of the community because of its failure to maintain discipline. This is because almost every man past middle age who has been subjected to the strict discipline of the traditional school can recall how new fields of experience and knowledge were opened to him, despite his own desires and inclinations, merely because some disciplinarian forced him to become acquainted with them. He was forced to apply himself until he became acquainted with the fundamentals of language, music, mathematics, geography, or history. Later on, through some miracle of learning, this casual acquaintance blossomed forth as appreciation, an appreciation that serves to enrich a man throughout his life time. On the other hand, there is evidence from the lives of many to indicate that strict discipline has often failed to attain this desired end. It has discouraged some who might otherwise have come to this appreciation under other auspices. It has driven other vigorous and hardy spirits to reject the values that are associated with the experiences of education in preference for the values of the old swimming hole of Mark Twain's youth or the free and easy comradeship of the local pool hall.

Progressive education under the leadership of John Dewey has shown that the growth of values progresses more naturally and efficiently through personal participation in group activities as a matter of free choice as compared with learning fostered by the motives of fear, anxiety, praise, and punishment. Experimental studies of the comparative progress of students

working in an autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire atmosphere indicate that strict discipline of the autocratic type is not as conducive to progress as discipline that is self-imposed. On the other hand laissez-faire groups that were left to their own resources without either guidance or discipline made very little progress.[1] It is generally recognized today that human nature is such that discipline is helpful when it serves to open new doors for possible experiences of value. The growth of values which yields true appreciation, however, cannot be fostered in any other way than through active, wholehearted participation. No amount of discipline can guarantee such participation.

B. Decisions on the Problem of Transfer of Training

If it can be said that educators on the whole have come to a position of general agreement on the question of the role of discipline in education, it must be admitted, on the other hand, that they are farther apart than ever regarding the question of how transfer of training occurs. What is learned in the classroom must transfer to other situations in such a way that there is expansion of the range of values of the students if education is to be effective. The problem of how this transfer can be best effected is one of the vital problems of contemporary education. Professional educators are able to cite evidence at any moment to support their own particular theories of transfer of training. The journals of educational psychology are filled with articles reporting studies of an experimental or statistical nature which throw additional light on the problem.

All are agreed that there is such a thing as transfer of training, otherwise learning would be impossible for the child. The moth never learns to avoid the flame. The child has one experience with the flame, learns to use the term "hot" and henceforth adopts a behavior pattern of caution and avoidance that

[1] Kurt Lewin, "Experiments on Autocratic and Democratic Atmospheres," *Social Frontier*, 1938, 4, 318.

transfers to all cases where hotness is involved. The neurologists tell us that a unit of learning is not restricted to a particular nervous reaction involving one particular nerve or pathway. The same nerve channels may be utilized in many situations involving many kinds of relations. Certain common elements must be recognized in these relations to make transfer possible, but as far as the nervous system is concerned one cannot set limits to the kinds or amount of transfer possible for the healthy organism. The problem for the educator is to offer a curriculum and a program of training that will contribute those common elements which are most amenable to transfer in life situations.

It is on this latter point that educators differ most radically today. Does training in mathematics transfer in such a way that the student attains the ability to reason accurately in general? Does training in Latin transfer to the ability to learn languages in general? Does training in the analysis of the content of the Hundred Great Books transfer in such a way that the student is able to grapple with the problems of our civilization that are analogous to the abstract problems considered in the analysis of these books? It is clear that the issue for the educator is that of a choice between general and specific training. It is an issue that involves a choice between abstract, theoretical training and practical, vocational training. Chancellor Hutchins of the University of Chicago has based his theory of education on the principle that transfer of training is general. John Dewey and his followers have emphasized the fact that transfer of training is relatively specific and depends upon a process of solving problems by action rather than through abstract reasoning.

The studies which have been made by educators indicate that this is not a matter of either-or. It appears that there are no academic subjects which are especially adapted for general training. On the other hand, attitudes, methods of work, points

of view transfer quite readily from the learning situation of the classroom to life situation. Certain skills, especially vocational skills, are very specific and must be learned through doing. The learning of content material is also specific, but in this case transfer can be increased when the common elements in sets of related data are emphasized. Since attitudes and methods of work offer the highest percentage of transfer, it would appear that greater emphasis should be put upon training in techniques of learning in various fields and upon the development of attitudes rather than upon the memorization of content or the mastery of specific vocational techniques. This does not mean that the latter are not important for the specialist, but rather that they should not be central in the procedures of general education.

A shift from the classical studies to the practical and the vocational may entail some consequences hardly foreseen. The liberal arts instruction based on the literary tradition of classical culture had certain psychological effects that tended to influence the student to develop any literary bent or interest that he might have. Initiation into the knowledge of a highly literary but comparatively useless language gave the initiate a sense of being set apart from the common lot. This inspired in him a confidence in his own literary ability and at the same time gave him a sense of responsibility for literary production. As a member of a select literary clique he was expected to make his contribution sooner or later to his cultural heritage. Moreover, it was taken for granted that this contribution would be a literary contribution. As a result a class of scholars arose in Western civilization previous to the twentieth century which had considerable influence in setting standards and in guiding the intellectual life of the people.

With the disappearance of this class of scholars before the rising tide of vocationalism, education tends to become more gadget-minded and less literary-minded. A civilization that is

under the guidance of an educational program of this type may be richly productive of material values and yet barren in the creation of cultural values that result from literary production. It must be recognized that these cultural values may arise from sources other than literary production, for example, through music or other fine arts. The trend appears to be in this direction. It is not generally recognized, however, that this trend may entail a radical shift in Anglo-Saxon culture from an intellectually alert, literary-minded culture to a less critical emotional culture.

Despite the apparently basic disagreement of the theories of Hutchins and Dewey, it is from our point of view primarily a disagreement on the level of techniques. There is some disagreement, to be sure, in their programs of education in so far as the former emphasizes the need for transmitting a system of values inherited from the classical heritage of Western civilization while the latter emphasizes the desirability of transmitting a system of values associated with the democratic tradition. It is no accident that the experimental center for the former group should be in the aristocratic, classical atmosphere of St. John's College, Annapolis, while the Dewey school has been most influential in state-controlled institutions that emphasize vocational training. In both cases our cultural heritage is accepted as a norm, even though there is a difference of opinion as to the relative importance for our age of various systems of value transmitted by that heritage. Neither group is likely to present a philosophy of education which will inaugurate the revolutionary changes in education that are needed today.

CAN EDUCATION MEET THE REAL NEEDS OF MODERN CIVILIZATION?

The lively discussion about techniques and the experimental studies that educators have conducted in this field have produced valuable results. It is clear, however, that no amount of

investigation of the techniques of transmitting knowledge will serve as a substitute for a satisfactory program of education. Under the present situation the educator must confine his use of techniques to meeting recognized needs of the community. He must accept the communities' evaluation of these needs in an uncritical way as they are dictated by the community he happens to serve. The recognized needs of the modern community which education aims to satisfy are extremely varied. They include the need for the transmission of the values of a national and religious cultural heritage, the need for the cultivation of refinement for privileged groups, the need for vocational training for the great masses, the need for the training of the technical expert in the pure and applied sciences. Is it any wonder that the professional educator is in a quandary when faced with this situation? He may follow the traditional pattern of developing a program of education around one of these felt needs of the community. If he is more inclusive in his approach, he may set up a program that endeavors to meet many or all of these needs. The movement in higher education in recent years which emphasizes survey courses for the purposes of general education followed by specialization in vocational and technical fields is a trend in this direction. In both cases, however, the educator remains a functionary of an institution, the conservative administrator of a program for satisfying felt needs rather than the philosopher of education who offers a program for meeting the real needs of modern culture.

Perhaps this situation is inevitable and irremediable. It cannot be denied that the programs for modern education have served to meet the recognized needs of the community in a remarkably efficient manner. Education is popular and deserves its popularity. However, education must be more than popular today. It must be creative. The world will not be saved by the transmission of any set of values or by satisfying the limited needs of a parochial-minded community. Perhaps education

cannot become the source for the creation and the dissemination of a new and expanded system of values. If that is the case, it will become relatively insignificant for the remaking of the future world community. One of the most promising techniques for the establishment of that community will have to be abandoned.

In order that education today may become genuinely creative a new type of educator must arise who will be aware of the values of our cultural heritage but who will nevertheless be free to approach the possibilities of new values of the future in a revolutionary manner. He must recognize that his task is not the task of transmitting a set of traditional values to meet recognized needs, regardless of whether those traditional values are the social values of a particular nationalism, the ethical virtues of a certain class, or the knowledge of how to get ahead in the world. It is that of transmitting an open attitude toward values rather than a particular set of values. This means that the educator will have to give more attention to a philosophical analysis of *real* needs of man today in world society.

We can go no further in this important venture than to offer a superficial catalogue of some of the real needs of our civilization. There is first of all the need for the development of a new type of personality, namely, the world man as over against the provincial or national man. In the second place, there is a need for the development of a hierarchy of values that can be recognized and accepted by all who desire the good life. By this we mean that there is a need for an ethic as a basis for international law and as a guiding principle for the individual. In the third place, there is a need for greater popularization and application of the results of scientific method and discovery in the personal life of man and in social affairs. Modern man should become familiar with the scientific approach so that he can apply it to the solving of personal, family, and social prob-

lems as naturally as he applies the scientific method to the solving of problems of health and economic welfare.

Finally, there is a need for a spiritually dynamic fellowship with an open attitude toward values that would assure an open membership for all who desire to share in this fellowship. Such a fellowship is needed to provide the motivation for arousing man from inertia and for the directing of his energies into socially constructive rather than socially destructive channels. Individual aspiration and initiative are not enough in the world of today. Individual initiative must be developed and channeled by a group fellowship that is world-wide in scope. If this is not done, individual initiative may become potentially dangerous at any stage in its development.

No type of education now available shows promise of meeting these real needs of modern society. In order to meet the first need mentioned above, the program of education of the future must become world centered rather than nation centered. There must be greater exchange of students and professors. Courses in comparative cultures and the sociology of knowledge offer promise in meeting this need. In order to meet the second need of our civilization, greater emphasis must be placed on the study of theory of value from the point of view of social psychology. Systems of ethics in the past have always been based on religious sanctions. Presupposing the secular state and the variety of world religions that now dominate the various centers of culture, there appears to be little likelihood for the application of religious sanctions today unless there is a world-wide revival of religion comparable to that which occurred in the first century of the Christian era. Perhaps further study of the nature of values will enable men of intelligence and good will to agree on the ethical principles for establishing the good life despite religious differences.

With regard to the third need of our civilization mentioned above, namely, the need for a wider application of the sciences,

the situation is more promising. It has been demonstrated that the scientific method is amenable to adult instruction through health clinics, co-operatives, night schools. Moreover, all the peoples of the world are ready to welcome an application of the scientific approach for the solution of their problems. Certainly progress will be made in this direction if in no other. The question as to the direction that this progress will take in the backward and undeveloped countries of the world is another matter. Education will not save the world merely by meeting this one need of wider application of science, if at the same time it fails to educate for world citizenship, ethical responsibility, and religious fellowship.

It is difficult to see how education can meet the fourth need that we have cited as a critical need of our civilization, namely, the need for a spiritually dynamic fellowship with open membership. Only a revival of religion can answer that need. A fellowship of suffering may arise after a future atomic war has destroyed the majority of the earth's inhabitants and driven man to despair. Such a fellowship of despair is not likely to be very dynamic or creative. A fellowship of work may arise in a world dominated by communism. This is the only hope for millions of sincere people. It is a hope that may be realized for some. It can never be realized for all for the simple reason that this fellowship of work is not an open fellowship receptive of standards, values, or insights that are foreign to the communist ideology. Moreover, the fellowship of work aims to unite men on the lowest level of fellowship, namely, that of forced co-operative labor for selfish purposes. Men who have experienced a higher level of fellowship, for example, that of friendship or mutual love and understanding or a fellowship based on co-operative scientific research can never be satisfied with this type of forced co-operative fellowship. The result is that they appear to be critics of the system and therefore deserving of ostracism or death from the point of view of that system.

The fellowship offered by communism is a closed fellowship. If it is successful, we submit, it will be because it takes on a religious orientation hitherto lacking but vaguely promised. If it succeeds in developing a spiritually dynamic fellowship with open membership on its present basis and with its present program, it will indeed be a new development in the long history of man. Every previous fellowship that has been both dynamic and open has been orientated toward God as well as toward man. We suspect that the situation is no different today in this respect than in past ages. Like men in all ages of history, we are brought to the point where we too must make decisions about religion. The concluding chapter will endeavor to clarify the nature of some of these decisions.

CHAPTER XVII

Decisions on Religion

THE NEED FOR SOCIAL, PERSONAL, AND INTELLECTUAL DECISIONS ABOUT RELIGIONS

The religious situation is so confused today that it is a matter of conjecture for one to place a finger on the pulsating religious life of the Western world and designate the exact points of tension where crucial decisions must be made by modern man. One can distinguish at least three areas in which important decisions must be made in religion, namely, the social, the personal, and the intellectual areas. In the social area modern man must decide to what extent the spiritual health, stability and progress of his culture depends upon religion. This is the problem that came to light in the preceding chapter in which we indicated that education must be supplemented by religion in order to meet some of the basic needs of our culture.

If this question as to the role of religion as a sustainer of cultural values is answered in a negative way, it behooves the critic of religion to offer some culturally creative source of values that can serve as a substitute for the contribution previously provided by religion. If the question is answered positively, the additional problem arises as to what kind of religion can serve to sustain and reinvigorate our civilization. Can some form of naturalistic humanism be impregnated with the breath of the "holy spirit" to become the religion of the future as the philosopher Comte predicted? Can some type of secular

ideology such as communism elicit the loyalties and offer the sustaining hopes that religion has customarily provided, and thus be metamorphosed into a new religious movement? Is the source of new creative values to be found in one of the great historic religions; and can this historic religion, for example, Christianity, be sufficiently aroused from its traditional inertia to meet this crucial need of modern civilization? These are some of the questions in the social area of religion.

The decisions that confront the modern man in the personal area of religion are more obvious for they are decisions that face every man in every age. Religion is concerned with apprehension of the total good. It is concerned with apprehending the totality of meanings of the world order in terms of a value system that is recognized as of ultimate importance. Moreover, religion is man's concern for making this total good operative for religious living in the interest of the maximization of values. This means that religion must necessarily arouse devotion to the total good and to the religious object which sustains the total good, that is, to God.

In his personal religious quest modern man does not differ in any significant way from his ancestors. He too must make crucial personal decisions as to the nature of this total good and as to his relationship with God who sustains and creates the values which are so precious to man. He too must make decisions as to what extent he can look outside himself and his society for help and aid in his quest for the maximization of values. In the dreadful loneliness of the cosmos man's heart goes out in search of cosmic fellowship. In the midst of the eternal mystery of existence his mind reaches out with overweening curiosity in search of ultimate truth. In the realization of his own frustration as he gets a glimpse of the realm of higher values which forever elude his grasp, he searches the cosmos for an all-powerful, all-good creator and sustainer of values. And in the guilt of his own soul as he feels the pull of

disvalue on his life, man's cry goes up again and again imploring forgiveness and seeking salvation. Today as always man must make decisions on the question: Is there a God and, if so, how can I have fellowship with him so that my life will be sustained and fulfilled in him and through his kingdom?

One can no more refrain from making personal decisions on this question than one can avoid breathing. The kind of religious affirmation that we make or refuse to make will be based on our experience of values and our sensitivity to values. The kind of religion which we accept and to which we adhere will in turn profoundly influence our experience of values. It may increase or deaden our sensitivity to values. It may create in us an open attitude toward the growth of values or it may act as a prison, cramping and distorting the soul. It may provide for us a rich storehouse of values pointing the way to the infinite growth and maximization of values or it may yield no more sustenance than the crumbs of value of a narrow traditionalism. And when these crumbs of a fixed traditionalism are presented to us as the ultimate totality of the good beyond which all desire, all striving must cease, religion may indeed become a dangerous incumbrance to the growth of values in the personal life of man and in his culture. This is the weakness of any kind of traditionalism.

It is not the part of wisdom to accept the truism that all religions are the same. It is a matter of great importance what kind of religion a man accepts. Religions differ as to the extent of their adequacy in giving us a true picture of the nature of the total good. They differ as to their effectiveness in providing a means by which man can be sustained by this total good. The man who makes the decision, "I believe . . . I trust . . . I yield allegiance and devotion" can do so only after profound, soul-searching inquiry. But whether he desires to do so or not, the fact remains that most, if not all, men must sooner or later say those words and make the decision which

counts beyond all other decisions as man's decision for life and death.

The philosopher is greatly concerned about the decisions that modern man must make in the social and personal areas of religion. However, he shares this concern with many others, for example, the educator, the clergyman, the sociologist, and the psychologist. As a matter of fact these areas of decision in religion concern all men. The third area of decision in religion, namely, the intellectual, is the area in which the philosopher has the greatest responsibility and in which he can make the greatest contribution. We shall consequently devote the remainder of this chapter to a consideration of some of the basic problems of religion which call for crucial decisions of an intellectual nature.[1] Among these problems are the following: (1) The problem of the proof of God's existence. Is there sufficient rational proof for the existence of God to warrant such a belief? (2) The problem of evil. How can one account for evil in a universe that is spiritually directed?

Since these problems are of a controversial nature, we shall approach them from an analytical rather than a constructive point of view. It must be admitted quite frankly that the present confused state of philosophical thinking about religion permits of no other approach in an introduction to philosophy. Since the cultural environment that has influenced all religious thinking in the Western world has been impregnated with Christianity, we have taken the liberty to consider these basic problems in terms of the context of that religion.

THE PROBLEM OF PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

One of the most effective arguments against a belief in existence of God is the argument that if God existed no one

[1] Those readers who are curious as to the author's personal point of view regarding the other areas of decision are referred to *Everyman's Adventure* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947).

could possibly doubt his existence. He would show himself so clearly that no proofs for the existence of God would be necessary. We suspect that the existence of God is accepted as a self-evident fact by most religious people. For this group no intellectual difficulties stand in the way of an acceptance of a belief in God, for as far as they are concerned it is virtually impossible to doubt the existence of God. However, there are always men who must have some reason for intellectual assent before they can yield themselves to positive religious affirmation. Decision regarding the proof for the existence of God is a crucial decision for these men. Philosophers will usually be found among this latter group. We shall offer brief consideration of four of the arguments for the existence of God which philosophers have emphasized during the course of the history of philosophy.

(1) The Ontological Argument. This argument was first formulated by Anselm in the early part of the twelfth century. Its logical formulation is somewhat as follows: We have an idea of the Most Perfect Being. If such a Being did not exist, he would not be the Most Perfect Being. Therefore, the Most Perfect Being must exist. The term "ontology" is derived from the Greek word "to be." As stated above it is clear that the argument moves from the idea of God to his being. This argument has had few philosophical supporters since the time of Kant who pointed out that having the idea of a hundred dollars in one's pocket does not assure us of the actual existence of the hundred dollars. However, the man who has confidence that the human mind is in direct relationship to a universe that is immediately intelligible still finds this argument helpful. The ordinary man who finds that he cannot think of a universe as a cosmos without at the same time thinking of a God has unconsciously been adopting a naive form of this argument.

(2) The Cosmological Argument. Aristotle proved the

existence of God by showing that a continuous series of causes and effects which we see in the universe points to a first cause or Prime Mover. The argument is as follows: Every effect must have a cause. The universe is an effect. Therefore, the universe must have a cause. Kant again criticized this argument by showing that a leap of faith rather than logical necessity is required if we are to move from a chain of causes to an uncaused first cause. This argument draws a distinction between a primary cause of the universe and secondary causes now at work in the universe. Since that distinction cannot be recognized in the scientific approach, the argument is usually recognized as supplementary to another positive argument, the teleological.

(3) The Teleological Argument. Strange as it may seem, the scientific theory that was regarded as most dangerous to religious belief, the theory of evolution, is now regarded as the chief support of one of the classical proofs for the existence of God. This argument runs as follows: Whatever shows marks of design must have a designer. The universe shows marks of design. Therefore, the universe must have a designer. That there should be an order in evolution which results in adaptations that lead onward and upward is itself an indication of design. Scientists are not adverse to drawing this conclusion as evidenced in *The Great Design,* a collection of essays by prominent scientists in all fields, and more recently in Du Noüy's *Human Destiny.* Some scientists are of the opinion that there is no design evidenced in the universe, as is the case with Bertrand Russell. If these men are right in this latter opinion, it must be pointed out that they not only endanger religious faith. They also endanger man's faith in science; for it is one of the basic assumptions of the scientist that the universe is an orderly universe, operating according to a principle of law and order.

(4) The Argument from Values. Throughout this final

section of the text we have emphasized the importance of values. We endeavored to analyze their nature in Chapter 13. In the subsequent chapters we were made aware of the importance of values in every realm in which man was called upon to make crucial decisions in his own personal life or for his civilization. The implications of this approach must now be brought to a head in a consideration of the extent to which values as experienced and carried by man point to a cosmic creator and sustainer of values.

The argument from values may be stated in a theoretical way as follows: Where there is a universally ordered system of values, there must of necessity be a universal orderer of values. Man's experience as an individual personality and as a maker of history points to the reality of a universally ordered system of values. Therefore, there must be a universal orderer of values. If our values are grounded in reality, if they are not merely passing delusions of our own subjective experience, then they must be grounded in a reality beyond man. That reality is a God who is concerned about values.

It is worthy of note that this is the only argument which we have considered which opens the way for a belief in a personal God. The world of nature which sustains man's quest for value need not by any logical necessity be directed by a personal God. The world of values in which God calls us to fulfill the highest possibilities of value is a world of interacting personalities. In such a world we can logically infer that God is personal. The experience of value is the highest aspect of reality that we know. If we get our best clue as to the ultimate nature of reality from these higher experiences of value, then there is no reason why we should not believe that the ultimate reality is a personal God who is a creator and sustainer of values. Since the higher realms of value experience are open only to personalities, it is logical to assume that the ultimate orderer of values is also a "Thou" and not an "It," that is, a

person rather than an impersonal drive, force, or energy.

On the basis of the above argument we are free to suggest an additional step. The revealing process by which God operates is a process by which tensions are resolved in the life of the individual and in the course of history through making decisions about values. We view the great sweeping panorama of human experience seeking out those tension points at which the greatest values emerge. And whatever our race or creed or philosophy may be, our eyes will be forced to rest, sooner or later, if we are at all objective and critical in our value-judgments, upon Jesus of Nazareth and the cross of Golgotha. The "hidden God" of law and promise is inevitably seen with new understanding as the God of the New Testament revealed to man in the tension struggle of Jesus of Nazareth. This may not mean that we know all God's nature. We can never be certain about that on philosophical grounds. It does mean that henceforth we can know the "hidden God," as "holy love"; and perhaps that is all we need to know to find fulfillment of values in life and in death.

No one will suspect for a moment that any of the arguments that presume to prove the existence of God can be regarded as satisfactory. They serve to offer satisfactory rational reasons for affirming a belief in God, so that the philosopher need not be ashamed of his faith when faced with the criticism of his colleagues. They cannot serve to convert the avowed atheist who, it must be admitted, can think up philosophically elaborate and ingenious arguments that carry considerable weight among laymen as well as in philosophical circles. Even the argument from values is based on faith, a faith that man's decisions for value are not mock decisions and that they really matter for the increase of value, a faith that there is an ordered system of values apart from the subjective judgment of one man or apart from the group judgment of a single nation, a faith that the ultimate reality is concerned with the increase

of values. Every man is driven to believe, sincerely and wholeheartedly, what he *can* believe, what he *must* believe; so we shall not quarrel with the atheist if he is sincere. What we can do, however, is point out that most avowed atheists go on making decisions about values. They act and live as if values were important and as if there were some reason for making a selection of values. Some of them, in fact, live very useful and creative lives. We wonder why? We have the suspicion that there is considerably more logic on the side of the believer than of the atheist if this pragmatic criterion for judging be allowed.

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

A. Is Evil Real or an Illusion?

In his famous work *Theodicy*, the philosopher Leibnitz argued that God is absolutely perfect in power, wisdom, and goodness. Since God cannot act without reason and since he is perfect, this rational deity can only choose the best. Thus God's creative activity results in the best of all possible worlds. God is limited in his freedom only in that he is under a moral necessity to choose the best. This argument of Leibnitz focused the attention of theologians and philosophers on the problem of evil. The problem has harassed the philosopher of religion ever since that time. Some philosophers have agreed with Leibnitz that there is actually no evil in the world and that what is commonly mistaken for evil in man's limited perspective actually contributes to the fulfillment of the good in the long run. Others, following in the footsteps of Plato, have found the source of evil in matter which must be controlled and ordered according to the reason of a higher being or beings. Others such as William James and John Stuart Mill have claimed that the struggle with evil is a real struggle. God is a limited God for these men. There is no assurance that goodness may not go down to defeat before the forces of evil.

Theologians who have faced this dilemma have developed

alternatives comparable to those of the philosophers. Those who have emphasized the power of God have been driven to maintain the doctrine of foreordination and foreknowledge, in which case they must logically maintain that God is responsible for evil. Calvin with his doctrine of predestination does not hesitate to accept this radical position. Other theologians who have been inclined to emphasize the goodness of God have attributed evil to the existence of an evil power, the devil, who struggles against God. The difficulties experienced in maintaining this latter position are twofold. There is danger that the devil may come to be recognized as a power coequal in power to God. Certain religious groups, such as the Manichean heretics of the early church, have maintained this position. On the other hand, if the devil is not recognized as an independent power, the problem arises as to why God created the devil in the first place or why he does not overcome Satan through an overpowering victory over evil that would at once demonstrate his infinite power and goodness.

Most theologians, recognizing the insuperable difficulties of this problem, have sought a way out of the dilemma by finding the source of evil in man's sin rather than in the structures of the universe itself. It can be said from the point of view of the philosopher that this attempt to escape the dilemma is an evasion of the problem. The theologian is free to reply, however, that even though he has not solved the problem, he has at any rate placed the emphasis on the point that needs to be emphasized. For even though man cannot do much to combat evil in general or the evils of the natural order of things, he can certainly do something about the evil that has its source in his own choice of values.

The two great historic religions of salvation are Buddhism and Christianity. Buddhism professes to offer man salvation from suffering, while Christianity attempts to save man from sin. The first is concerned largely with cosmic evil. It seeks

to eliminate those disvalues in the natural world which are due to a world in which sickness and pain, hurricane and famine, birth and rebirth are always in operation. Christianity is concerned with moral evil. It seeks to eliminate the hold that disvalue has upon human personality. Going even deeper than this it seeks, somehow, to reconcile man's ingrained selection of and tendency toward disvalue with a God who is the source and fulfillment of all values.

The religious technique by which Buddhism achieved its goal of salvation from suffering was the fourfold pathway by which one learned to renounce the world in order to become indifferent to the round of suffering and desire which afflicted one. The religious technique by which Christianity achieved its goal of salvation from sin was through faith in Jesus Christ by which a change was wrought in the personality, a change which broke the hold of disvalue and provided the opportunity for the infinite growth of values through enhancing sensitivity to values and the strengthening of the will in the choice of values. In line with our method of investigating religious phenomena through the analytical microscope of a theory of value, let us consider the nature of disvalue that we may form some judgment as to the effectiveness of the techniques of these two great salvation religions for overcoming evil.

B. Disvalue as Suffering and as Sin

As the possibilities for the creation of values are to all appearances infinite, so the possibilities for experiencing disvalue are equally great. All men can and do experience suffering as well as joy, pain as well as pleasure, frustration as well as fulfillment. All men are lured by the temptations to sin as well as by the prospects of holiness. There are at least three realms of disvalue that can be clearly distinguished, namely, disvalue as suffering, disvalue as deliberate sinfulness, and disvalue as negative goodness.

(1) Disvalue as suffering. The world of nature sustains but cannot fulfill man's quest for values. Man is a finite creature who possesses an infinite capacity for values. The result is that his experience is always a tragic one. He is limited by his physical organism which is subject to the pain of physical breakdown, old age, and death. He is limited by mischance in the form of loss of position, the bereavement of loss of friends and loved ones, the disaster of mental breakdown. He is limited by the fact that, as a social creature, he may be subjected to the evils of injustice, prejudice, poverty, and war. He is limited by the fact that his life span is insufficient for achieving the fullness of values which he is theoretically capable of achieving.

The Buddhist technique for overcoming disvalue as suffering has never been acceptable to the Western world. As an alternative, Western man has developed the technique of scientific research by means of which he endeavors to understand the natural world in order that he may modify that world as much as possible so that it may contribute to the fulfillment of values. He has been remarkably successful in this venture. Certainly no one would be willing to substitute the Buddhist technique for the technique of modern scientific research. There is no reason why this scientific technique should not be made more and more effective for the alleviation of human suffering. There is no reason why religion should not recognize in science an ally in the struggle against disvalue as suffering. There is no reason why one should not be willing to regard scientific discovery as God's ally in his struggle against suffering. The only alternative to such recognition is to maintain that suffering is not real, that suffering is not evil, or that God is not sufficiently good or powerful to overcome suffering.

It is clear, however, that the problem of suffering is not solved for the religious man even though it be granted that scientific research may attain goals far beyond our highest

hopes in its battle against suffering. The fact remains that man is still limited by his own finitude. The only solution to the problem of evil as suffering is a religious solution rather than an intellectual solution. The philosopher, like every other man in this tragic situation, must learn to trust God and his promised gift of eternal life. If he cannot trust God in this situation, it is difficult to see how he can continue his struggle against disvalue and how he can consistently lead others to fulfill their possibilities for the creation of values. He is more consistent if, like Schopenhauer, he recognizes man's quest for values as a sham and an illusion; in which case he is free to regard the teachings of Gotama Buddha as the highest wisdom. However, let him remember that such wisdom is the wisdom of defeat and despair rather than the wisdom of a Socrates or a Kant.

(2) Disvalue as deliberate sinfulness. There are certain deeds of men and certain attitudes of the heart which are immediately recognized as evil, that is, as disvalues. The individual has a personal intuitive recognition of these deeds and attitudes as disvalues. His experiences of these disvalues are as clear and self-evident as his perception of values. To be sure, the individual who is responsible for perpetrating and disseminating the disvalue may not recognize it as evil. As we say, such an individual is devoid of conscience. The person who experiences the consequences of the evil act or attitude, for example, an unjust act or an attitude of hatred, has no difficulty in recognizing the disvalue as a reality.

Christian theologians have claimed that there is a demonic element in man's personality which tends to make him sin deliberately and maliciously. In other words man is not only a creator and carrier of values. He is potentially a creator and carrier of disvalues. It is this tendency in human nature which has led the theologians to speak of original sin. There is no doubt but that there are men who are powerhouses of evil. It

is interesting to note, however, that they are effective in disseminating disvalue only to the extent that they are masters of deception. When their deception breaks down they are immediately recognized as carriers of disvalue. Shakespeare brings out this truth in his masterly portrayal of Iago in *Othello.* No one is in doubt about the reality of demonic evil at work in Iago's heart once his deception is unmasked.

The Christian technique for salvation is a technique which aims to change the personality of man in such a way that the hold that disvalue has upon the human personality will be unmasked and broken. Christianity has had the boldness to affirm that not only is every man a potential saint as a carrier of values. He is also a potential Iago as a carrier of disvalues. Unless a man has been touched by the creative love of God, there is no assurance that his life will fulfill its possibilities for the creation of values.

(3) Disvalue as negative goodness. It may indeed appear paradoxical that we should consider that goodness could be a disvalue or in any way negative. We use the term "negative goodness" to designate those choices in which an individual or a group accepts and clings to a lesser good in situations in which opportunity is afforded for the liberation of the processes of creativity through choice of a higher value. It is a tragic fact that there is no way by which the relative degrees of goodness can be easily distinguished. The community is reduced to the necessity of setting up its own hierarchy of values based on the long-run experience of the group. This hierarchy of values becomes fixed in the form of a value system composed of mores, custom, and law. This process is inevitably a part of the cultural life of all peoples. If it were not in operation, values could not be transmitted from one generation to another.

It must be recognized, however, that there is a kind of lethargy in social groups, a kind of "cultural lag" which is

analogous to original sin in the life of the individual personality. When this lethargy operates in such a way that it induces man to feel that he has exhausted the possibilities of value merely because he steadfastly maintains the finality of the cultural values of his society and lives up to the letter of the law established by his social group, ample opportunity is afforded for the growth of a negative type of goodness. Men are induced to cling desperately to the little deed of goodness which receives social approval and to ignore or disown the lure of the possibilities for the creation of higher values in their own lives and in the life of their society.

Much of the evil of the world results from the fact that "good" men are dominated by the pseudo-values of negative goodness. This is especially true of social evils such as injustice, prejudice, war, greed, poverty. Wars may be caused by good men who are dominated by the limited values of nationalism. Poverty may be caused by good men who are dominated by the limited values of a legally recognized but nevertheless ruthless system of enterprise which gives rise to monopoly and depression. Injustice may be caused by good men who are dominated by the limited values of loyalty to the working class. Prejudice may be fostered by good men who fanatically cling to the limited values of a fixed system of theology. This is the source of modern man's experience of frustration. It is a tragic experience. When brought under the judgment of the Christian God, the experience is enhanced to the point where it results in either despair or repentance.

Scientific research has given man a technique for combatting, at least to some degree, the disvalues of suffering. Christianity shows us the way by which mankind may win the victory over disvalue as sin. All indications point to the fact that so far no philosopher, no religion, no program for the remaking of civilization has shown how mankind can control or overcome the disvalue of negative goodness. Until that can

be accomplished, civilization as we know it is in danger of destruction.

Modern man is in a position where he must make grave decisions about religion. He must make decisions as to the relevancy of religion for his own personal life and for the health of his civilization. He must decide what authoritative basis is acceptable for him, for this decision will determine his theological orientation and his church affiliation. He must make decisions as to whether the struggle against evil is a real struggle, recognizing that this decision may force him to accept a view of the nature of God radically different from the traditional view. He must make decisions as to how sin and suffering can be overcome in his own life and in the social order, realizing that this decision is a call to faith and action which may lead to the modern equivalent of the stake or the dungeon. The time may come and may be even now at hand in which all men, even the philosopher, must decide what kind of religion will best meet the needs of man in his hour of crisis.

Appendixes

APPENDIX I

An Open Forum as a Laboratory For Philosophy

We considered language as a tool for philosophy in Chapter 3. We emphasized the fact that talking has always been one of the important tools of the philosopher. It is not enough for the philosopher to observe and to reason in lonely solitude. He must also be willing to join in the process of co-operative thinking in the give and take of debate. In order to encourage participation in this type of thinking we suggest that a laboratory for philosophy be instituted by the class after the pattern of radio Town Meetings or similar open forums. In this appendix we offer a program for open forum discussions on some of basic problems considered in the third and fourth sections of the text. The director of the discussions may find it helpful to use this program in whole or in part depending upon the time available and the objectives of the course of study.

Philosophical discussion has been so important in the history of philosophy that philosophers have coined a special term, *dialectic,* to distinguish philosophical debate from other types of discussion. Philosophical dialectic is distinctive in that it presupposes that the participants are trained thinkers. Participants must have the philosophical attitude, they must be conscious of the necessity of avoiding verbal difficulties, they must know how to define terms. The second section of the text aims to afford elementary training along this line. Philosophical dialectic is distinctive in the second place because it has abstract problems for its subject matter. The third and fourth sections of the text, it is hoped, have made the student aware of the nature and importance of some of these problems.

The student must be warned of the limitations of dialectic as a method for philosophy. Talking cannot take the place of observation. The trained dialectician knows this for he never argues about facts. He argues about the interpretation of facts in order to attain clarifica-

tion of ideas. Philosophical debate can achieve the following ends: (1) It can clarify terms by discovering the extent to which terms are used in a vague way to designate the ideas of the participants. (2) It can insist on the development of a system of ideas and can demonstrate the extent to which this system is logical or illogical. (3) It can bring to light what is known by the participants about the problem and can show what remains to be known. In this way we are stimulated to go in quest of further knowledge. (4) It can stimulate us to think so that new and suggestive ideas arise as a result of group participation.

PROGRAM FOR OPEN FORUMS

Participants

1. The student moderator. It is the task of the moderator to see that the discussion continues smoothly and to organize the plan of presentation of the problem. It is also his task to summarize the results of the discussion. The professor may act as moderator if desired. This may be advisable for the first few sessions.

2. A fact finder who does some research regarding the problem. This student must be familiar with the various answers to the problem offered by philosophers. If desired, he can give a short résumé of some of these positions in the form of a brief paper.

3. Debaters. It is the task of the debater to select one of the possible solutions to the problem, think about it in his own way, and offer arguments in favor of this position.

Class Participation

Previous to the open forum all members of the class will be instructed to think about the problem and will be expected to compile a list of five or ten questions which concern them personally and which they hope to have answered in the forum. They may be called upon to ask these questions at the end of the period of debate or, better yet, they may question the individual debaters on problems that have arisen during the course of the discussion. Debaters may be given the first opportunity to question their opponents previous to opening the forum for questions from the floor.

REFERENCE

See: *Forums for Young People* by J. W. Studebaker, P. H. Sheats, C. S. Williams. Bulletin 1937, No. 25, United States Department of the Interior (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1938). Bibliography pp. 105-13.

CHAPTER VI
IMMANUEL KANT AND THE LANDMARKS IN EPISTEMOLOGY

PROBLEM: *What determines the truth of a proposition?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. Correspondence theory of truth: A proposition is true or false to the extent that it corresponds to observable fact.
2. Coherence theory of truth: A proposition is true or false to the extent that it harmonizes with the total system of knowledge in a realm of discourse.
3. Pragmatic theory of truth: A proposition is true or false to the extent that it leads to satisfactory consequences in the solving of problems.
4. Skepticism: Man's quest for truth is a fruitless quest since man is incapable of knowing the truth.

REFERENCES:

Bronstein, D. J., Krikorian, Y. H., and Wiener, P. P., *Basic Problems of Philosophy*: Selected Readings with Introductions (New York: Prentice Hall Co., 1947). See Chapter V.

Frost, S. E., *The Basic Teachings of the Great Philosophers,* "The New Home Library" (Philadelphia: The Blakiston Co., 1942). See Chapter X.

Titus, H. H., *Living Issues in Philosophy* (New York: American Book Co., 1946). See pages 201-10.

CHAPTER VII
SOCRATES AND PLATO AND THE LANDMARKS IN ETHICS

PROBLEM: *What is the greatest good for man and how can it be achieved?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. The kingdom of God is the greatest good. It can be obtained by membership in a religious group.
2. The kingdom of God is the greatest good. It can be achieved through a change of heart which will enable one to do the will of God.
3. The greatest good is self-adjustment experienced as contentment and achieved through knowledge and self-control.
4. The greatest good is self-adjustment achieved through renunciation.
5. The greatest good is self-assertion achieved through development of the intellect.

6. The greatest good is self-assertion achieved through cultivation of sensitivity of feelings.

7. The greatest good is self-assertion achieved through will to power.

8. The greatest good is self-satisfaction achieved through either intense or durable pleasure.

9. The greatest good is self-satisfaction for the greatest number to be achieved by social and economic progress.

REFERENCES:

Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter I
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter III
Titus, *op. cit.*, Chapter XXI

CHAPTER VIII

KARL MARX AND THE LANDMARKS IN PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY

PROBLEM: *What determines the course of history and toward what end does history move?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. Economic theory of history: History is determined primarily by economic forces and the final goal toward which history moves is capacity production of material goods in the classless society.

2. Idealistic theory of history: History is determined by the creative activity of mind at work in the universe. The goal of history is the development of an ideal pattern of institutions as an unfoldment of the Absolute Mind.

3. Circular theory: History is determined by the natural processes of growth, decay, and rebirth which affect civilizations as they affect all other kinds of organisms. History has no goal.

4. Evolutionary theory: History is determined by the evolutionary process of adaption to environment which provides for continuous, even though intermittent, progress. The goal of history is continuous growth within the limits of the natural world.

5. Christian theory: History is determined by the will of God and the goal of history is the kingdom of God.

REFERENCES:

Titus, *op. cit.*, Chapter XXIV
Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter II

CHAPTER IX
ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER AND THE LANDMARKS IN AESTHETICS

PROBLEM: *What is the source of beauty?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. The source of beauty is to be found in an ideal system of order or Platonic forms.
2. The source of beauty is found in relational forms perceived through the senses.
3. The source of beauty is found in natural forms perceived through emotional intuition.
4. The source of beauty is found in the psychological drive toward self-expression.
5. The source of beauty is found in the psychological drive toward play activity.
6. The source of beauty is found in the psychological drive toward wish fulfillment.
7. The source of beauty is found in the cultural atmosphere of a certain age and civilization.
8. The source of the beauty is found in the group appreciation of that which is useful and appropriate.

REFERENCES:

Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI

CHAPTER XI
SOREN KIERKEGAARD AND THE LANDMARKS IN PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

PROBLEM I: *What is the nature of God?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. Radical theism—God regarded as redeemer.
2. Ethical theism—God regarded as ethical order.
3. Deism—God regarded as rational order.
4. Pantheism—God equated with the universe.
5. Naturalism—God regarded as cosmic process.
6. Humanism—God regarded as a projection of man's ideals.

REFERENCES:

Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter IV

PROBLEM II: *How is God related to the universe?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. God is related to the universe as a sovereign who providentially directs all things.

2. God is related to the universe by sacrificial love experienced in the hearts of the followers of Christ.

3. God is related to the universe by means of the delegated authority of a sacred tradition or institution.

4. God is related to the universe by means of the ethical order which he has established, an order which man can know through reason or intuition.

5. God is related to the universe through the rational order of the natural world and through the rational nature of man which enables man to understand this order.

6. God is related to the universe through man's utilization of the processes of creativity in the universe.

7. Relationship with God is established through appreciation of man and fellowship in the community of mankind.

REFERENCES:

Same as Problem I

CHAPTER XII
HEGEL AND THE LANDMARKS IN METAPHYSICS

PROBLEM I: *What is the nature of the universe?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. Idealism: The ultimate nature of the universe is mind or consciousness.

2. Materialism: The universe is a magnificent machine, self-sustained and governed by forces which move according to law.

3. Naturalism: The universe is a growing organism undergoing evolutionary changes.

4. Supernaturalism: The universe is a drama involving a struggle between the moral forces of good and evil and having as its goal the kingdom of God or the fulfillment of God's will.

REFERENCES:

Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter I
Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII

PROBLEM II: *What is the relationship between mind and matter?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. Mind is derived from matter and is an epiphenomenon dependent upon matter.
2. Matter is dependent upon mind and non-existent without mind.
3. Parallelism: Mind and body are independent entities, but both are dependent upon the evolutionary processes.
4. Spiritualistic parallelism: Mind and body are independent entities, but both are dependent upon the total personality created in the image of God.

REFERENCE:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX

CHAPTER XIII
VALUES AND THE PHILOSOPHER AS MAN OF DECISION

PROBLEM: *What is the nature of values?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. Materialistic theory: Values reside in things.
2. Subjective theory: Values reside in the feelings of the individual.
3. Idealistic theory: Values reside in the Absolute Mind.
4. Platonic theory: Values are objective realities existing in the realm of essences and independent of things and of the mind of man.
5. Relational theory: Values arise from the relation between man as a perceiving mind and the thing perceived.
6. Organic theory: Value is the complex of factors in any situation related in such a way as to yield satisfaction.

REFERENCE:
Titus, *op. cit.*, Chapter XIX

CHAPTER XIV
DECISIONS ON THE NATURE OF MAN

PROBLEM I: *What is the nature and destiny of the soul?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. Man is of no more ultimate significance than other organisms. There is no soul and no life after death.
2. Man is part of a world-soul and is absorbed into that world-soul at death.

3. The soul of man is his intellect and he is immortal in so far as reason conquers the emotional and physical elements in his personality.
4. The soul is man's moral will and man is immortal if he is a good man.
5. The soul of man is the totality of his personality as it responds to God and its destiny is everlasting life.

REFERENCE:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter VI

PROBLEM II: *To what extent does man have freedom of the will?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. What a man is and does is determined by heredity.
2. What a man is and does is determined by God's will and ordination.
3. What a man is and does is determined by the natural laws of his social environment.
4. What a man is and does is determined by the class to which he belongs and by the economic mode of production which he utilizes.
5. What a man is and does is determined by free choice.
6. What a man is and does is determined by unconscious psychological urges.

REFERENCES:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter V
Titus, *op cit.*, Chapter XI

CHAPTER XV
DECISIONS ON THE COMMUNITY

PROBLEM I: *What is the ideal form of community or state?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. A traditional religious community based on the values of group worship.
2. The nation state.
3. The racial community based on the values of group unity furnished by pride of race.
4. The capitalistic economic community which fosters progress through competition and individual initiative.
5. The communistic economic community which assures equitable distribution of goods to all.
6. A world-wide confederation of nations as provided by the United Nations program.

REFERENCES:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter VII
Titus, *op. cit.*, pp. 400-421
Bronstein, *op. cit.*, Chapter II

PROBLEM II: *What is the best form of government?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. Theocracy or rule by God through God's appointed representatives, the clergy.
2. Monarchy or rule by inherited leadership.
3. Democracy or rule by the people through elected representatives or by personal participation in governing.
4. Dictatorship or rule by power leadership.
5. Communism or rule by the working class.
6. Anarchy in which no established rule is in operation.

REFERENCES:
Same as for Problem I

CHAPTER XVI
DECISIONS ON EDUCATION

PROBLEM: *What is the purpose of education and what type of school is best suited to provide an education?*

ALTERNATIVES:

1. The purpose of an education is to offer cultural refinement and social status. This can be attained best by an aristocratic school of the type of Eton or Oxford which emphasizes the classical tradition or by some form of aristocratic finishing school.

2. The purpose of education is to train one in obedience and in loyalty to a tradition. This can be attained best by a school which emphasizes the military system of order and discipline.

3. The purpose of education is to train one for a successful career. The technical school and the school which emphasizes vocational training is the superior school.

4. The purpose of education is to acquaint one with the total values of one's cultural heritage. This can be attained best in the liberal arts school which emphasizes a core curriculum with survey courses and a program of general education.

5. The purpose of education is to train one in techniques of adjust-

ment to one's environment for the increase of happiness. The progressive, functional type of school is the superior school.

REFERENCE:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter VIII

CHAPTER XVII
DECISIONS ON RELIGION

PROBLEM: *What is the source of evil in the world?*
ALTERNATIVES:
1. There is no evil in the world.
2. The source of evil is in matter.
3. God is responsible for evil.
4. The devil is responsible for evil in his struggle against God.
5. The source of evil is in man's sinful will and disobedience.
6. The source of evil is to be found in man's unnatural life in civilized society—Rousseau's theory.

REFERENCE:
Frost, *op. cit.*, Chapter III

APPENDIX II

Bibliography

A. ANTHOLOGIES READILY AVAILABLE TO THE STUDENT, OFFERING SELECTIONS FROM THE WRITINGS OF THE PHILOSOPHERS

ADAMS, G. P., and MONTAGUE, W. P., ed. *Contemporary American Philosophy.* 2 vols. New York: Macmillan Co., 1930.

ANDERSON, P. R., and FISCH, M. H., ed. *Philosophy in America from the Puritans to James with Representative Selections.* New York: D. Appleton Century Co., 1939.

AVEY, A. E., ed. *Readings in Philosophy.* Columbus: Adams Co., 1921.

BAKEWELL, C. M., ed. *Source Book in Ancient Philosophy.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907.

BRONSTEIN, D. J., KRIKORIAN, Y. H., and WIENER, P. P. *Basic Problems of Philosophy: Selected Readings with Introductions.* New York: Prentice Hall Co., 1947.

BURNET, J. *Early Greek Philosophy,* 3rd ed. London: A. and C. Black Co., 1920.

BURTT, E. A., ed. *English Philosophers from Bacon to Mill.* Modern Library, 1939.

CARRITT, E. F., ed. *Philosophies of Beauty from Socrates to Robert Bridges.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931.

CLARK, G. H., ed. *Selections from Hellenistic Philosophy.* New York: Crofts & Co., 1940.

COMMINS, SAXE, and LINSCOTT, R. N., ed. *Man and Man: The Social Philosophers. The World's Great Thinkers Series.* New York: Random House, 1947.

———. *Man and the Universe: The Philosophers of Science. Ibid.*

———. *Man and Spirit: The Speculative Philosophers. Ibid.*

———. *Man and the State: The Political Philosophers. Ibid.*

ERDMAN, ERWIN., ed. *Fountainheads of Freedom.* New York: Reynal and Hitchcock Co., 1941.

HOOPLE, R. E., *et al.* ed. *Preface to Philosophy: Book of Readings.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1947.

JANET, PAUL, and SEAILLES, GABRIEL. *A History of the Problems of Philosophy.* Tr. Ada Monchau. 2 vols. London: Macmillan Co., 1902.

Living Philosophies. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1937.

MCKEON, RICHARD., ed. *Selections from Medieval Philosophers.* 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1930.

MUELDER, W. G., and SEARS, LAURENCE., ed. *The Development of American Philosophy: A Book of Readings.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1940.

MUIRHEAD, J. H., ed. *Contemporary British Philosophy.* 2 vols. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1924.

NAHM, M. C., ed. *Selections from Early Greek Philosophers.* 3rd ed. New York: Crofts & Co., 1947.

RADER, M. M., ed. *A Modern Book of Esthetics.* New York: Henry Holt Co., 1939.

RAND, BENJAMIN., ed. *The Classical Moralists: Selections Illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909.

———. *Modern Classical Philosophers: Selections Illustrating Modern Philosophy from Bruno to Spencer.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1908.

RANDALL, J. H., BUCHLER, J., and SHIRK, E. U., ed. *Readings in Philosophy.* New York: Barnes and Noble Co., 1946.

ROBINSON, DANIEL SOMMER, ed. *An Anthology of Modern Philosophy.* New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1931.

ROBINSON, DANIEL SOMMER, ed. *An Anthology of Recent Philosophy: Selections for Beginners from the Writings of the Greatest 20th Century Philosophers.* New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., 1929.

SMITH, T. V., ed. *Philosophers Speak for Themselves: Guides and Readings for Greek, Roman, and Early Christian Philosophy.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934.

B. LIST OF PHILOSOPHERS, TOGETHER WITH SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF WORKS MENTIONED IN THE TEXT

ADAMS, HENRY (1838-1918)

The Education of Henry Adams. Houghton, 1928.

Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres. Houghton, 1933.

ALEXANDER, SAMUEL (1859-1938)
Space, Time and Deity. 2 vols. Macmillan, 1920.
Beauty and Other Forms of Value. Macmillan, 1933.

AMES, E. S. (1870-)
Psychology of Religious Experience. Houghton, 1910.
Religion. Holt, 1929.

ANAXIMANDER (*ca.* 611-547 B.C.)
See Burnet, J., in Bibliography A.

ANAXIMENES (fl. 550-500 B.C.)
See Burnet, J., in Bibliography A.

AQUINAS, THOMAS (*ca.* 1225-1274)
Selected Writings. Ed. M. C. D'Arcy. Dutton, 1939.
Basic Writings. Ed. A. C. Pegis. 2 vols. Random House, 1945.

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.)
Complete Works. Ed. W. D. Ross. 11 vols. Oxford, 1908-31. Student edition, 6 vols.
Selections. Ed. W. D. Ross. Scribners, 1927.
Basic Works. Ed. R. McKeon. Random House, 1941.

AUGUSTINE (A.D. 354-430)
The City of God. 2 vols., Dutton, 1947.
Confessions. Dutton, 1907.
Augustine Synthesis. Arr. by E. Przywara. Sheed, 1945.

BABBITT, IRVING (1865-1933)
Literature and the American College. Houghton, 1908.
Democracy and Leadership. Houghton, 1924.
Rousseau and Romanticism. Houghton, 1919.

BACON, FRANCIS (1561-1626)
Advancement of Learning. Dutton, 1915.
Selections. Ed. M. T. McClure. Scribners, 1928.

BAILLIE, JOHN (1886-)
Interpretation of Religion. Scribners, 1928.

BELL, CLIVE (1881-)
Art. Stokes Ltd., 1914.
Civilization. Harcourt, 1928.

BENDA, JULIEN (1867-)
The Treason of the Intellectuals. Morrow, 1928.

BENTHAM, JEREMY (1748-1832)
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Ed. L. J. Lafleur. Hafner, 1948.
Theory of Fictions. Harcourt, 1932.

BERDYAEV, N. A. (1874-1948)
The Meaning of History. Scribners, 1936.
Destiny of Man. Scribners, 1937.
Spirit and Reality. Scribners, 1939.

BERGSON, HENRI L. (1859-1941)
Matter and Memory. Macmillan, 1911.
Introduction to Metaphysics. Putnam, 1912.
Creative Evolution. Holt, 1911.

BERKELEY, GEORGE (1685-1753)
Selections. Ed. Mary W. Calkins. Scribners, 1929.
New Theory of Vision. Dutton, 1910.

BOEHME, JACOB (1575-1624)
Signature of All Things. Dutton, 1912.
The Way to Christ. Harper, 1947.

BOETHIUS (*ca.* A.D. 480-524)
Consolation of Philosophy. Oxford, 1900.

BOSANQUET, BERNARD (1848-1923)
The Principle of Individuality and Value. Macmillan, 1912.

BRADLEY, F. H. (1846-1924)
Appearance and Reality. Macmillan, 1902.
Ethical Studies. Stechert, 1904.

BROAD, C. D. (1887-)
Mind and Its Place in Nature. Harcourt, 1925.
Five Types of Ethical Theory. Harcourt, 1930.

BROWN, W. A. (1865-1946)
Christian Theology in Outline. Scribners, 1906.

BRUNNER, EMIL (1889-)
Revelation and Reason. Westminster, 1946.

BULGAKOV, S. N. (1871-)
Wisdom of God. Paisley, 1937.

BURROUGHS, JOHN (1837-1921)
Accepting the Universe. Houghton, 1915.

BURY, J. B. (1861-1927)
The Idea of Progress. Macmillan, 1920.
History of Freedom of Thought. Oxford, 1946.

CARLYLE, THOMAS (1795-1881)
Best of Carlyle. Selected Essays. Nelson, 1929.

CARNAP, RUDOLF (1891-)
The Logical Syntax of Language. Harcourt, 1937.
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics. U. of Chicago Press, 1939.

CASSIRER, ERNST (1874-1945)
Essay on Man. Yale U. Press, 1944.
Language and Myth. Harper, 1946.

COMTE, AUGUSTE (1798-1857)
Positive Philosophy. 3 vols. Macmillan, 1896.

CONDILLAC, E. B. (1715-1780)
Treatise on Sensations. U. of Southern California, 1930.

CROCE, BENEDETTO (1866-)
Aesthetics. Macmillan, 1909.
Logic. Macmillan, 1917.

DARWIN, CHARLES (1809-1882)
Origin of Species. Dutton, 1928.

DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596-1650)
Discourse on Method. Dutton, 1912.
Living Thoughts of Descartes. Ed. P. Valery. McNay, 1947.
Selections. Ed. R. M. Eaton. Scribners, 1927.

DEWEY, JOHN (1859-)
Human Nature and Conduct. Holt, 1922.
The Quest for Certainty. Minton Balch, 1929.
Reconstruction in Philosophy. Holt, 1920.
Experience and Nature. Open Court, 1925.
A Common Faith. Yale U. Press, 1934.
Intelligence in the Modern World. Ed. J. Ratner. Random House, 1939.

DRIESCH, HANS (1867-1940)
Science and Philosophy of the Organism. Macmillan, 1929.

DUCASSE, C. J. (1881-)
Philosophy of Art. Dial, 1930.

DU NOUY, LECONTE (1883-1948)
Human Destiny. Longmans, 1947.

EATON, H. O. (1895-)
The Austrian Philosophy of Values. U. of Oklahoma Press, 1930.

EDDINGTON, SIR ARTHUR (1882-1944)
Nature of the Physical World. Macmillan, 1928.
New Pathways in Science. Macmillan, 1935.

EINSTEIN, ALBERT (1879-)
The Meaning of Relativity. Princeton U. Press, 1923.
The World as I See It. Covici, 1934.

EMERSON, RALPH WALDO (1803-1882)
Complete Writings. Wise, 1929.

EPICTETUS (b. *ca.* A.D. 60)
Moral Discourses. Dutton, 1910.

FICHTE, J. G. (1762-1814)
Popular Works. 2 vols. Scribners, 1911.

FOUCILLON, HENRI (1881-1943)
The Life of Forms in Art. Yale U. Press, 1942.

FREUD, SIGMUND (1856-1940)
Interpretation of Dreams. Macmillan, 1923.
The Future of an Illusion. Liveright, 1928.

GALILEO (1564-1642)
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Northwestern U. Press, 1946.

GOETHE, J. W. (1749-1832)
Faust. Dutton, 1928.

GREEN, T. H. (1836-1882)
Prolegomena to Ethics. Oxford, 1899.
Works. Longmans, 1915.

GROOS, KARL (1861-)
Play of Animals. Appleton, 1898.
Play of Man. Appleton, 1901.

HARTMANN, NICOLAI (1882-)
Ethics. 3 vols. Macmillan, 1932.

HARTSHORNE, CHARLES (1897-)
Beyond Humanism. Willett, 1937.
Man's Vision of God. Willett, 1941.

HAYDON, A. E. (1880-)
Man's Search for the Good Life. Harper, 1937.

HEGEL, G. W. F. (1770-1831)
Selections. Scribners, 1929.
Phenomenology of the Mind. Macmillan, 1910.
Science of Logic. Macmillan, 1929.

HERACLITUS (*ca.* 500 B.C.)
See J. Burnet, in Bibliography A.

HERBART, J. F. (1776-1841)
Outline of Educational Doctrine. Macmillan, 1901.

HIRN, Y. (1870-)
The Origins of Art. Macmillan, 1900.

HOBBES, THOMAS (1588-1679)
Selections. Ed. F. J. E. Woodbridge. Scribners, 1930.
Ethics. Ginn, 1898.
Leviathan. Dutton, 1914.

HOCKING, W. E. (1873-)
The Meaning of God in Human Experience. Yale U. Press, 1912.
Human Nature and Its Remaking. Yale U. Press, 1923.

HOOK, SIDNEY (1902-)
Reason, Social Myths and Democracy. Day, 1940.

HUGEL, FRIEDRICH VON (1852-1925)
Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion. Dutton, 1927.
Eternal Life. Scribners, 1913.
The Reality of God. Dutton, 1931.

HUME, DAVID (1711-1776)
Moral and Political Philosophy. Ed. H. D. Aiken. Hafner, 1948.
Selections. Ed. C. W. Hendel. Scribners, 1927.
Treatise of Human Nature. Dutton, 1911.

JAMES, WILLIAM (1842-1910)
The Meaning of Truth. Longmans, 1909.
Papers on Philosophy. Dutton, 1917.
Philosophical Essays. Ed. A. Castell. Hafner, 1948.
Varieties of Religious Experience. Longmans, 1911.

JASPERS, KARL (1883-)
Man in the Modern Age. Holt, 1933.

JEANS, J. H. (1877-1946)
The Universe Around Us. Macmillan, 1934.
The Mysterious Universe. Macmillan, 1944.

JEFFERSON, THOMAS (1743-1826)
Democracy. Ed. S. K. Padover. Appleton, 1939.
Living Thoughts. Ed. J. Dewey. Longmans, 1940.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)
Critique of Judgment. Tr. J. H. Bernard. Macmillan, 1914.
Critique of Pure Reason. Tr. N. K. Smith. Macmillan, 1929.
Kant's Theory of Ethics. Tr. T. K. Abbott. Longmans, 1898.
Living Thoughts. Ed. J. Benda. Longmans, 1940.
Selections. Ed. T. M. Greene. Scribners, 1929.

KIERKEGAARD, S. (1813-1855)
Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Oxford, 1942.
Edifying Discourses. Augsburg, 1943.
A Kierkegaard Anthology. Ed. R. Bretall. Princeton U. Press, 1946.
Philosophical Fragments. Princeton U. Press, 1936.
Stages on Life's Way. Princeton U. Press, 1940.

KORZYBSKI, A. (1879-)
Science and Sanity. Science Press, 1933.

KROPOTKIN, P. A. (1842-1921)
Ethics: Origin and Development. Dial 1924.
Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution. Doubleday, 1902.

LAIRD, JOHN (1887-)
The Idea of Value. Macmillan, 1929.
Knowledge, Belief, and Opinion. Century, 1930.

LEE, VERNON (1856-1935)
Beauty and Ugliness. Lane, 1911.

LEIBNITZ, GOTTFRIED W. (1646-1716)
Monadology and Other Philosophical Writings. Oxford, 1925.
Philosophical Works. Tuttle, 1908.
Philosophical Writings. Dutton, 1934.

LEWIS, C. I. (1883-)
Mind and the World Order. Scribners, 1929.

LOCKE, JOHN (1632-1704)
An Essay on Human Understanding. Oxford, 1931.
The Reasonableness of Christianity. Ferris, 1946.
Selections. Ed. S. P. Lamprecht. Scribners, 1928.
Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Collier, 1910.
Two Treatises of Civil Government. Dutton, 1924.

LOSSKI, N. O. (1870-)
Freedom of Will. Williams & Norgate, 1932.
Intuitive Basis of Knowledge. Macmillan, 1919.
Value and Existence. Allen, 1935.

LOTZE, RUDOLF H. (1817-1881)
Outlines of the Philosophy of Religion. Ginn, 1885.
Outlines of Aesthetics. Ginn, 1886.

LYMAN, E. W. (1872-)
The Meaning and Truth of Religion. Scribners, 1933.

MACINTOSH, D. C. (1877-)
Religious Realism. Macmillan, 1931.
Theology as an Empirical Science. Macmillan, 1919.

MARCUS AURELIUS (A.D. 121-180)
Meditations. Oxford, 1906.

MARITAIN, JACQUES (1882-)
Art and Scholasticism Scribners, 1930.
The Degrees of Knowledge. Bles, 1937.
Introduction to Philosophy. Sheed, 1930.

MARX, KARL (1818-1883)
Capital. Random House, 1936.
Capital, the Communist Manifesto and Other Writings. Ed. M. Eastman. Modern Library, 1932.

MEAD, GEORGE H. (1863-1931)
Mind, Self, and Society. U. of Chicago Press, 1935.
Philosophy of the Act. U. of Chicago Press, 1938.

MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)
Philosophy of Scientific Method. Hafner, 1948.
System of Logic. 2 vols. Longmans, 1894.
Utilitarianism. Dutton, 1910.

MONTESQUIEU, CHARLES (1689-1755)
Spirit of Laws. Lamb, 1908.

MOORE, G. E. (1873-)
Principia Ethica. Putnam, 1907.
Philosophical Studies. Harcourt, 1922.

MORE, PAUL E. (1864-1937)
The Skeptical Approach to Religion. Princeton U. Press, 1934.

MORGAN, C. L. (1852-1936)
Emergent Evolution. Holt, 1923.

MORRIS, CHARLES (1901-)
Foundations of the Theory of Signs. U. of Chicago Press, 1938.
Paths of Life. Harper, 1942.
Signs, Language and Behavior. Prentice-Hall, 1946.

MUMFORD, LEWIS (1895-)
Technics and Civilization. Harcourt, 1934.

MUNSTERBERG, HUGO (1863-1916)
The Eternal Values. Stechert, 1908.

NEWTON, ISAAC (1642-1727)
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy. U. of California Press, 1934.

NIEBUHR, REINHOLD (1892-)
The Nature and Destiny of Man. 2 vols. Scribners, 1941.

NIETZSCHE, F. W. (1844-1900)
Philosophy of Nietzsche. Random House, 1937.

OGDEN, C. K. (1889-)
Meaning of Meanings. With I. A. Richards. Harcourt, 1938.

ORTEGA Y GASSET, J. (1883-)
Revolt of the Masses. Norton, 1932.

OTTO, M. C. (1876-)
The Human Enterprise. Crofts, 1940.

OTTO, RUDOLF (1869-1937)
The Idea of the Holy. Oxford, 1936.

PARKER, D. H. (1885-)
Human Values. Harper, 1931.
The Principles of Aesthetics. Crofts, 1946.

PEARSON, KARL (1857-1936)
Grammar of Science. Dutton, 1937.

PEIRCE, CHARLES SANDERS (1839-1914)
Collected Papers. 6 vols. Harvard U. Press, 1931-1935.
Philosophy of Peirce. Ed. J. Buchler. Harcourt, 1940.

PEPPER, S. C. (1891-)
Aesthetic Quality. Scribners, 1938.
World Hypotheses. U. of California Press, 1942.

PERRY, R. B. (1876-)
The General Theory of Value. Longmans, 1926.

PLATO (428-348 B.C.)
Dialogues. 5 vols. Jowett translation. Oxford, 1925.
Dialogues. 2 vols. Random House, 1937.
Selections. Ed. R. Demos. Scribners, 1927.

POINCARÉ, HENRI (1854-1912)
Foundations of Science. Science Press, 1929.
Science and Hypothesis. Scribners, 1906.

PRZYWARA, ERICH (1889-)
Polarity. Oxford, 1935.

RICHARDS, I. A. (1893-)
Principles of Literary Criticism. Harcourt, 1925.

RITSCHL, ALBRECHT (1822-1889)
Justification and Reconciliation. Scribners, 1900.

ROUSSEAU, J. J. (1712-1778)
Confessions. Tudor, 1933.
Living Thoughts. Ed. R. Rolland. Longmans, 1939.

ROYCE, JOSIAH (1855-1916)
The World and the Individual. 2 vols. Macmillan, 1901.
Philosophy of Loyalty. Macmillan, 1908.
Problem of Christianity. Macmillan, 1913.
Hope of the Great Community. Macmillan, 1916.

RUSKIN, JOHN (1819-1900)
Modern Painters. 5 vols. Dutton, 1907.

RUSSELL, BERTRAND (1872-)
Mysticism and Logic. Norton, 1929.
Let the People Think. A Selection of Essays. Watts, 1941.

SANTAYANA, GEORGE (1863-)
The Sense of Beauty. Scribners, 1896.
Reason in Art. Scribners, 1905.

SARTRE, J. P. (1905-)
The Age of Reason. Knopf, 1947.
Existentialism. Philosophical Library, 1947.

SCHELLING, F. W. J. (1775-1854)
Ages of the World. Columbia U. Press, 1942.

SCHLEIERMACHER, F. E. D. (1768-1834)
Christian Faith. Scribners, 1928.

SCHOPENHAUER, ARTHUR (1788-1860)
Complete Essays. Willey, 1942.
Living Thoughts. Ed. T. Mann. Longmans, 1939.
Selections. Ed. D. H. Parker. Scribners, 1928.

SCHWEITZER, ALBERT (1875-)
Philosophy of Civilization. 2 vols. Macmillan, 1929-1933.

SELLARS, R. W. (1880-)
Evolutionary Naturalism. Open Court, 1922.
Religion Coming of Age. Macmillan, 1928.

SHAFTESBURY, A. A. C. (1671-1713)
Second Characters. Putnam, 1914.

SMITH, ADAM (1723-1790)
Moral and Political Philosophy. Ed. H. W. Schneider. Hafner, 1948.

SMUTS, J. C. (1870-)
Holism and Evolution. Macmillan, 1926.

SOCRATES (469-399 B.C.)
See *Dialogues* of Plato.

SOROKIN, P. A. (1889-)
Social and Cultural Dynamics. 3 vols. American, 1937.

SPENCER, HERBERT (1820-1903)
Synthetic Philosophy. 3 vols. Appleton, 1901.

SPENGLER, OSWALD (1880-1936)
The Decline of the West. Knopf, 1932.

SPINOZA, BENEDICT (1632-1677)
Selections. Ed. J. Wild. Scribners, 1930.

TAINE, H. A. (1828-1893)
Lectures on Art. 2 vols. Holt, 1912.

TAYLOR, A. E. (1869-)
Faith of a Moralist. Macmillan, 1930.

THALES (fl. *ca.* 600 B.C.)
See J. Burnet in Bibliography A.

TILLICH, PAUL (1886-)
The Interpretation of History. Scribners, 1936.
The Protestant Era. U. of Chicago Press, 1948.

TOLSTOY, L. N. (1828-1910)
What is Art? Crowell, 1902.
Living Thoughts. Ed. S. Zweig. Longmans, 1939.

TOYNBEE, A. J. (1889-)
A Study of History. Abridgment of vols. 1-6 by D. C. Somervell. Oxford, 1947.

TROELTSCH, ERNST (1865-1923)
Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. 2 vols. Macmillan, 1931.

UNAMUNO, MIGUEL (1864-1936)
Tragic Sense of Life. Macmillan, 1921.

URBAN, W. M. (1873-)
Valuation. Macmillan, 1909.
Language and Reality. Macmillan, 1939.

VEBLEN, THORSTEIN (1857-1929)
Essays in Our Changing Order. Ed. L. Ardzrooni. Viking, 1934.
What Veblen Taught: Selected Writings. Ed. W. C. Mitchell. Viking, 1936.

VOLTAIRE, FRANCOIS (1694-1778)
Best Known Works of Voltaire. Halcyon, 1941.
Living Thoughts. Ed. A. Maurois. Longmans, 1939.

WEBER, MAX (1864-1920)
From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Ed. H. H. Gerth. Oxford, 1946.

WELLS, H. G. (1866-1946)
God the Invisible King. Macmillan, 1917.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED N. (1861-1947)
Aims of Education. Macmillan, 1929.
Process and Reality. Macmillan, 1929.
Science and the Modern World. Penguin, 1938.
Essays in Science and Philosophy. Philosophical Library, 1947.

WIEMAN, H. N. (1884-)
The Growth of Religion. In collaboration with W. M. Horton. Willett, 1938.
The Source of Human Good. U. of Chicago Press, 1946.

Index

Index

Absolute mind, 202, 214; and idealism, 200ff.; and philosophy of history, 141ff.
Academy of Plato, 114ff., 168
Adams, Henry, 144
Adult education, 235
Aesthetics, chap. IX, 18, 22ff., 30ff.; theories of, 160ff.; social factors in, 164 ff.
Albigensians, 44
Alexander the Great, and Aristotle, 169
Alexander, Samuel, 27, 31, 178, 204
Ames, E. S., 206
Analogy, as a method, 82ff.
Anarchy, ethical, 265
Anaximander, 26
Anaximenes, 26
Anderson, Carl, 181
Anglican church, 199
Antinomies of Kant, 95, 209
Aquinas, Thomas, 7, 11, 27ff., 144, 147, 254, 262, 273, 292
Archelaus, 105
Aristotle, chap. 5, 18ff., 28, 38, 67, 76f., 115, 119, 158, 201, 223, 255, 269, 309
Arrhenius, 179
Atomistic school, 173
Augustine, 11, 24, 146ff.
Authority, as a method, 62ff., 102
Axiology; *see* Value, theory of

Babbitt, Irving, 161
Bach, J. S., 9, 144
Bacon, Francis, 5, 19, 41, 66, 119
Bacon, Roger, 66
Baillie, John, 200
Baumgarten, Alexander, 158
Beethoven, 144, 245
Bell, Clive, 161
Bellarmine, 7
Benda, Julien, 142
Bentham, Jeremy, 23, 54, 119, 124, 212
Berdyaev, N. A., 24, 148, 193
Bergson, Henri, 27, 119
Berkeley, George, 98, 223
Bible, 72, 104, 118; and apocalyptical view of history, 147
Boehme, Jacob, 61, 198
Boethius, 5
Bohr, N., 181
Bosanquet, Bernard, 101, 122
Bradley, F. H., 101, 122
Broad, C. D., 21
Brown, W. A., 200
Browne, E. P., 122
Brunner, Emil, 193
Bruno, 223
Buddhism, 120, 153ff., 265, 314ff.
Bulgakov, S. N., 147, 199n.
Burroughs, John, 203f.
Bury, J. B., 24

Calvin, John, 7, 147, 262, 314
Capitalism, 134ff., 280ff.
Carlyle, Thomas, 142

Carnap, Rudolf, 55
Case study method, 71
Cassirer, Ernst, 101
Chadwick, James, 181
Chase, Stuart, 55
Christianity, 66, 108, 111, 118, 190, 213, 236, 306ff.; and the church, 188ff.; and idealism, 213ff.; and immortality, 256ff.; and philosophy of history, 145ff.
Clarke, E. L., 67n.
Classification, as a method, 70
Clericalism, 274ff.
Communism, 280, 283ff.
Community, decisions on, chap. XV; types of, 272ff.
Comte, Auguste, 7, 119, 205, 212, 305
Condillac, E. B., 98
Confucius, 124
Cosmology, chap. X, 18, 26f., 32
Croce, Benedetto, 25, 163
Cudworth, 23
Cultural lag, 145
Cyrenaics, 23, 122f., 126, 158

Dalton, John, 180
Dampier, W. C., 176n.
Dante, 144, 146
Darwin, Charles, 26, 30, 34, 145, 179
Deductive reasoning, 76ff.
Definition, methods of, 52ff.
Deism, 200ff.
Democracy, 51, 282
Democritus, 106, 130, 168, 172, 174, 180
Descartes, Rene, 98, 219, 254
Determinism, 263ff.
Dewey, John, 21, 23, 29, 31, 100, 119, 120, 165, 206, 223, 295, 297, 299
Dialectic, and language, 37ff.
Dialectical materialism, chap. VIII, 136, 221
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 142
Dos Passos, 129
Driesch, Hans, 27, 176
Ducasse, C. J., 25
Du Nouy, L., 310

Eastern Orthodox church, 199, 285
Eaton, H. O., 31
Eddington, Arthur, 26f., 177n.
Education, philosophy of, chap. XVI, 113; current programs of, 292ff.; techniques of, 294; and discipline, 295ff.; and transfer of training, 296ff.
Einstein, Albert, 26
Eleatic philosophers, 73
Emergent evolution, 178ff.
Emerson, R. W., 23, 122, 142, 203
Emotion, 238ff.
Empedocles, 106
Encyclopedists, 140
Engels, F., 133, 284
Enlightenment, 90ff.
Epictetus, 119
Epicureans, 23, 122ff., 130
Epistemology, chap. VI, 18, 19ff., 32.; theories of, 98ff.
Eschatology, 147
Ethical theism, 199ff.
Ethics, chap. VII, 18, 22ff., 30, 32, 128, 192; of the Bible, 262ff.
Evil, problem of, 313ff.
Existentialists, 122

Fichte, J. G., 122, 151f., 200, 210, 255.
Foucillon, Henri, 161
Fouillee, Alfred, 143

Franciscans, 66
Franklin, Benjamin, 119
Freud, Sigmund, 109, 163, 206

Galileo, 9, 26, 62, 66
Gestalt psychology, 162
Gibson, Boyce, 101
God, chaps. XI, XVII, 27f., 30, 97, 104, 108f., 111, 117f., 225ff., 236, 262, 273; and immortality, 256ff.; proofs for existence of, 308ff.; soul as emanation from, 253f.; will of God, 145ff.
Goethe, 62, 121f., 144
Government, 266ff.
Greek philosophy, 8, 12, 16, 26, 38, 40, 66, 104ff., 111, 167ff., 255; and view of history, 143
Green, T. H., 23, 122
Groos, Karl, 163
Guyau, Marie, 143

Hall, E. W., 29n.
Harris, William Torrey, 212
Hartmann, Nicolai, 23, 243n.
Hartshorne, Charles, 28
Hayakawa, S. I., 55
Haydon, A. E., 206
Hedonism, 122ff.
Hegel, G. W. F., chap. XII, 24, 28, 122, 151ff., 158, 187, 189, 255; and philosophy of history, 130ff., 136f., 141f.
Hegesias, 126, 153
Heidegger, M., 193
Heine, 98, 187
Heisenberg, W., 181
Heraclitus, 26, 106
Herbart, J. F., 161
Herder, J. G., 107, 143ff.
Herrick, C. J., 177n.
Hirn, Y., 163
Historical method, 72
History, philosophy of, chap. VIII, 18, 22ff., 30, 32
Hobbes, Thomas, 23, 222
Hocking, W. E., 28, 202
Hook, Sidney, 101
Horace, 123f.
Hugel, Friedrich von, 28
Humanism, 205ff.
Hume, David, 19, 21, 90, 93, 98, 103
Husserl, E., 21, 101
Hutchins, R. M., 297, 299
Huxley, Julian, 177
Hypostatization, 45
Hypotheses, testing of, 67ff.

Idealism, 99f., 213, 218ff., 237
Ideas, Platonic doctrine of, 113ff., 154, 160; and Schopenhauer, 154f.
Immortality, 125, 256ff.; Plato's doctrine of, 108
Incarnation, doctrine of, 260
Insight, as a method of knowing, 59f., 102
Institutions, 266ff.
Ionian philosophers, 26, 73, 106f., 168

James, William, 28, 100, 222, 313
Jaspers, Karl, 193
Jeans, J. H., 27
Jefferson, Thomas, 119
Jesus Christ, 148, 198, 260, 312ff.
John of the Cross, and mysticism, 61
Johnson, Samuel, 156
Judaism, 198, 256f., 273

Kant, Immanuel, chap. VI, 12, 19, 21, 25, 27f., 97, 118, 151, 187, 199f., 209f., 255, 309f.

Keats, John, 9, 186, 240
Kelvin, Lord, 179
Khayyam, Omar, 123f.
Kierkegaard, Soren, chap. XI, 7.
Kingdom of God, 117f., 125, 260
Korzybski, A., 55
Kropotkin, P. A., 23

La Mettrie, 222
Laird, John, 31
Lange, Konrad, 163
Language, chap. III, 89, 101, 246; misuses of, 41ff.
Lee, Vernon, 163
Leibnitz, G. W., 54, 70, 92, 209f., 313
Lenin, 284f.
Lessing, 25, 201
Lewin, K., 296n.
Lewis, C. I., 21
Lipps, T., 163
Locke, John, 21, 54, 93, 98, 201, 229
Logic, 7, 18, 19, 22, 37, 44ff., 100; as tool of philosophy, chaps. III, IV, V
Logical positivists, 21
Losski, N. O., 31, 243n.
Lotze, R. H., 122
Lucretius, 140
Luther, Martin, 7, 262
Lycaeum, 170
Lyman, E. W., 28, 200

McClure, M. T., 41n.
McGiffert, A. C., 200
Mach, Ernst, 26, 55
Macintosh, D. C., 200
Malthus, 84
Man, nature of, chap. XIV; Christian doctrine of, 258ff.
Manicheans, 314
Marcus Aurelius, 119f.
Maritain, Jacques, 29, 161
Marshall, J. S., 243n.
Marx, Karl, chap. VIII, 7, 24, 150, 214, 284
Marxism, 109, 265
Materialism, 137, 220ff.; and philosophy of history, 140f.; and theory of value, 237
Mead, George Herbert, 101
Metaphysics, chap. XII, 18, 28f., 32, 97
Middle Ages, 19, 27, 44, 66, 75, 147, 272f.
Mill, John Stuart, 19, 67f., 69n., 120, 124, 313
Mohammedanism, 198, 262, 273
Montesquieu, Charles, 23
Moore, A. W., 101
Moore, G. E., 23
Moral law, 96f.; and Fichte, 152
More, Paul Elmer, 161
Morgan, C. Lloyd, 178
Mormons, 273
Morris, Charles, 55, 101
Morris, William, 165
Mumford, Lewis, 39n., 165
Munsterberg, Hugo, 31
Mysticism, 60ff., 102, 253

Nationalism, 272, 276ff.
Naturalism, 204f., 223ff.
Nature, and cosmology, chap. X
Nazi movement, 126, 250, 272, 279f., 286, 293
Neo-Thomists, 28f., 175, 273
Newton, Isaac, 26, 177
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 148, 193
Nietzsche, F. W., 30, 121, 126, 163, 265

Observation, chap. IV
Ogden, C. K., 55
Ontology, 28

Original sin, 258
Ortega y Gasset, 24, 141
Otto, M. C., 205
Otto, Rudolf, 28

Pantheism, 202ff.
Parker, D. H., 31
Pavlov, I. P., 84
Pearson, Karl, 21
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 19, 54, 100
Pepper, S. C., 29
Perception, 57f.
Perry, R. B., 31
Petronius, 124
Philosophy, scope and purpose of, chap. I; definition of, 13; approaches to, 14f., divisions of chap. II
Plato, chap. VII, 38, 128, 150, 154, 158, 161, 168, 171f., 219, 269; as a statesman, 115
Pliny, 68
Poincare, Henri, 21, 27
Politics, philosophy of, 113ff.
Pragmatism, 100ff.
Prophets, and ethics, 104f., 132, 263
Protagoras, 19
Przywara, Erich, 193
Puritans, 273
Pythagoreans, 107, 110

Rathenau, Walter, 141
Rationalism, 92f., 152
Realism, 99
Reason, chap. V, 56, 89, 92, 95, 102, 105f., 238; by analogy, 82ff.; false steps in, 79ff.; soul as, 254ff.; and the syllogism, 76ff.
Religion, philosophy of, chaps. XI, XVII, 18, 23, 27f., 32
Renaissance, 66, 236
Richards, I. A., 25, 55
Ritschl, Albrecht, 200
Rogers, A. K., 101
Roman Catholicism, 7, 147, 175, 199, 273ff.
Roosevelt, F. D., 51, 138
Rousseau, J. J., 23, 92, 121, 269
Royce, Josiah, 23, 101, 118
Ruskin, John, 25, 161
Russell, Bertrand, 19, 100, 206, 310
Russia, 129, 138, 221, 250, 281, 285, 288

Santayana, George, 25, 101
Sartre, J. P., 122, 193
Schelling, F. W. J., 122, 148, 151, 210, 212
Schleiermacher, F. E. D., 212, 229
Schopenhauer, Arthur, chap. IX, 25, 255, 265
Schweitzer, Albert, 142f.
Science, and philosophy, 11ff., 176ff.; philosophy of, 18, 21f., 101
Scientific method, 65ff., 206f.; of agreement, 68; of difference, 69
Scotus, Duns, 255
Sellars, R. W., 101, 206
Semantics; *see* Semiotic
Semiotic, 8, 54ff.
Sense experience, 92, 94ff., 99, 102, 152, 157
Shaftesbury, A. A. C., 23
Simmel, 142
Sinclair, Upton, 129
Skepticism, 102
Smuts, J. C., 178
Social psychology, 101
Social sciences, methods for, 71ff.
Socrates, chap. VII, 8, 22f., 128, 150, 187f., 199f., 292
Sorokin, P. A., 24, 149, 165

Soul, views of, 113f., 252ff.; Aristotle's view of, 175
Space, 181ff.
Spencer, Herbert, 119, 145, 223
Spengler, Oswald, 24, 144, 165
Speusippus, 169
Spinoza, Benedict, 30, 61, 185, 203, 209, 229, 254
Statistics, as method, 70f.
Stern, W., 143
Stoics, 23, 111, 119f., 123
Summum bonum, 23, 27; theories of, 118ff.
Supernaturalism, 225ff., 253, 256ff.
Swinburne, A. C., 203
Syllogism, 76ff.

Taine, H. A., 25
Taylor, A. E., 200
Thales, 26
Theism, 197ff.
Theology, and philosophy, 10ff., 27, 118, 193ff.
Tillich, Paul, 24, 148, 193
Time, 181ff.
Tolstoy, L. N., 162
Toynbee, A. J., 24, 149
Trivium, 37
Troeltsch, Ernst, 142
Truth, theories of, 98ff.

Unamuno, Miguel, 193
United Nations, 110, 286ff.
Urban, W. M., 31
Utilitarianism, 124ff., 212

Values, theory of, chap. XIII, 30ff.; and the community, 267ff.; definition of, 241; theories of listed, 237ff.
Veblen, Thorstein, 139
Vico, 144
Vinci, da, Leonardo, 66
Voltaire, 7, 92, 144, 201
Vries, de, Hugo, 179

Weber, Max, 139, 142
Weismann, A., 178
Wells, H. G., 204
Western civilization, 66, 131, 133ff., 165ff.; and Greco-Roman civilization, 170, 236
Whitehead, A. N., 12, 19, 27, 29, 165, 229
Wieman, H. N., 31, 204
Wilde, Oscar, 124
Will: as Absolute, 152, 154f.; freedom of, 261ff.; soul as, 254ff.
Will to power, 126
Windelband, W., 101, 142
Wordsworth, Wm., 162

Xenocrates, 169

Zeno, 119

Type used in this book
Body, 12 on 13 and 10 on 10 Garamond
Display, Garamond bold

लाल बहादुर शास्त्री राष्ट्रीय प्रशासन अकादमी, पुस्तकालय
Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration Library
मसूरी
MUSSOORIE 100138

यह पुस्तक निम्नांकित तारीख तक वापिस करनी है।
This book is to be returned on the date last stamped.

दिनांक Date	उधारकर्त्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.	दिनांक Date	उधारकर्ता की संख्या Borrower's No.

GL 109
BOY

109
Boy

100138
अवाप्ति संख्या
Acc No. ~~H1100~~

वर्ग संख्या
Class No. _____
पुस्तक संख्या
Book No. _____
लेखक
Author Boyer, M. W. _____
शीर्षक
[illegible] of philosophy. _____

109
Boy
~~H1100~~

LIBRARY 100138
LAL BAHADUR SHASTRI
National Academy of Administration
MUSSOORIE

Accession No. _____

1. Books are issued for 15 days only but may have to be recalled earlier if urgently required.
2. An over-due charge of 25 Paise per day per volume will be charged.
3. Books may be renewed on request, at the discretion of the Librarian.
4. Periodicals, Rare and Refrence books may not be issued and may be consulted only in the Library.
5. Books lost, defaced or injured in any way shall have to be replaced or its [illegible]